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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three self-contained papers on related themes in the
area of formal and social epistemology. The first paper explores the possibility
of measuring the coherence of a set with multiplicative averaging. It has been
pointed out that all the existing probabilistic measures of coherence are flawed
for taking the relevance between a set of propositions as the primary factor which
determines the coherence of the set. What I show in this paper is that a group of
measures, namely the confirmation-based ones, can be saved from this problem if
we adopt a nonlinear averaging function to measure the coherence of a set.
The second paper discusses how people should conciliate in disagreements.
Some epistemologists take linear averaging as the only way of conciliating and
claim that conciliating leads to fallacious results. In the paper, I show that the
problem is not conciliating, but taking linear averaging as the only way to concil-
iate. Since there is no reason for us to insist on conciliating with linear averaging,
we can adopt nonlinear averaging functions for conciliating and thereby avoid the
formal deficiencies.
The third paper focuses on the pragmatic results of taking conciliating as a
general strategy in disagreements. There is a potential dilemma about conciliat-
ing: if everyone always conciliates, it is likely for an epistemic bubble to arise. If
everyone refuses to conciliate, an epistemic echo chamber may appear. A possible
way of solving the dilemma is to develop a diachronic strategy which tells people
how to both conciliate and update their estimate of their interlocutors’ reliability.
Although the three papers differ in the subject, they jointly offer some unifying re-
flections on the way we approach philosophical problems with formal tools. From
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the first two papers, we see that a formal analysis of a philosophical position is in-
complete if philosophers fail to consider a sufficiently wide range of formal tools.
The third paper, on the contrary, shows that we should change the ordinary way
of modelling a notion if required. This thesis concludes by proposing a pluralistic
view of formal methods in formal epistemology.
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A growing trend in contemporary epistemology is to reformulate classical issues
with formal apparatuses. With the help of a variety of tools ranging from modal
logic to decision theory, epistemologists not only reviewed the extensively dis-
cussed problems from a new perspective, but also discovered many new questions
to work on. However, as novelty does not guarantee superiority, epistemologists
need to justify this new approach by scrutinising its crucial features.
What are the advantages of doing philosophy with formal tools? The most ap-
parent one is that these tools allow us to discuss problems with greater clarity
and precision. To illustrate, imagine a case where two agents face a highly ques-
tionable claim and need to decide whether to act upon it. While both of them
neither believe nor repudiate the claim, the first agent is a bit more confident in
the claim than the second. Without some kind of formal tool, it is hard to cor-
rectly capture the exact nature of this case. Traditionally, epistemologists adopt a
tripartite framework of beliefs, under which an agent can only be in three doxastic
states concerning a proposition: believe, disbelieve or suspend judgement. Since
both agents in the example neither believe nor repudiate the claim, they can only
be taken as suspending judgement regarding the claim. The difference between
them, hence, is beyond the expressive power of a tripartite framework. For the
traditional framework to correctly represent the case, we might expand it with
a new state of ‘slightly more confident than suspending judgement’. Without a
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fourth doxastic state, one cannot correctly represent the difference between the
two agents under a traditional framework.
Expanding a framework piecemeal in this fashion by adding more doxastic
states is not really a satisfactory solution. If, in the example given, there is a third
agent who is even more confident than the first agent yet still does not believe the
questionable claim wholeheartedly, we would have to expand the framework with
one more state to represent the doxastic state of this new agent. We can thus see
that a traditional framework always runs the risk of being incomplete. No matter
how many different doxastic states are included, it is always possible for a tradi-
tional framework to lack the proper doxastic state to represent a case correctly.
Compared to the traditional framework, a probabilistic framework, namely one
which formalises the notion of belief with probability theory, provides an easier so-
lution. Under a probabilistic framework, we can take the agents as having different
degrees of belief and reformulate their doxastic states with numbers in between 0
and 1. When we say that the first agent, compared to second one, is more confident
in the disputed claim, one may take her as having greater credence than the sec-
ond agent. By formulating their doxastic states this way, we do not have to expand
the framework every time a new doxastic state appears. As we can see, formal
tools provide us with a more fine-grained framework and make it possible for us
to carry out detailed discussions.
Apart from being good apparatuses for descriptive purposes, doing philosoph-
ical research with formal tools brings us another significant benefit. When we re-
formulate a notion with a formal theory, the constraints that can be derived from
the theory could be taken as the constraints of the notion. In other words, from the
formal theories we adopt to formalise philosophical notions, we can derive norms
governing the notions we aim to capture.
We may thus see that the formal tools play two roles in philosophical research.
On the one hand, they provide us with frameworks that are descriptively more ac-
curate which facilitate and deepen our discussion concerning philosophical con-
cepts. On the other hand, they may serve as additional sources generating norms
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about the notions we modelled. For these reasons, formal philosophy should be
taken as a promising approach which generates significant results.
There are, however, some potential worries that accompany this approach.
When one formulates a philosophical view with some formal tools and finds the
view formally incorrect, it is not only possible that the theory is indeed wrong,
but also well possible that the formal tools adopted are not the right tools for for-
mulating the theory and hence bring up the problem. If we fail to spot where the
problem really lies, we may attain an incorrect understanding of the theory mod-
elled. Adopting formal tools to do philosophy, instead of bringing us forward in
philosophical research, may lead us astray.
To avoid getting such an undesirable result, we should explore a sufficiently
wide range of formal apparatuses when dealing with philosophical disputes. Then
if we have formulated a theory with the ideal formal tool and obtain the conse-
quence that the theory, formulated in the correct way, is mistaken, we may safely
claim that the theory is indeed incorrect.
This thesis consists of three essays in formal epistemology, each of which in-
dividually contributes to a particular formal challenge in epistemology. Jointly,
the essays highlight the fact that problems may arise when epistemologists ne-
glect alternative ways of modelling a notion. In chapters two and three, I examine
two formal approaches to issues in both traditional and social epistemology. With
the cases I present, it can be seen that some philosophers overlook the deficien-
cies of the formal apparatuses they adopt and thus mistakenly take the incorrectly
formalised philosophical position as problematic. Chapter four, compared to the
other chapters, looks a bit like an outlier. It does not show that epistemologists
mistakenly take the problem of a formal tool as the problem of a philosophical
position. Instead, what it shows is that we should try out different ways of for-
malising the well known notions and explore possible ways to solve the problems
surrounding them. Still, it is in accordance with the basic tenet of this thesis that
we have to carefully reflect on the way we formulate philosophical notions, even
for those that we are familiar with, and make substantial revisions when needed.
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In conclusion, the overall upshot of the project, apart from making progress on
three important problems in formal epistemology, is to call attention to the impor-
tance of exploring a variety of formal apparatuses. With a complete understanding
of the formal tools we apply, we can correctly spot where the problem lies and tell
whether it is the philosophical theory or the tool for formalising that is flawed. In
the following sections, I will briefly introduce the three projects in this thesis.
1.1 Saving the confirmation-based measures of coher-
ence
Philosophers have been trying to characterise the notion of coherence for decades.
With this notion correctly defined, we may have a better understanding of both
the notion of truth and the notion of justification. Some philosophers approach
this issue from a comparative perspective and aim to establish a way of measur-
ing the coherence of a set of propositions (Shogenji, 1999; Olsson, 2002; Fitelson,
2003; Douven and Meijs, 2007; Roche, 2013). If, according to an ideal measure of
coherence, a greater degree of coherence of a set indicates a greater likelihood of
truth, we may obtain a theory of truth based on the notion of coherence. Similarly,
if a greater degree of coherence of a set indicates a greater degree of justification,
we may account for the notion of justification in terms of coherence.
Most measures of coherence take the relevance between the propositions as the
core factor determining the coherence of a set. If the contents of a set of propo-
sitions overlap to a great extent, we take the propositions as highly relevant and
thus highly coherent. However, Koscholke and Schippers (2019) point out that the
relevance-sensitive measures are flawed for failing to deal with cases where a com-
mon cause of a set appears. Given a set of relevant propositions, when a common
cause of all these propositions appears and taken as background knowledge, the
relevance between these propositions would be screened-off (Reichenbach, 1956).
If we adopt the relevance-sensitive measures to calculate the coherence of such a
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set, we will get the counterintuitive result that the propositions are irrelevant to
each other, and, since coherence is measured in terms of relevance, the set is nei-
ther coherent not incoherent. Moreover, if we, instead of taking a common cause
as background knowledge, expand the set with the common cause, we would get
another problematic result that a set may become less coherent when a common
cause appears. Based on the two observations, Koscholke and Schippers conclude
that epistemologists should give up the relevance-sensitive measures.
In this second chapter, I provide an overview of the search for an ideal prob-
abilistic measure of coherence and raise some issues with the measures that have
been established. It should be noted that, as coherence measures were the focus
of my MSc dissertation, there is inevitably some overlap in the background dis-
cussion of existing coherence measures. With a thorough understanding of the
literature, I will move on to reexamine the two problems Koscholke and Schippers
(2019) raised. The crucial problem, as I will show, is not that the coherence of a
set is measured in terms of relevance, but that the function we endorse lacks some
important features. If we adopt a different averaging function which bears the re-
quired property to derive the result, the problem of common cause can be solved.
As a consequence, it should still be allowed to measure the coherence of a set in
terms of the relevance between the propositions in the set.
Koscholke and Schippers’ criticism is a typical case in which epistemologists
neglect the possibility of adopting a different formal apparatus and end up with a
hasty conclusion. If we are aware of the blind spot in their reasoning and consider
a sufficiently wide range of formal tools, we may correctly locate the problem and
reach a more moderate, yet more accurate conclusion. The project of searching for
an appropriate measure of coherence, thus, can be saved.
1.2 Beyond Linear Conciliation
An extensively discussed problem in the study of social epistemology is peer dis-
agreement: when a person disagrees with her epistemic peer, how should she re-
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act? The epistemologists who endorse the Conciliatory View advise one to concil-
iate with the peer. Since one’s interlocutor is one’s epistemic peer who is equally
likely to form a correct credence in the disputed claim, one should be epistemi-
cally modest and revise one’s credence. On the contrary, some others claim that
one should remain steadfast. When one’s interlocutor forms a credence which dif-
fers from one’s own credence, one may think that the interlocutor suffers from
some cognitive defect. Hence, one should remain steadfast in the face of the dis-
agreement. Since both views are supported by some strong arguments, the debate
over an ideal solution to peer disagreement has not yet been settled.
In chapter three, I focus on a series of arguments against the Conciliatory View
based on its formal features. Formal epistemologists criticise this view for a num-
ber of reasons. It is non-commutative with conditionalisation; it is path depen-
dent, and it does not preserve the independence between propositions (Fitelson
and Jehle, 2009; Gardiner, 2014; Elkin and Wheeler, 2018a). Failing to commute
with conditionalisation means that one may switch the order between conciliating
and conditionalising and obtain different outcomes. Failing to be path indepen-
dent means that the outcome of conciliation varies with the order of the acquisition
of new testimonies. Failing to preserve the independence between propositions
means that one may suffer from a sure-loss and hence be deemed irrational. The
three formal deficiencies urge people to abandon the Conciliatory View.
What I aim to show in this chapter is that the Conciliatory View can be saved
if we conciliate with nonlinear averaging functions. Research in the study of opin-
ion pooling shows that the three deficiencies are not problems of the Conciliatory
View, but problems of linear averaging (Genest, 1984; Dietrich and List, 2016).
Hence, one can get rid of these formal deficiencies by making conciliation with
nonlinear averaging functions. After showing how the three deficiencies can be
avoided, I will explore the features of nonlinear averaging functions and argue
that they have properties that correctly capture people’s intuitions concerning dis-
agreement. The conclusion, therefore, is to suggest epistemologists develop a more
fine-grained taxonomy for cases of disagreement. With a deliberate categorisation
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of different kinds of disagreement, epistemologists can pick the proper averaging
rule to apply in each specific case, and eliminate possible formal deficiencies.
Chapter three again provides a case where epistemologists misfire. The real tar-
get of their argument is the proposition that the Conciliatory View is formally defi-
cient if we conciliate with linear averaging, rather than the much stronger proposi-
tion that making conciliation, in general, leads to formal fallacies. By emphasising
this fact, it can be shown that, for an argument concerning the formal features of
a philosophical position to be valid, we must carefully consider sufficiently many
ways of formalising the position.
1.3 Escaping an Echo Chamber
One way of evaluating different views concerning peer disagreement is to see the
consequences of adopting each view. For example, if adopting the Conciliatory
View leads to a defective epistemic community in which people are vulnerable
to misinformation, we would have a reason to reject the Conciliatory View. A
striking result is that when a group of people adopt the Conciliatory View, it would
be quite likely for the group to form an epistemic bubble, namely a community
with insufficient exposure to a diverse set of information sources. However, if one
rejects the Conciliatory View and adopt the Steadfast View instead, it would be
extremely likely for one to end up in an epistemic echo chamber, a community in
which the members deem every external source of information unreliable. Hence,
there seems to be a dilemma concerning whether to conciliate.
I will unpack this dilemma in chapter four. According to Christensen (2011),
the mainstream views concerning peer disagreement can be categorised into two
groups: the ones which suggest one to conciliate and the ones which do not. The
crucial distinction between them is marked by the Principle of Independence: one
needs to have a dispute-independent reason to deem one’s interlocutor unreliable.
The views conforming to this principle are the conciliatory ones, while the views
violating it can be categorised as variants of the Steadfast View. By narrowing
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down the debate to the principle, we may, according to Nguyen’s (2018) analyses
of an epistemic bubble and an echo chamber, show that the Principle of Inde-
pendence leads to a dilemma. After the dilemma is introduced, I will provide a
possible solution based on an alternative understanding of reliability. If one fol-
lows the new strategy, the probability of one ending up in a defective community
could be reduced. We may hence discuss the problem of disagreement from a new
perspective and hopefully derive better solutions.
The core of my solution is an alternative formulation of the notion of reliability.
The standard treatment of this notion takes it as the probability of one having the
correct doxastic state. This formulation, however, leads to some strange results
and thus cannot fully capture our ordinary understanding of reliability. To solve
the problem, I propose a different understanding of the notion which, on the one
hand, better fits the formal framework we adopt and, on the other hand, sheds
light on a new response to the problem of peer disagreement. Again, the discussion
about reliability shows that what we need is to consider different possible ways
of formalising a philosophical notion. If we stick to the standard treatment, it
would be hard to solve the dilemma. We may thus reaffirm the central tenet of this







The notion of coherence has long played a central role in philosophy. On the one
hand, some philosophers appeal to this notion to provide an account of truth,
claiming that a true proposition must cohere with other true propositions. A
highly coherent set, therefore, is very likely to be true. On the other hand, some
take this notion to explain the nature of epistemic justification, arguing that a
proposition is justified only if it is an element of a coherent set. Due to its philo-
sophical significance, philosophers made various attempts to clarify the nature of
the notion of coherence. This chapter focuses on one specific question: what is the
proper way for us to compare the degree of coherence between different sets of
propositions?
It should be noted that this question implicitly takes coherence as a graded
notion. That is, the coherence of a set is not an all-or-nothing notion, but comes
in different degrees. What we would like to obtain is a proper method to compare
the degree of coherence between different sets of propositions. If we can find an
ideal measure to correctly capture this notion, we may further explore the features
of the notion of coherence and derive philosophically significant results from the
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method developed.
Many philosophers have tried to answer this question (Shogenji, 1999; Olsson,
2002; Fitelson, 2003; Douven and Meijs, 2007; Roche, 2013). However, all these
measures are flawed in some aspects and thus fail to capture some of our intuitive
understanding of coherence. Moreover, Koscholke and Schippers (2019) point out
that all these measures yield an incorrect result if they take the relevance between
the elements of a set as a factor determining the coherence of the set: given a
set of propositions, when a common cause of the set of propositions appears, the
relevance between the propositions would be screened-off. Hence, if we take the
relevance of a set of propositions as a factor determining the coherence of the set,
we would have to accept the counterintuitive result that, once the common cause
of a set appears, the degree of coherence of the set becomes zero, which implies
that the set is neither coherence nor incoherent. As most coherence measures take
the relevance between propositions as the crucial factor determining the coher-
ence of a set, Koscholke and Schippers’ challenge seems to destroy the project of
measuring coherence.
Although Koscholke and Schippers’ argument looks convincing, it does not
bring an end to the search for a proper measure of coherence. The crucial problem
of the relevance-sensitive measures of coherence, as I will show, is that the number
of mutual confirmations between propositions is not taken into account. If we can
develop a measure which generates the result that the degree of coherence of a set
increases with the number of mutual confirmation between elements, we may get
rid of Koscholke and Schippers ’ challenge.
In the following sections, I will first make a thorough review of the role of co-
herence in contemporary epistemology and introduce several traditional accounts
concerning this notion.1 With a complete survey of the defining features of this
notion, I will move on to reexamine previous attempts at measuring coherence in
1Since the coherence measures were the focus on my MSc dissertation, part of the review of
existing coherence measures in this chapter inevitably overlaps with what I wrote in my previous
work. However, this section has all been developed, refined and extended. Also, the positive
proposal in this chapter is entirely new.
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terms of the probability of propositions. All these attempts, however, are unsat-
isfactory in some respects. After the relevant issues are clearly presented, I will
propose a new way of measuring coherence which satisfies most of our intuitive
requirements of an ideal coherence measure and, more importantly, is free from
Koscholke and Schippers’ criticism. By measuring coherence with this new mea-
sure, we can secure the project of measuring coherence and derive further results
that are epistemically significant.
2.2 Two uses of coherence
2.2.1 The coherence theory of truth
The coherence theory of truth was originally proposed as an alternative to the
more widely accepted correspondence theory of truth. To gain a thorough under-
standing of the coherence theory of truth and grasp the motivating idea behind
it, we should begin with a comparison between the two theories.2 The basic idea
of the correspondence theory of truth is rather straightforward: for a proposition
to be true, it must stand in a specific relation, namely correspondence, to some
entities in reality. According to this theory, for the proposition ‘F. Scott Fitzgerald
is the author of The Great Gatsby’ to be true, there must be a fact, namely the very
fact that Fitzgerald wrote The Great Gatsby, which corresponds to the proposition
and makes it true.3 In other words, the truth-condition of a proposition is the ob-
taining of the corresponding fact in reality. Given this account, we know what it
means for a proposition to be true.
One of the primary obscurities of the correspondence theory lies in the mys-
terious relation of correspondence. How does a proposition, an abstract entity,
correspond to something in reality? For entities in the same category, it is compar-
2There are other theories of truth, such as pragmatic and deflationary. Since we do not have
to know these theories to understand the underlying rationale of the coherence theory, there is no
need to introduce these theories here.
3Recent discussions of the correspondence theory of truth take truthmakers, rather than facts,
as the entity corresponded by the truth-bearer (Mulligan et al., 1984). For the sake of simplicity, I
reformulate the view in its rudimentary form which takes facts as the truthmakers in reality.
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atively easy to figure out the relation between them. Suppose there is a ball and a
table. The ball may be on the table, beneath it, or stand in some other relations to
the table. Since the table and the ball belong to the same category, people generally
do not find the relation between them confusing. Similarly, it is not hard for peo-
ple to sort out the relation between propositions. A proposition can bear several
different relations to another. It can be the cause, the logical consequence or inde-
pendent from another proposition. All these relations are complicated, but not as
obscure as the cross-category correspondence relation between a proposition and
a fact. Propositions are linguistic entities, while facts are not.4 Since they belong
to different ontological categories, the main challenge for the correspondence the-
orists is to explain the way propositions correspond to facts. Instead of trying to
provide an account for the correspondence relation, some philosophers approach
the notion of truth in a different way. They give up the idea that a proposition can
bear a relation to entities in a different category and, as a result, embrace the view
that the truth-condition of a proposition consists in its relation to other entities in
the same category, namely other propositions. They claim that if a set of proposi-
tions ‘hang together well’, then they are true. By expanding this idea, philosophers
develop the coherence theory of truth.
How does the notion of coherence account for the notion of truth? The coher-
entists argue that true propositions cannot contradict each other. For example, the
true proposition that ‘The English army won the Battle of Agincourt’ is compati-
ble with other true propositions about the Battle of Agincourt, such as ‘The French
were defeated in the Battle of Agincourt.’ On the other hand, it is incompatible
with false propositions like ‘The English army did not win the Battle of Agincourt.’
Following this line of reasoning, all the propositions that are true should form a
set such that all the elements of it can be simultaneously true. Moreover, since all
these true propositions describe the same reality, they would provide evidential
4Here I take propositions as the truth-bearer in the current discussion, which are linguistic en-
tities. Some philosophers might criticise my formulation of the correspondence theory by claiming
that propositions belong to the same category as facts. My response to this criticism is that what-
ever one takes the truth-bearers to be, they belong to a different category from the entities they
correspond to.
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support for each other. Consider a toy example:
(1) The English army won the Battle of Agincourt.
(2) King Henry V of England led the English troops into the Battle of Agincourt.
(3) King Henry V commanded well in the Battle of Agincourt.
None of these propositions entails another but they do confirm each other to some
extent. Given (2) and (3), (1) becomes more likely to be true. We may, from this
example, see that a set of true propositions that correctly depict reality should
support each other and be very coherent. Hence, if a set of propositions cohere
well with a true proposition, these propositions are likely to be true. The notion
of coherence, hence, can be an useful indicator for the truth of some propositions.
Once we find a highly coherent set which contains a true proposition, it is likely
that all other propositions in the set, apart from the one known to be true, are also
true.5
2.2.2 The coherence theory of justification
Epistemologists who give an account of epistemic justification in terms of coher-
ence are motivated by a different debate. They aim to answer a fundamental ques-
tion in epistemology: under what condition can we say that a proposition is jus-
tified? A straightforward answer to this question is that a proposition is justified
when there is another proposition supporting it. In other words, there needs to be
a justifier for that proposition. However, since we intuitively think that a justifier
should itself also be justified, we need another justifier for the first justifier. Thus,
for a proposition to be justified, there has to be a chain-like structure consisting of
justifiers such that the justified proposition stands on one end of the chain. This
structure of justification naturally gives rise to a question: how does such a chain
of justifiers come to an end? There are, given our ordinary understanding of a
5Note that a proposition belonging to a highly coherence set could still be false, given that other
propositions are not true. That is, the notion of coherence alone does not guarantee the truth of a
proposition.
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chain, three possibilities. First, a chain may extend infinitely and never reach an
end. Second, it may stop at some point. Third, it may circle back to some previ-
ous propositions. The three ideas respectively evolve into three different theories
about justification: infinitism, foundationalism and coherentism. Supporters of
infinitism accept the result that epistemic justification is an infinite chain, while
foundationalists claim that the chain stops at some particular propositions. If one
accepts the former, one needs to explain how could an infinite regress be innocu-
ous. If one accepts the latter, she needs to explain the nature of the end-points
of a justification chain. Coherentists take the third route: they allow the chain to
circle back and link to some proposition already in the chain. They claim that if
the chain is long enough, it is acceptable that a proposition justifies a proposition
in the same chain of justification.6 Hence, if a proposition is involved in a very
coherent set in which every proposition is justified by at least a proposition in the
set, we may accept all the propositions on the chain as justified.
2.2.3 Characterising coherence
Serving as an explanation of truth and justification, the notion of coherence plays
an crucial role in contemporary epistemology. However, an important question
remain unanswered: what is coherence? Although we do seem to have a rough
idea concerning a set of propositions ‘hanging together’, it is rather vague how this
basic understanding allows us to derive a complete account for both the notion
of truth and justification. To make the notion useful, we need a more accurate
formulation.
The rudimentary versions of the coherence theory equate the notion of coher-
ence with consistency and hold that a proposition is true if and only if it is a mem-
ber of a consistent set. As long as a logically closed set of propositions does not
6Rorty (1979, p.178) explains the idea clearly by saying that
‘...nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what we already accept, and
that there is no way to get outside our propositions and our language so as to find
some test other than coherence.’
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include any pair of contradictory propositions, it is coherent. Although this def-
inition of coherence correctly captures a basic aspect of coherence, it is far from
adequate. For any non-maximal consistent set, we may find a pair of contradictory
propositions which are both consistent with the set.7 To illustrate, consider a set
𝑆1 which contains the following three propositions:
(𝑝1) Jay Gatsby owns a mansion.
(𝑝2) Jay Gatsby owns a yellow Rolls-Royce.
(𝑝3) Jay Gatsby inherited a large amount of money from Dan Cody.
The set 𝑆 is consistent as its elements and their logical consequences do not con-
tradict with each other. If we take coherence as consistency, the set is coherent.
Now consider two further propositions:
(𝑝4) Tom Buchanan went to Yale.
(𝑝5) Tom Buchanan did not go to Yale.
Both (𝑝4) and (𝑝5) are consistent with 𝑆1. If we simply define the notion of co-
herence as consistency, both 𝑆1 ∪ {𝑝4} and 𝑆1 ∪ {𝑝5} are coherent. If we adopt the
coherence theory of truth, we should accept that all the members of a coherent set
are true. Since both 𝑆1 ∪ {𝑝4} and 𝑆1 ∪ {𝑝5} are coherent, we may derive the result
that both 𝑝4 and 𝑝5 are true. However, since 𝑝4 contradicts 𝑝5, it is impossible for
both 𝑝4 and 𝑝5 to be true. We may thus see that the notion of coherence, if equated
to consistency, cannot be taken as a proper account for the notion of truth. Coher-
entists must seek further conditions to define the notion of coherence in a more
precise way.
A much stronger account, proposed by Ewing (1934), takes entailment as the
defining feature of coherence: a set is coherent if every proposition in it logically
follows from all other propositions in the set taken together. Consider a set com-
posed of three propositions 𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2. In this set, 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 follows from the
7A maximal set is one such that for every proposition 𝑝, either 𝑝 or ¬𝑝 is in the set.
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rest of the set, namely {𝑝2,𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2}. Similarly, 𝑝2 follows from the set {𝑝1,𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2}.
The last proposition 𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2 also follows from the conjunction of the rest of the
set, namely the conjunction of 𝑝1 and 𝑝2. According to Ewing’s definition, this is a
coherent set. However, this account sets a very demanding standard for coherence
which can only be met by a limited range of sets. Consider the set 𝑆1 in the pre-
vious example. Intuitively, the set is highly coherent as all its elements show that
Gatsby is a rich person. But since none of them entails the other propositions, the
set does not satisfy Ewing’s definition. It can thus be seen that this definition of
coherence is overly narrow and fails to include many intuitively coherent sets.
Lewis (1946) provides a definition for coherence which can be regarded as a
weaker version of Ewing’s.8 He claims that for a set of propositions 𝑆 to be coher-
ent, it should satisfy the condition that for any proposition 𝑝 which is an element
of 𝑆, if all other elements in 𝑆 are assumed as true, the probability of 𝑝 raises. That
is, the probability of the proposition 𝑝 conditioning on 𝑆1∖{𝑝} is greater than the
unconditional probability of 𝑝.9 This definition of coherence is preferred to Ew-
ing’s as it is less strict. The notion Lewis appeals to in order to define coherence is
probability raising, rather than the much stronger logical entailment. We may con-
sider the Gatsby example again to see this point. The proposition 𝑝1 indicates that
Jay Gatsby is very rich. If we assume this piece of information is true, the proba-
bility of Jay Gatsby owning an expensive car should increase. In other words, since
all the propositions in 𝑆1 indicate that Gatsby is rich, assuming the truth of each
of them does make other propositions more probable.
Convincing as it seems, Lewis’ definition of coherence is still far from adequate.
He takes probability raising of a single proposition as the criterion for coherence,
8Lewis called the notion congruence in the original text. It has been generally agreed that con-
gruence is identical to the notion of coherence.
9Chisholm (1966) provides a definition of coherence which is pretty similar to the one Lewis
proposed:
‘A set of propositions 𝑆 is coherent just if 𝑆 is a set of two or more propositions each of
which is such that the conjunction of all the others tends to confirm it and is logically
independent of it.’
The disadvantages of this definition are also pretty similar to problems of Lewis’ definition.
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but neglects the fact that coherence can also be a relation between different sets.
Suppose that we have a set 𝑆 which has two subsets 𝑆* and 𝑆**. According to
Lewis’ definition, we are in no position to tell whether 𝑆* coheres with 𝑆**. Lewis’
definition only allows us to check if a set of propositions is coherent, but provides
no way for us to check whether a set is coherent with another. Also, what Lewis’
definition provides is a qualitative, rather than a quantitative notion. That is, it
only tells us whether a set is coherent, but not whether one set is more coherent
than another (Bovens and Olsson, 2000). Hence, Lewis’ definition still fails to fully
capture our understanding of coherence.
BonJour (1985, p.97-99) proposes a set of coherence criteria which provides a
more complete and subtle characterisation of the notion of coherence:10
1. A system of propositions is coherent only if it is logically consistent.
2. A system of propositions is coherent in proportion to its degree of probabilis-
tic consistency.11
3. The coherence of a system of propositions is increased by the presence of
inferential connections between its component propositions and increased
in proportion to the number and strength of such connections.
4. The coherence of a system of propositions is diminished to the extent to
which it is divided into subsystems of propositions which are relatively un-
connected to each other by inferential connections.
5. The coherence of a system of propositions is decreased in proportion to the
presence of unexplained anomalies in the propositional content of the sys-
tem.
10In the original text, BonJour considers the coherence between beliefs. Here I replace beliefs
with propositions.
11BonJour characterises the notion of probabilistic consistency with two factors: (a) the number
of conflicts between propositions in a system and (b) the degree of improbability involved in each
case. If a set of propositions involves many conflicting pairs of propositions, it is probabilisti-
cally inconsistent. Also, if the members of a set are highly improbable, the set is probabilistically
inconsistent.
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These criteria highlight that the essence of coherence is the inferential connec-
tion between the elements of a set. If a set is closely connected, it is coherent.
Also, the degree of coherence of a set is determined by the extent it is inferentially
connected. A highly connected set, compared to a less connected one, is more co-
herent. With BonJour’s criteria, we have a more sophisticated understanding of
the notion of coherence.
2.3 Coherence and truth-conduciveness
The more complicated definitions of coherence, including Lewis and BonJour’s,
reveal an important point: the degree of coherence of a set can be understood
in terms of the probabilities of the propositions included in the set. Put more
precisely, we may measure the extent a set of propositions are connected with the
probabilities of these propositions and thereby see how coherent a set is.
Surprisingly, based on the very idea that probability and coherence are cor-
related, Klein and Warfield (1994) claim that the degree of coherence of a set is
negatively correlated to its likelihood of truth. In other words, the more coherent
a set is, the less likely it is true. Their argument begins with two propositions:
1. Any set of propositions 𝑆1 is more likely to be true than any other set of
propositions 𝑆1 ∪ 𝑆2, given that at least one element in 𝑆2 is not entailed by
𝑆1 and does not have an objective probability of 1.
2. To increase the coherence of a set of propositions 𝑆, one may expand the
set with a proposition which is relevant to the propositions in the set. This
proposition should not be entailed by 𝑆 and does not have an objective prob-
ability of 1.
What the first claim says is that for any set of propositions, the more elements
it has, the more likely it is false. However, to make a set of propositions more
coherent, one has to expand it with a proposition which carries some information
that provides inferential support to the propositions in the set. If a newly added
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proposition carries some information, it cannot be a proposition with objective
probability of one since only tautologies are of maximal probability. The direct
result that can be derived from the two observations is that a set can only be made
more coherent when it is expanded with a proposition that is possibly false. In
other words, when the coherence of a set increases, the probability for it to be
false would also increase. When we see a highly coherent set which contains many
highly specific propositions, we should infer that it is very likely to be false. Klein
and Warfield thereby conclude that coherence, instead of being a truth-conducive
notion, is negatively correlated with the likelihood of truth.
Their argument can be illustrated with a simple example. Consider the earlier
set 𝑆1 which includes three propositions about Jay Gatsby’s wealth. Suppose there
is another proposition describing how Gatsby earned his wealth:
(𝑝6) Jay Gatsby was a smuggler.
The original set 𝑆1, if expanded with the new proposition 𝑝6, would become more
coherent since 𝑝6 provides a reason supporting other propositions in 𝑆1. As the
fact that Gatsby was a smuggler can well explain where his wealth comes from, 𝑝6
supports both 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 which describe Gatsby as a rich person. However, since 𝑝6
is not tautologous, it is possible for 𝑝6 to be false. As a direct result, the set 𝑆1∪{𝑝6},
compared to 𝑆1, is less likely to be true. We may thus see that the coherence of a
set is negatively correlated to its likelihood of truth.
Klein and Warfield’s observation seriously undermines the coherence theory of
truth. If their argument is correct, we may see that that the notion of coherence
is at best unrelated and at worst negatively correlated to truth. As a consequence,
philosophers should give up the idea of taking coherence as an indicator of the
truth of a set of propositions and abandon the coherence theory of truth, Similarly,
if we adopt the coherence theory of justification, the result that follows from Klein
and Warfield’s argument is that a highly justified set of propositions, compared
to a less justified one, may be less likely to be true. Such a result violates our
ordinary understanding of the notion of justification. The coherentists, hence,
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have to either give up the idea of explaining justification in terms of coherence, or
admit that epistemic justification is not truth-conducive. Since the latter option
looks disastrous, giving up coherentism seems to be the only way out.
One way of responding to Klein and Warfield’s challenge is to argue that the
notion of coherence should be understood in an alternative way. If one can provide
a more sophisticated way of measuring the degree of coherence of a set which
shows that greater degree of coherence does guarantee greater likelihood of truth,
one may save coherentism. To achieve this goal, the first step is to introduce the
formal apparatus for establishing the desired formal definition of coherence.
2.3.1 Formal preliminaries
As we have seen in previous discussions, there are two primary requirements for
a set of propositions to be coherent. First, the elements of a coherent set of propo-
sitions should be true or false together, or at least tend to be true or false together.
That is, when a single proposition in a coherent set is assumed to be true, other
propositions in the set should be more likely to be true. We can also understand
this in terms of the content of these propositions. When a set of propositions tend
to be true or false together, what is implied is that their contents overlap to a suffi-
ciently large extent. If this condition is met, these propositions are likely to be true
or false together. Second, the elements of a coherent set must bear strong mutual
support with each other. In BonJour’s words, there should exist strong inferential
connections between the elements of a coherent set. A proper way of measuring the
coherence of a set should capture the two factors.
The two aspects of a set could be represented in terms of probability. To show
how to do this, we need some basic formal preliminaries. Since coherence is a
property of a set of propositions, the first item we need is an algebra of propo-
sitions 𝐴, namely a set of propositions closed under negation and conjunction.12
Secondly, we need a set of probability functions 𝑃 𝑟 which assign values within the
12For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the algebra is finite.
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interval [0,1] to every element in the algebra 𝐴.13 Given the two basic entities 𝐴
and 𝑃 𝑟, a coherence measure 𝒞 can be defined as a function which assigns a real
number to a set of propositions given a specific probability function 𝑃 𝑟, namely
that 𝒞 : 𝐴𝑛 → R where 𝑛 is the number of propositions in the set. Given a prob-
ability function 𝑃 𝑟, a coherence measure takes a set of propositions as input, and
generates the degree of coherence of that set.
2.3.2 Shogenji’s coherence measure
In order to refute Klein and Warfield’s criticism to coherentism, Shogenji (1999)
provides a probabilistic coherence measure to show that coherence could be a
truth-conducive notion. Given a set of propositions 𝑆 = {𝑝1, · · · ,𝑝𝑛} and a probabil-
ity function 𝑃 𝑟, Shogenji measures the degree of coherence of 𝑆 with the following
formula:






Shogenji’s measure divides the probability of the conjunction of all the propo-
sitions in 𝑆 with the product of the probabilities of each proposition. The out-
come, namely the quotient of the two probabilities, is taken to be the degree of
coherence of 𝑆. Shogenji’s original idea is quite elegant. In probability calculus,
if a proposition 𝑝𝑖 is independent from another proposition 𝑝𝑗 , the probability of
their conjunction would be equivalent to the product of their probabilities, namely
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝𝑖)𝑃 𝑟(𝑝𝑗). If we expand the idea, we may infer that if a set of propositions are all
mutually independent, the probability of their conjunction would be equivalent
to the product of the probabilities of each. If the propositions are not indepen-
dent but relevant to a certain extent, the probability of their conjunction would
be greater than the product of the probability of each. Shogenji takes the ratio
between the two values as the degree of coherence of the set which indicates the
13A probability function is one which conforms to Kolmogorov’s probability axioms.
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degree of relevance between its elements. If the probability of the conjunction of
all the elements in a set is high, the set is highly coherent. On the contrary, if the
probability of the conjunction of all the elements is low or equivalent to to product
of the probability of each proposition, the set is rather incoherent.
To see how Shogenji’s measure works, we could compare two different sets of
propositions. Suppose there are two sets 𝑆1 = {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3}, 𝑆2 = {𝑝4,𝑝5,𝑝6} and a
probability function 𝑃 𝑟 such that 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1) = 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝4), 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝2) = 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝5) and 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝3) =
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝6). Further assume that the main difference between the two sets is that the
probability of the conjunction of all the propositions in 𝑆1 is greater than 𝑆2,
namely that 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2 ∧ 𝑝3) > 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝4 ∧ 𝑝5 ∧ 𝑝6). In other words, the elements of
𝑆1 is more relevant with each other compared to 𝑆2. Given Shogenji’s measure 𝒞𝑆ℎ,
the degree of coherence of 𝑆1 is
𝒞𝑆ℎ(𝑆1) =
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2 ∧ 𝑝3)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1)𝑃 𝑟(𝑝2)𝑃 𝑟(𝑝3)
while the degree of coherence of 𝑆2 is
𝒞𝑆ℎ(𝑆2) =
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝4 ∧ 𝑝5 ∧ 𝑝6)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝4)𝑃 𝑟(𝑝5)𝑃 𝑟(𝑝6)
.
Since the product of the probabilities of 𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3 equals the product of the prob-
abilities of 𝑝4,𝑝5,𝑝5, the denominator of 𝒞𝑆ℎ(𝑆1) is equivalent to the denominator
of 𝒞𝑆ℎ(𝑆2). Given that 𝑃 𝑟(
⋀︀
𝑆1) is greater than 𝑃 𝑟(
⋀︀
𝑆2), Shogenji’s measure gives
the verdict that 𝑆1 is more coherent than 𝑆2. We can thus see that, given Shogenji’s
measure, a set is highly coherent if the probability of the conjunction of its ele-
ments is high. This measure correctly captures the intuitive idea that the degree
of coherence of a set is determined by the extent the contents of the propositions
overlap, namely the extent the propositions ‘hang together’. According to this
measure, a set if highly coherent only if the conjunction of its elements is highly
likely to be true.
Shogenji’s measure has an important merit that it is sensitive to the size of the
proposition set being measured. Other things being equal, the more elements a set
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includes, the more coherent the set is.14 This feature correctly reflects our intu-
itive idea that for any two sets of propositions, if the degree of relevance between
elements of the two sets are the same, the one which has more elements should
be considered as more coherent. The underlying rationale here is that it is harder,
compared to a smaller set, for the elements of a bigger set to agree with each other.
This point can be illustrated with an analogy. Imagine there are two groups of
people. The first group has three members, while the second has thirty. It is much
harder for members of the second group to reach a consensus, as it involves more
members. Analogously, it is more difficult for the contents of propositions in a
big set to agree with other propositions in the same set, compared to a smaller
set. Therefore, when comparing two sets with the same degree of agreement, the
one with greater size should be rendered with greater coherence.15 This feature of
coherence is well captured by Shogenji’s measure, which can be illustrated by the
following example:
Example 2.3.1. Given two sets of propositions 𝑆1 = {𝑝1, · · · ,𝑝𝑖} and 𝑆2 = {𝑝1, · · · ,𝑝𝑖 ,𝑝𝑖+1}.
Suppose that 𝑃 𝑟(
⋀︀
𝑆1) is equivalent to 𝑃 𝑟(
⋀︀
𝑆2) and 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝𝑖+1) is smaller than 1. Ac-
cording to the given premises, the denominator of 𝒞𝑆ℎ(𝑆2) is smaller than the de-
nominator of 𝒞𝑆ℎ(𝑆1). Hence, the degree of coherence of 𝑆2 is greater than the
degree of coherence of 𝑆1 under Shogenji’s measure, namely that
𝒞𝑆ℎ(𝑆1) =
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ · · · ∧ 𝑝𝑖)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1) · · ·𝑃 𝑟(𝑝𝑖)
<
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ · · · ∧ 𝑝𝑖 ∧ 𝑝𝑖+1)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1) · · ·𝑃 𝑟(𝑝𝑖)𝑃 𝑟(𝑝𝑖+1)
= 𝒞𝑆ℎ(𝑆2)
With this case, we may see that Shogenji’s measure yields the result that, other
things being equal, a big set is more coherent than a small set.
Another factor which needs to be considered while measuring coherence is the
specificity of elements of a proposition set. Two highly specific propositions, com-
pared with two general ones, are less likely to agree with each other. Hence, a set
of highly specific propositions, compared with a set of less specific ones, should be
more coherent. This point can be illustrated by the following example:
14The most important factor here is the specificity of the propositions.
15‘Having the same degree of agreement’ here means that the probability of the conjunction of
all the propositions are equal in both sets.
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Example 2.3.2. Consider two pairs of propositions concerning the same subject
matter but with different specificity:
(𝑝1) Gatsby lives in New York.
(𝑝2) Gatsby attended college.
(𝑝3) Gatsby lives on Long Island in New York.
(𝑝4) Gatsby attended Trinity College, Oxford.
In this example, (𝑝3) implies (𝑝1) and (𝑝4) implies (𝑝2). We can hence derive
that 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝3) ≤ 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1) and 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝4) ≤ 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝2) for any arbitrary probability function
𝑃 𝑟. It can be further derived that 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1)𝑃 𝑟(𝑝2) is greater than 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝3)𝑃 𝑟(𝑝4), which
implies that the denominator of 𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑝1,𝑝2}) is greater than the denominator of
𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑝3,𝑝4}). On the condition that all other factors are equal, namely that 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧
𝑝2) is equivalent to 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝3 ∧ 𝑝4), we may get the result that 𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑝3,𝑝4}) is greater
than 𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑝1,𝑝2}). That is, other thing being equal, Shogenji’s measure generates
the result that a set of highly specific propositions is more coherent than a less
specific set, which is in accordance with our intuitive understanding of coherence.
Shogenji calls the size and specificity the total individual strength of a set. With
this notion, he argues that given two sets with the same total individual strength,
a coherent set of propositions, compared to a less coherent one, is more likely to be
jointly true. We can again illustrate this point with an example. Suppose there are
two equally specific sets {𝑝1,𝑝2} and {𝑝3,𝑝4} such that the propositions in each set
are of the same degree of specificity. Assuming that equal specificity implies equal
probability, we may derive that 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1)𝑃 𝑟(𝑝2) = 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝3)𝑃 𝑟(𝑝4). In this scenario, if
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1∧𝑝2) is greater than 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝3∧𝑝4), the degree of coherence of the first set would
be greater than the coherence of the second. Also, if 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2) is greater than
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝3 ∧ 𝑝4), namely that the contents of 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 overlap to a greater extent, then
{𝑝1,𝑝2} would be more likely to jointly be true than {𝑝3,𝑝4}. Suppose that both 𝑝1
and 𝑝3 are true. When we know that {𝑝1,𝑝2} is more coherent than {𝑝3,𝑝4}, we can
infer that the elements of {𝑝1,𝑝2} are more likely to be jointly true. Given that 𝑝1 is
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true, the whole set {𝑝1,𝑝2} is more likely to be true than {𝑝3,𝑝4}. Shogenji thereby
concludes that, given his probabilistic coherence measure, coherence with truth is
truth-conducive. That is, coherence is truth-conducive on the condition that there
are some true propositions in the set.
Given Shogenji’s measure, Klein and Warfield’s claim that coherence is nega-
tively correlated with truth can be refuted. Suppose there is a set 𝑆 which contains
some true propositions. A proposition which coheres with the elements of 𝑆 is
highly likely to be true. Hence, expanding 𝑆 with such a proposition would not
make 𝑆 more likely to be false.
In spite of its plausibility, some epistemologists are dissatisfied with Shogenji’s
measure is fallacious. Akiba (2000) points out that Shogenji’s measure may ac-
tually be falsity-conducive and cannot properly measure the coherence of a set
of propositions bearing the entailment relation. Consider the case in which the
propositions 𝑝1 entails 𝑝2. The pairwise coherence between 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 would be:
𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑝1,𝑝2}) =








Since 𝑝1 entails 𝑝2, the probability of the conjunction of 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 is equivalent
to the probability of 𝑝1. The degree of coherence of the set {𝑝1,𝑝2} would thus
be the reciprocal of the probability of 𝑝2. In other words, 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝2) is negatively
correlated with 𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑝1,𝑝2}). When 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝2) decreases, 𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑝1,𝑝2}) increases. With
such a result, Akiba claims that Shogenji’s measure cannot show that coherence is
truth-conducive.16
Apart from being falsity-conducive, Akiba points out another problem of Shogenji’s
measure which can be illustrated by the following example:
Example 2.3.3. When throwing a dice, one may believe in the following three
propositions:
16A potential problem here is that the degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2}, according to Shogenji’s
measure, is solely determined by the probability of 𝑝2. This result looks strange, as what we aim
to measure is the coherence between two propositions. A possible response is to bite the bullet
and claim that, since 𝑝1 entails 𝑝2, it is pointless to measure the coherence between the two propo-
sitions. As measuring the coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2} is pointless, it does not matter that the degree of
coherence is determined only be the probability of 𝑝2.
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(𝑝1) The dice will come up two.
(𝑝2) The dice will come up an even number less than six.
(𝑝3) The dice will come up an even number.
The probability of the 𝑝1 is one-sixth, while the probabilities of 𝑝2 and 𝑝3 are
respectively two-sixth and one-half. Intuitively, a proposition is supposed to be
extremely coherent with its consequence. Since both 𝑝2 and 𝑝3 are immediate
results of 𝑝1, the degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2} should be the same as {𝑝1,𝑝3}.
However, if we calculate the degree of coherence of the two sets with Shogenji’s
measure, we may obtain the result that the coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2} is 3, whereas the
coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝3} is 2. Such result indicates that Shogenji’s measure fails to
capture our intuitive understanding of coherence.
A further problem, as Akiba argues, is that the coherence of a singleton will
always be 1. As a proposition is perfectly coherent with itself, 1 is supposed to be
the maximal degree of coherence. However, if we arbitrarily combine two prob-
abilistic independent propositions 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 into a proposition and measure the
coherence of the singleton {𝑝1∧𝑝2}, the degree of coherence of 𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑝1∧𝑝2}) would
also be 1. This result, again, is quite counterintuitive. Since we have assumed
that 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are probabilistically independent, it should not be the case that the
set {𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2} is perfectly coherent. Because of these reasons, Akiba concludes that
Shogenji’s measure of coherence is inadequate.
Shogenji (2001) rejects all Akiba’s criticisms. The claim that Shogenji’s measure
is falsity-conducive, according to Shogenji, does not really pose a threat to his
measure. What Shogenji intends to show with his measure is exactly that a set of
low probability, which can be interpreted as being highly specific, is more likely
to be coherent compared to a less specific set. Akiba’s criticism does not show
that Shogenji’s measure is falsity-conducive, but instead reveals the fact that the
degree of coherence of a set increases with the specificity of the propositions in
the set. Hence, in debating whether coherence is truth-conducive, the specificity
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of the propositions should be fixed. Akiba fails to see the underlying motivation of
proposing a coherence measure and came up with a criticism that misses the point
of measuring coherence..
As for the dice case, Shogenji provides an example to show that pairs of propo-
sitions bearing the entailment relation can differ in coherence.
Example 2.3.4. Consider the following propositions:
(𝑝1) The fossil was deposited 64-to-66 million years ago.
(𝑝2) The fossil was deposited 63-to-67 million years ago.
(𝑝3) The fossil was deposited more than 10 years ago.
In this case, 𝑝1 entails both 𝑝2 and 𝑝3 but, intuitively, the set {𝑝1,𝑝2} is more co-
herent than {𝑝1,𝑝3} as the information provided by 𝑝2 is far more specific than 𝑝3.
Hence, it should be acceptable that in Akiba’s example, the degree of coherence of
{𝑝1,𝑝2} differs from the degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝3}. It should be allowed that
the coherence of a set containing a proposition 𝑝 and its consequence differs from
the coherence of another set containing 𝑝 and a different consequence.
The last problem, namely the one concerning the coherence of the conjunc-
tion of two individual propositions, does not undermine Shogenji’s measure ei-
ther. Coherence is a relation between propositions, rather than a property of a
single proposition. Measuring the coherence of a singleton set, hence, makes little
sense. It does not tell us any information about the relation between the proposi-
tions in the set. Therefore, Akiba’s arguments does not really show that Shogenji’s
measure is fallacious for failing to generate the correct degree of coherence for a
singleton set.
There exist two other problems of Shogenji’s measure The first one is the depth
problem. Fitelson (2003) points out that Shogenji’s measure does not take the
coherence of the subsets of a set as a factor when measuring the overall coherence
of the set. Given a set of propositions with 𝑛 elements, Shogenji’s measure can
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only calculate its 𝑛-wise coherence, but not its 𝑘-wise coherence for any 𝑘 < 𝑛.
A set might be very coherent when one considers only the pairs of propositions
involved in the set, but not quite coherent when evaluated as a whole. Failing to
capture the mixed nature of coherence, thus, is a serious shortcoming of Shogenji’s
measure. Consider the following example Schupbach (2011) provides:
Example 2.3.5. Police investigators caught eight robbery suspects, each of them
are equally likely to have committed the crime. Three independent witnesses
claimed that they have seen the criminal. In the first case, the witnesses provide
the following set of testimonies respectively:
𝑡1: The criminal was either suspect 1, 2 or 3.
𝑡2: The criminal was either suspect 1, 3 or 4.
𝑡3: The criminal was either suspect 1, 2 or 4.
In the second case, the witnesses respectively provide three different testimonies:
𝑡′1: The criminal was either suspect 1, 2 or 3.
𝑡′2: The criminal was either suspect 1, 4 or 5.
𝑡′3: The criminal was either suspect 1, 6 or 7.
The set of testimonies in the first case, intuitively, is more coherent than the
testimonies in the second case. In the first case, the three testimonies indicates
that it is very likely that suspects one to four are the real criminal. Compared to
the first set, the information one may obtain from the set of testimonies in the sec-
ond case is more ambiguous. Seven suspects were mentioned but, except suspect
1, all the suspects were mentioned only once. It is thus quite hard for us to make
an inference about who the criminals are from the set of testimonies in the second
case. We may thus see that the first set of propositions is intuitively more coherent.
However, such difference cannot be reflected by Shogenji’s measure which gener-
ates the result that the two sets are equally coherent. We may express this result
formally:
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𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3}) =
𝑃 𝑟(𝑡1 ∧ 𝑡2 ∧ 𝑡3)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑡1)𝑃 𝑟(𝑡2)𝑃 𝑟(𝑡3)
=















All the testimonies are equiprobable, since they all point to three suspects. Hence,





conjunction of {𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3} is that the criminal is suspect 1, which is the same as the




3}. Given Shogenji’s measure, the two sets of testimonies are
equally coherent. Such a result violates our intuition concerning the coherence of
the two sets.
The problem, as we can see, stems from a feature of Shogenji’s measure such
that the sub-coherence of a set is not taken into account. In the given example,









coherent than {𝑡1, 𝑡2}. We may conclude that Shogenji’s measure fails to generate
the intuitive result that the first set of testimonies is more coherent. This is the the
so-called depth problem.
The second problem is the problem of irrelevant addition. When a proposition
which is totally irrelevant to a set 𝑆 is added to 𝑆, the degree of coherence of that
set, according to Shogenji’s measure, remains the same. Again, this is a highly
counterintuitive result. We may see this with an example.
Example 2.3.6. Recall the robbery example. Suppose a witness by accident pro-
vides another testimony:
(𝑡4) It is raining in Paris now.
This new testimony is totally irrelevant to 𝑡1, 𝑡2 and 𝑡3. If we add this irrelevant
testimony 𝑡4 to the set {𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3}, the degree of coherence of the new set {𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, 𝑡4}
is:
𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, 𝑡4}) =
𝑃 𝑟(𝑡1 ∧ 𝑡2 ∧ 𝑡3 ∧ 𝑡4)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑡1)𝑃 𝑟(𝑡2)𝑃 𝑟(𝑡3)𝑃 𝑟(𝑡4)
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Since 𝑡4 is irrelevant to all other testimonies in the set, the probability of the con-
junction of 𝑡4 and other testimonies is equivalent to the product of their probabil-
ities. Hence, this formula is equivalent to
𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, 𝑡4}) =
𝑃 𝑟(𝑡1 ∧ 𝑡2 ∧ 𝑡3)𝑃 𝑟(𝑡4)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑡1)𝑃 𝑟(𝑡2)𝑃 𝑟(𝑡3)𝑃 𝑟(𝑡4)
As 𝑃 𝑟(𝑡4) appears in both the denominator and the numerator, we may remove
it from the formula and derive the consequence that the degree of coherence of
{𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, 𝑡4} is equivalent to the degree of coherence of {𝑡!, 𝑡2, 𝑡3}.
Given Shogenji’s measure, no matter how many irrelevant propositions are
added to a set, as long as they are independent from the other propositions in
the set, the degree of coherence of the set remains the same. This result is highly
counterintuitive. When a set is extended with irrelevant propositions, people tend
to consider the new set as less coherent then the original set since the newly added
propositions do not provide any support to any proposition in the original set.
Again, Shogenji’s coherence measure fails to capture what we think about the no-
tion of coherence.
Because of the two problems, Shogenji’s measure cannot be adopted as an ideal
coherence measure. Coherentists need to invent a different measure which is free
from the two problems to show that coherence is truth-conducive.
2.3.3 Shogenji’s measure generalised
Upon realising that Shogenji’s measure is flawed, Schupbach (2011) provides a re-
vised measure which is free from the two problems. The common root of the depth
problem and the problem of irrelevant addition is that Shogenji’s original measure
does not take the coherence of the subsets into account. Hence, Schupbach comes
up with the idea to measure the coherence of a set at different levels and take the
weighted average as the overall degree of coherence of the set. The first notion that
needs to be introduced, hence, is the 𝑟-wise coherence of a set:
Definition 2.3.2. 𝑟-wise Shogenji coherence
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For a set of propositions 𝑆 = {𝑝1, · · · ,𝑝𝑘}, [𝑆]𝑟 represents the set of all subsets
of 𝑆 with 𝑟 elements. Given an ordering ⟨𝑆1, · · · ,𝑆𝑚⟩ of the members of [𝑆]𝑟 , the














Suppose one wants to measure the 3-wise coherence of a set 𝑆. She should collect
all subsets of 𝑆 with three elements, calculate the coherence of all these subsets
respectively with the original Shogenji measure, and average the logarithm of the
degrees of coherence of these subsets. The outcome is the desired 3-wise coherence
of 𝑆.
With the notion of 𝑟-wise coherence, we can calculate the weighted coherence
of a set by giving a weigh vector to each 𝑟-wise coherence:
Definition 2.3.3. The generalised Shogenji measure
Given a set of propositions with 𝑘 elements 𝑆 = {𝑝1, · · · ,𝑝𝑘} and a weight vector
⟨𝜇1, · · · ,𝜇𝑘−1⟩ which assigns different weights to 𝑟-wise coherence for every 𝑟 such
that
∑︀𝑘−1





What this measure generates is the weighted average of the coherence of the set at
all levels.18 Here 𝜇𝑖 is the weight for the 𝑖+1-wise coherence of 𝑆. For example, 𝜇2
is the weight of the 3-wise coherence.
17Here Schupbach used logarithm to simplify the numbers to be calculated.
18Note that the coherence of singleton sets are intentionally neglected. Given Shogenji’s idea the
coherence is a relation between propositions, this consequence should be acceptable.
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This scheme allows us to define different coherence measures by changing the
value of the weight vector. The simplest one is generated by assigning equal weight
to all 𝑟-wise coherence:






This formula sums up the coherence of 𝑆 at all levels and divide it by the number
of levels. Hence, this measure assigns equal weight to the degree of coherence of
each level.
Given the scheme of coherence measures, we can define another measure which
assigns greater weight to the higher level coherence of a set.
Definition 2.3.5. Deeper Decreasing
Let the scheme assign decreasing weights to decreasing 𝑘
𝜇𝑖 =
𝑖















With this measure, the pairwise coherence of a set is assigned with the lowest
weight, while the 𝑘-wise coherence the greatest.
On the contrary, we may also define a measure which assigns greater weight to
the 𝑟-wise coherence of a set when 𝑟 is distant from 𝑘:
Definition 2.3.6. Deeper Increasing
Let the weight of each 𝑖-wise coherence be
𝜇𝑖 =
𝑘 − 𝑖












𝑖=1 (𝑘 − 𝑖)𝐶𝑖+1(𝑆)
2𝑘(𝑘 − 1)
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This measure assigns the greatest weight to the pairwise coherence and the lowest
weight to the 𝑘-wise coherence of a set.
All the measures generated this way are free from the depth problem, for they
all take the coherence of subsets of a set into account while measuring the coher-
ence of the set. Let us reconsider the two sets of testimonies in the given exam-




3}. The depth problem stems from the fact that
Shogenji’s measure fails to reflect the difference in the pairwise coherence of the
two sets. That is, although we know that 𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑡1, 𝑡2}) > 𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑡′1, 𝑡
′
2}), 𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑡1, 𝑡3}) >
𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑡′1, 𝑡
′




3}), the overall coherence of the two sets




3} are equal. By taking the pairwise coherence of a set as a
factor determining the overall coherence of the set, the problem can be solved.
Moreover, 𝐶𝑆𝐴 and 𝐶𝐷𝐼 are free from the problem of irrelevant addition.19 This
point can be seen by considering the pairwise coherence of each set. If an irrelevant
proposition is added to a set, the pairwise coherence of that set decreases, as the
newly added proposition is not coherent with any proposition in the original set.
As a result, the overall coherence of the set decreases when expanded with an
irrelevant proposition. Revising this way, Shogenji’s measure may still be taken as
a good measure for coherence.
2.3.4 Olsson’s coherence measure
Although Shogenji claims that being specificity-sensitive is an advantage of his co-
herence measure, Olsson (2002) criticises Shogenji’s measure for having this fea-
ture. He points out that if a coherence measure is specificity sensitive, the upper
bound of the degree of coherence of a set, given that measure, would be deter-
mined by the specificity of its elements. We may illustrate this deficiency with a
simple example.
Example 2.3.7. Suppose there are four propositions 𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝′1 and 𝑝
′
2 such that
19𝐶𝐷𝐷 is similar to the original 𝒞𝑆ℎ that it assigns less weight to subsets that are small. Although
not as serious as Shogenji’s original measure, 𝐶𝐷𝐷 is still vulnerable to the problem of irrelevant
addition.
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𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1) = 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝2) = 0.5, 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝′1) = 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝
′
2) = 0.3. The degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2},
according to Shogenji’s measure, is
𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑝1,𝑝2}) =
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1)𝑃 𝑟(𝑝2)
=
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2)
0.25
Since 𝑃 (𝑝1) = 𝑃 (𝑝2) = 0.5, when 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 coincide perfectly, {𝑝1,𝑝2} is maximally
coherent. The degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2}, according to Shogenji’s measure, is
𝒞𝑆ℎ({𝑝1,𝑝2}) =







On the other hand, if 𝑝′1 and 𝑝
′




2} would also be














If we suppose that both {𝑝1,𝑝2} and {𝑝′1,𝑝
′
2} are maximally coherent, {𝑝1,𝑝2} will be
rendered a degree of coherence lower than {𝑝′1,𝑝
′
2} simply because 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are
more probable than 𝑝′1 and 𝑝
′
2. Such a result, as Olsson sees, is undesirable. We
can imagine cases in which the set {𝑝′1,𝑝
′
2} is intuitively moderately coherent, yet
still measured as more coherent than a perfectly coherent but less specific set of
propositions {𝑝1,𝑝2}. We may further expand this idea and see that a set with per-
fectly coherent propositions may still not be rendered maximally coherent if the
measure has no upper bound. In sum, Olsson claims that the degree of coherence
of a set should not be bounded by the probability of its elements. That is, the max-
imal degree of coherence of a set should not be determined by the specificity of
that set.
The underlying problem revealed by this case is that Shogenji’s measure does
not have a maximal value. That is, adopting Shogenji’s measure may lead to the
consequence that no matter how coherent a set is, one can always arbitrarily create
another set which is more coherent. Since there is no maximal degree of coherence,
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a set of logically equivalent propositions, which is supposed to be the most coher-
ent set that can possibly be perceived, do not have a maximal degree of coherence.
Such a result does look quite problematic.
Being aware of the defect of Shogenji’s measure, Olsson develops another co-
herence measure which is free from these problems:
Definition 2.3.7. Olsson’s coherence measure








With Olsson’s measure, the degree of coherence of a proposition set is no longer
bounded by the probability of elements in the set but takes [0,1] as range. For a
set of propositions which do not agree on anything, the set has minimal degree
of coherence. On the other hand, a set of propositions {𝑝1, · · · ,𝑝𝑛} is maximally
coherent when 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ · · · ∧ 𝑝𝑛) equals 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∨ · · · ∨ 𝑝𝑛).
Olsson’s measure is free from the problem of irrelevant addition. Suppose there
are two sets of propositions 𝑆 = {𝑝1,𝑝2} and 𝑆 ′ = {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3}. If 𝑝3 is irrelevant to 𝑝1
and 𝑝2, the denominator of 𝒞𝑂(𝑆 ′) would be greater than the denominator of 𝒞𝑂(𝑆)
and the numerator of 𝒞𝑂(𝑆 ′) would be smaller than the numerator of 𝒞𝑂(𝑆). We
may derive the result that
𝒞𝑂(𝑆) =
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∨ 𝑝2)
>
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2 ∧ 𝑝3)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∨ 𝑝2 ∨ 𝑝3)
= 𝒞𝑂(𝑆 ′)
With Olsson’s measure, expanding a set with irrelevant propositions leads to a
decrease in its coherence. Thus, Olsson’s measure fares better than Shogenji’s in
capturing our ordinary idea in this aspect.
Although Olsson’s measure is free from some problems of Shogenji’s, it is not
impeccable. Siebel (2005) points out that with Olsson’s measure, adding necessary
truths to a set makes the set less coherent. Consider a set of propositions {𝑝1,𝑝2}
such that both 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are not necessary truths. If one expands the set with a
necessary truth, say 𝑝𝑡, the denominator would become one. As a result, the overall
coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝𝑡} would be lower than the coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2}.
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𝒞𝑂({𝑝1,𝑝2}) =
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∨ 𝑝2)
>
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2 ∧ 𝑝𝑡)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∨ 𝑝2 ∨ 𝑝𝑡)
=
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∨ 𝑝2 ∨ 𝑝𝑡)
= 𝒞𝑂({𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝𝑡})
When expanded with a necessary truth 𝑝𝑡 which is irrelevant to 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1∧
𝑝2) remains the same, while 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∨ 𝑝2 ∨ 𝑝𝑡) raises.20 Therefore, adding 𝑝𝑡 lowers
the degree of coherence of the original set.
Although Siebel’s observation is correct, it may not cause substantial harm to
Olsson’s measure. Given a set of propositions {𝑝1, · · · ,𝑝𝑛}, if one adds a necessary
truth which is irrelevant to all elements of that set, it does not seem wrong to
consider the new set as less coherent than the original one. Take the robbery case
in the last section for example. Suppose that a witness provides the testimony
𝑡4 : Five plus seven equals twelve.
Since this testimony is totally irrelevant to the robbery, it should not be regarded
as coherent with the original set of testimonies. According to Olsson’s measure,
the degree of coherence of {𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, 𝑡4} is lower than the degree of coherence of
{𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3}, which correctly captures this idea. Hence, the point Siebel criticises
should be taken as an advantage, rather than a shortcoming.
The real problem of Olsson’s measure lies in it being size-uninformative. The
degree of coherence of a set, according to Olsson’s measure, does not increase with
its size. Consider two sets 𝐵 = {𝑝1,𝑝2} and 𝐵′ = {𝑝′1, · · · ,𝑝
′
100}. The size of the latter,
as we can see, is much bigger than the first. If 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2) = 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝′1 ∧ · · · ∧ 𝑝
′
100) and
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∨ 𝑝2) = 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝′1 ∨ · · · ∨ 𝑝
′
100), then, according to Olsson’s measure, the degree of
coherence of 𝐵 is equivalent to 𝐵′. Such a consequence is quite dubious. As pre-
viously discussed, other things being equal, people tend to take sets with greater
size as more coherent. We can illustrate this with a revised version of the robbery
example:
Example 2.3.8. Police investigators caught eight suspects for a robbery. Each of
them are equally likely to have committed the crime. In the first scenario, two
20The idea of irrelevance here differs from the notion of probabilistic independence. If what we
meant by the term irrelevance is actually probabilistic independence, then there would not be any
necessary truth that is irrelevant to other propositions. Siebel uses this term in an ordinary way
and refer to our everyday understanding of irrelevance.
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independent witnesses claimed that they have seen the suspect and provided the
following set of testimonies:
𝑡1: The criminal was either suspect 1, 2 or 3.
𝑡2: The criminal was either suspect 1, 3 or 4.
In the second scenario, there are one hundred independent witnesses who
claimed that they have seen the suspect and provided the following set of testi-
monies:
𝑡1−50: The criminal was either suspect 1, 2 or 3.
𝑡51−100: The criminal was either suspect 1, 3 or 4.
Intuitively, the set of testimonies in the second scenario is more coherent than in
the first scenario as the size of the set of testimonies is much larger than the set of
testimonies in the first scenario. More precisely, if we do want to take coherence as
a notion which accounts for justification, the second set must be more coherent as
it provides stronger justification for suspect 1 and 3 being the real criminal. Ols-
son’s measure fails to capture this feature of coherence but takes the two sets as
equally coherent instead. Hence, it does not generate the intuitive verdict. Com-
pared to Olsson’s, Shogenji’s measure fares better in this aspect. When the size of a
set increases, the denominator of Shogenji’s measure decreases. Consequently, the
degree of coherence of the set increases.21
We have seen that both Shogenji and Olsson’s measures are flawed. Although
Shogenji’s measure is size-informative, it has the undesirable feature that the max-
imal degree of coherence is determined by the specificity of its elements. On the
other hand, although Olsson’s measure has a fixed upper bound, it is not size-
informative. If we agree that a coherence measure should be size-informative but
21Recall that the denominator in Shogenji’s measure is the product of the probabilities of all the
propositions in the set that is being measured. Since all the values are in the interval [0,1], the
denominator can only decrease when the size increases when all the values remain unchanged.
Thus, the overall coherence of a set can only increase when the size increases.
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not bounded by the specificity of its elements, both Shogenji and Olsson’s mea-
sures are fallacious. Thus, coherentists need to find better measures to capture
this notion.
2.3.5 Coherence as the average strength of confirmation
Both Shogenji and Olsson’s measures are based on the idea that coherence is about
the overlapping of the contents between several propositions. The more the con-
tents of a proposition set overlap, the more coherent it is. As both measures are
unsatisfactory, coherentists need to measure the notion of coherence in a more
sophisticated way. Since it is generally accepted that coherence is the mutual sup-
port between the elements of a set, a possible approach is to take the degree of
coherence of a set as the average degree of confirmation between all the pairs of
elements in that set.
Based on the idea that coherence should be measured by the degree of mutual
support between elements, Fitelson (2003) proposes a coherence measure based on
the notion of mutual confirmation. His measure generates the degree of coherence
of a set in two steps. First, we calculate the degree of confirmation between every
pair of combinations of propositions in the set. Second, we calculate the average
degree of confirmation between all such pairs in the set. With this two-step pro-
cess, we may generate the average degree of mutual support between all possible
combinations of propositions in a set and take this value as the degree of coherence
of that set. To formally construct the desired measure, Fitelson first introduced a
two-place function 𝐹(𝑝,𝑝′).22 This function measures the degree a proposition 𝑝′
confirms another proposition 𝑝,23 which is defined as the following:
Definition 2.3.8. Fitelson’s measure for support
Given any pair of propositions 𝑝 and 𝑝′ and a probability function 𝑃 𝑟, the de-
gree that 𝑝′ confirms 𝑝, denoted by 𝐹(𝑝,𝑝′), is defined as:
22This function is a modification of the measure of factual support proposed by Kemeny and
Oppenheim (1952).
23Here 𝑝 and 𝑝′ can also be sets of propositions. We can just take the conjunction of all elements




𝑃 𝑟(𝑝′ |𝑝)− 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝′ |¬𝑝)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝′ |𝑝) + 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝′ |¬𝑝)
if 𝑝′ does not entail 𝑝 and 𝑝 does not entail 𝑝′
1 if 𝑝 entailS 𝑝′ and 𝑝 is not inconsistent
−1 if 𝑝′ entails ¬𝑝
With this function, Fitelson defines his coherence measure as follows:
Definition 2.3.9. Fitelson’s coherence measure











where 𝑀 is the set of all pairs of non-empty non-overlapping subsets of 𝑆 defined
as {⟨𝑋,𝑌 ⟩|𝑋,𝑌 ∈ (℘(𝑆)/∅)∧𝑋 ∩𝑌 = ∅} and J𝑀K is the cardinality of 𝑀.
The set 𝑀 contains all non-empty non-overlapping subsets of 𝑆 which stands for
all the pairs of combinations of propositions in a set. Take a set of propositions
𝑆 = {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} for example. According to the definition given, 𝑀 is the set
{⟨{𝑝1}, {𝑝2}⟩,⟨{𝑝1}, {𝑝3}⟩,⟨{𝑝1}, {𝑝2.𝑝3}⟩,⟨{𝑝2}, {𝑝1}⟩,⟨{𝑝2}, {𝑝3}⟩,⟨{𝑝2},
{𝑝1,𝑝3}⟩,⟨{𝑝3}, {𝑝1}⟩,⟨{𝑝3}, {𝑝2}⟩,⟨{𝑝3}, {𝑝1,𝑝2}⟩,⟨{𝑝1,𝑝2}, {𝑝3}⟩,⟨{𝑝1,𝑝3}, {𝑝2}⟩,⟨{𝑝2,𝑝3}, {𝑝1}⟩}.
Given any set of propositions, every non-empty subset 𝑋 ∈ ℘(𝑆∖∅) is confirmed or
disconfirmed by another subset 𝑌 ∈ ℘(𝑆∖∅) to a certain degree. We may derive the
degree of confirmation by calculating the degree the conjunction of all elements
in 𝑋 confirms the conjunction of all elements in 𝑌 . By averaging the degree each
𝑋 is confirmed or disconfirmed by every other non-empty element of ℘(𝑆∖∅), one
may measure the strength of mutual confirmation between all the subsets in 𝑆 and
take this value as the degree of coherence of 𝑆.
Fitelson’s measure is free from the depth problem. Given any set, the degrees
of coherence of all its subsets are taken into account. We may take the robbery
case introduced earlier for example again. Recall that we have a set of testimonies
{𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3}:
55
𝑡1: The criminal was either suspect 1, 2 or 3.
𝑡2: The criminal was either suspect 1, 3 or 4.
𝑡3: The criminal was either suspect 1, 2 or 4.
Suppose every suspect is equally susceptible, the probability of every testimony
from 𝑡1 to 𝑡3 is
3
8 as each testimony points out three suspects. The degree of co-
herence is the average value of the set {𝐹(𝑡1, 𝑡2), 𝐹(𝑡1, 𝑡3), 𝐹(𝑡2, 𝑡1), 𝐹(𝑡2, 𝑡3), 𝐹(𝑡3, 𝑡1),
𝐹(𝑡3, 𝑡2), 𝐹(𝑡1, 𝑡2∧𝑡3), 𝐹(𝑡2, 𝑡1∧𝑡3), 𝐹(𝑡3, 𝑡1∧𝑡2), 𝐹(𝑡1∧𝑡2, 𝑡3), 𝐹(𝑡1∧𝑡3, 𝑡2), 𝐹(𝑡2∧𝑡3, 𝑡1)}.
With the function 𝐹(𝑋,𝑌 ) defined above, we can derive that
𝐹(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = 𝐹(𝑡1, 𝑡3) = 𝐹(𝑡2, 𝑡1) = 𝐹(𝑡2, 𝑡3) = 𝐹(𝑡3, 𝑡1) = 𝐹(𝑡3, 𝑡2) =
𝑃 𝑟(𝑡1|𝑡2)− 𝑃 𝑟(𝑡1|¬𝑡2)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑡1|𝑡2) + 𝑃 𝑟(𝑡1|¬𝑡2)
Since 𝑃 𝑟(𝑡1|𝑡2) is 23 and 𝑃 𝑟(𝑡1|¬𝑡2) is
1
5 , the value of 𝐹(𝑡1, 𝑡2) is
7
13 . We can further
derive that
𝐹(𝑡1, 𝑡2 ∧ 𝑡3) = 𝐹(𝑡2, 𝑡3 ∧ 𝑡1) = 𝐹(𝑡1, 𝑡3 ∧ 𝑡2) =
1
4
𝐹(𝑡1 ∧ 𝑡2, 𝑡3) = 𝐹(𝑡2 ∧ 𝑡3, 𝑡1) = 𝐹(𝑡1 ∧ 𝑡3, 𝑡2) =
1
5
With these values, we may calculate the average degree of mutual support between
all the combinations of propositions in the set, which is roughly 0.38. On the other





𝑡′1: The criminal was either suspect 1, 2 or 3.
𝑡′2: The criminal was either suspect 1, 4 or 5.
𝑡′3: The criminal was either suspect 1, 6 or 7.
Similarly, since 𝑃 𝑟(𝑡′1) = 𝑃 𝑟(𝑡
′




8 . However, the degree of mutual support



































































3} is roughly 0.254,
which is lower than 𝒞𝐹({𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3}). It can thus be seen that Fitelson’s measure cor-





Fitelson’s measure is also immune to the problem of irrelevant additions. A
proposition, if irrelevant to a set, does not confirm any proposition in that set.
Hence, expanding a set with an irrelevant proposition would reduce the degree of
confirmation between its subsets, and further reduce the degree of coherence of
the whole set.
Similar to Olsson’s measure, Fitelson’s measure does have a maximal value for
perfectly coherent proposition sets. For two perfectly coherent sets of proposi-
tions which differ in their specificity, Fitelson’s measure renders them with equal
maximal coherence. Again, this result is in accordance with our common under-
standing of coherence. For these reasons, Fitelson’s coherence measure seems like
an ideal way of measuring coherence.
Although Fitelson’s measure looks quite promising, Bovens and Hartmann (2003)
provide an example to cast doubt on its validity:
Example 2.3.9. Imagine two criminal scenarios: In the first one, there are 100
suspects, 6 of them play chess, 6 of them are from the Trobriand island but only
one of the suspects is a Trobriand chess player. Let 𝑝1 stand for ‘the culprit is a
chess player’, 𝑝2 for ‘the culprit is a Trobriand’, we may measure how strongly 𝑝1
confirms 𝑝2 and the other way round:
𝐹(𝑝1,𝑝2) = 𝐹(𝑝2,𝑝1) =
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1|𝑝2)− 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1|¬𝑝2)


























The second case involves 100 suspects. 85 of them are rugby players. 85 of
them are from Uganda. 80 rugby players are from Uganda. Let 𝑝3 be ‘The culprit
is a rugby player’, 𝑝4 be ‘The culprit is from Uganda’,we may derive the following
result:
𝐹(𝑝4,𝑝3) = 𝐹(𝑝3,𝑝4) =
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝3|𝑝4)− 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝3|¬𝑝4)





















Since the overlapping part between elements of {𝑝3,𝑝4} is greater than the over-
lapping part between elements of {𝑝1,𝑝2}, {𝑝3,𝑝4} is intuitively more coherent than
{𝑝1,𝑝2}.24 However, Fitelson’s measure gives us the counterintuitive verdict that
{𝑝1,𝑝2} is more coherent than {𝑝3,𝑝4}.25
Fitelson’s measure, like other measures, fails to correctly capture our concep-
tion of coherence. Thus, coherentists need to find out if this new measure can be
refined to get rid of problematic cases.
2.4 Douven and Meijs’ scheme of coherence measures
Douven and Meijs (2007) develop a scheme for coherence measures which, similar
to Fitelson’s measure, takes the degree of coherence of a set as the average degree of
mutual confirmation between all its subsets. We may plug different Bayesian mea-
sures of confirmation in the scheme and generate a variety of coherence measures.
Hence, it can be seen as a generalisation of Fitelson’s measure.
24It is generally accepted by epistemologists that the degree of coherence of a set is determined
by the extent its elements overlap.
25One may claim that this criticism is based on the idea that the coherence of a set is determined
by the extent its elements overlap. If one gives up this idea, Fitelson’s measure would no longer be
problematic. One who aims to save Fitelson’s measure this way must explain why {𝑝1,𝑝2} is more
coherent than {𝑝3,𝑝4}, which is rather counterintuitive.
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They begin with an introduction to three major types of confirmation measures:
the difference measure, ratio measure and likelihood measure.
Definition 2.4.1. Confirmation measures
Given a probability function 𝑃 𝑟, the degree a proposition 𝑝′ confirms 𝑝 can be
measured in the following ways:
Difference measure: 𝑑(𝑝,𝑝′) =: 𝑃 (𝑝|𝑝′)− 𝑃 (𝑝)
Ratio measure: 𝑟(𝑝,𝑝′) =:
𝑃 (𝑝|𝑝′)
𝑃 (𝑝)
Likelihood measure: 𝑙(𝑝,𝑝′) =:
𝑃 (𝑝|𝑝′)
𝑃 (𝑝|¬𝑝′)
These confirmation measures can be generalised to measure the degree of confir-
mation between sets by taking a set as the conjunction of all its elements:
Definition 2.4.2. Measure for the confirmation between sets
Based on the three measures, the degree a set 𝑆 ′ confirms another set 𝑆 can be
measured as:




𝑆 ′)− 𝑃 𝑟(
⋀︀
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Based on these confirmation measures, we may define a scheme of coherence mea-
sures. Let 𝑑,𝑟, 𝑙 stand respectively for the three measures and 𝑚 be the variable
for different confirmation measures. Further define [𝑆] as the set of ordered pairs
of non-empty, non-overlapping subsets of 𝑆. Put formally, [𝑆] = {⟨𝑆 ′,𝑆 ′′⟩|𝑆 ′,𝑆 ′′ ⊂
𝑆∖{∅} ∧ 𝑆 ′ ∩ 𝑆 ′′ = ∅}. With this definition, we can establish the following scheme
of coherence measures:
Definition 2.4.3. The scheme for confirmation-based coherence measures
Given a set 𝑆 = {𝑝1, · · · ,𝑝𝑛}. With an ordering ⟨𝑆1, · · · ,𝑆J𝑆K⟩ of the members of
[𝑆], the degree of coherence of 𝑆 is given by the function
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Table 2.1: The degree of coherence in the murder case











for 𝑚 ∈ {𝑑,𝑟, 𝑙}. Here J𝑆K stands for the number of elements in the ordering.






𝑃 (𝑝1|𝑝2)− 𝑃 (𝑝1) + 𝑃 (𝑝2|𝑝1)− 𝑃 (𝑝2)
2
Douven and Meijs (2007) claim that 𝒞𝑑 is the least problematic coherence mea-
sure among all that have been proposed. To show this, they provide several test
cases:
Example 2.4.1. Two murder cases
Case 1. A murder happened in a city with 10,000,000 inhabitants. 1,059 among
them are Japanese, 1059 among them own Samurai swords while only 9 of them
are Japanese owning Samurai swords.
Case 2. A murder happened on a street with 100 inhabitants. 10 of them are
Japanese, 10 of them own Samurai swords, and 9 of them are Japanese who own
Samurai swords.
Let 𝑝1 stand for the proposition ‘The murderer is Japanese’ and 𝑝2 for the
proposition ‘The murderer owns a Samurai sword.’ Degrees of coherence of 𝑆 =
{𝑝1,𝑝2} under different coherence measures in two cases are listed in Table 2.1.
In the first case, the two groups, namely the Japanese people and the Samurai
sword owners, overlap to a very small extent. On the contrary, the two proposi-
tions overlap with each other very well in the second case. The intuition, hence,
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should be that the coherence of 𝑆 in case 2 is much greater than the coherence of 𝑆
in case 1. 𝒞𝑆ℎ,𝒞𝐹 ,𝒞𝑟 ,𝒞𝑙 all fail to capture this intuition. Fitelson’s measure 𝒞𝐹 and
the likelihood measure 𝒞𝑙 render the set 𝑆 with similar degree of coherence in both
cases. 𝒞𝑟 and 𝒞𝑆ℎ renders 𝑆 with greater coherence in case 1 than in case 2, which is
even worse than 𝒞𝐹 and 𝒞𝑙 . Only 𝒞𝑑 and 𝒞𝑂 correctly represent the expected huge
difference between the coherence of 𝑆 in the two cases.
Another example, originally provided by Bovens and Hartmann (2003), shows
that Olsson’s measure leads to an unacceptable result:
Example 2.4.2. Consider two sets 𝑆 = {𝑝1,𝑝2} and 𝑆 ′ = {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} such that
(𝑝1) Our pet is a bird.
(𝑝2) Our pet is a ground dweller.
(𝑝3) Our pet is a penguin.
The probability distribution of these propositions is shown in Figure 2-1. Intu-
itively, 𝑆 ′ is more coherent than 𝑆. Since only a few kinds of birds are ground
dwellers, the set {𝑝1,𝑝2} is not very coherent. Expanded with 𝑝3, the set becomes
more coherent. However, 𝒞𝑂 generates the problematic result that the degree of
coherence of 𝑆 is equivalent to the degree of coherence of 𝑆 ′. Olsson’s measure,
thus, should be abandoned.
With these examples, Douven and Meijs (2007) show that 𝒞𝑑 is the only co-
herence measure which does not generate unacceptable outcomes. The difference
coherence measure 𝒞𝑑 , hence, should be taken as the correct way of measuring
coherence.
Roche (2013) provides a variant to Douven and Meijs’s coherence measure. He
claims that although 𝒞𝑑 is free from problems of other coherence measures, it gen-
erates unacceptable results for some other cases. Consider the following example:
Example 2.4.3. Suppose there are 10 suspects over a murder. Each of the suspects
has equal probability of 0.1 of being the murderer. 6 of them have committed
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both pickpocketing and robbery, 2 of them have only committed pickpocketing
and another 2 committed only robbery. Let the set 𝑆* be {𝑝1,𝑝2} and
(𝑝1) The murderer has committed robbery.
(𝑝2) The murderer has committed pickpocketing.
Since there are six suspects who committed both robbery and pickpocketing, the






Since the outcome is negative, 𝒞𝑑 indicates that 𝑆* is incoherent. This violates our
intuition that 𝑆* is fairly coherent.
To get rid of this problem, Roche suggested we measure coherence with a new
confirmation measure which differs from 𝒞𝑑 ,𝒞𝑟 ,𝒞𝑙 :
𝑅(𝑝,𝑝′) =:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝|𝑝′) if 𝑝 does not entail 𝑝′ and 𝑝 does not entail ¬𝑝′.
1 if 𝑝 entails 𝑝′ and 𝑝 is consistent.
0 if 𝑝 entails ¬𝑝′.
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By plugging the confirmation measure 𝑅 in Douven and Meijs’ scheme, we may





This measure is invulnerable to all the problematic cases for other confirmation-
based coherence measures. Thus, Roche claimed that 𝒞𝑅 is an ideal way for mea-
suring coherence.
We can see Roche’s coherence measure as just another variant of Fitelson’s
measure. The only difference between the two is that Roche does not measure
the degree of mutual support between two propositions in terms of confirmation,
but takes it as the probability of one proposition conditioned on another. Hence,
Roche’s measure is, like many others, a confirmation-based measure. The degree of
coherence of a set of propositions, given Roche’s measure, is positively correlated
to the degree of confirmation between the propositions.
The approach Douven and Meijs propose can be further expanded by consid-
ering other confirmation measures. We may plug in a set of different confirma-
tion measures into Douven and Meijs’s scheme and generate the corresponding
confirmation-based coherence measures.26 By doing so, we would have a set of
coherence measures that have different features. If we examine each confirmation-
based measure with different examples, we can expect to find one which is impec-
cable and could be adopted as the correct coherence measure.
2.5 The problem of common cause
All these coherence measures introduced can be categorised as relevance-sensitive.
That is, the core factor determining the coherence of a set, according to these mea-
sures, is the relevance between the propositions. Shogenji and Olsson’s measures
take the probability of the conjunction of a set of propositions as the primary fac-
tor. By measuring this quantity, we may know how coherent a set is. Here the
26For a list of significant Bayesian confirmation measures, see Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Bayesian Confirmation measures
Measure Proponent
𝑃 𝑟(𝑒|ℎ)/𝑃 𝑟(𝑒) Keynes (1921)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑒 | ℎ)− 𝑃 𝑟(𝑒) Carnap1(1950)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑒∧ ℎ)− 𝑃 𝑟(𝑒)𝑃 (ℎ) Carnap2(1950)
[𝑃 𝑟(ℎ | 𝑒)− 𝑃 𝑟(ℎ | ¬𝑒)]/[𝑃 𝑟(ℎ | 𝑒) + 𝑃 𝑟(ℎ | ¬𝑒)] Kemeny and Oppenheim (1952)
[𝑃 𝑟(𝑒|ℎ)− 𝑃 𝑟(𝑒)]/[(1− 𝑃 𝑟(𝑒))𝑃 𝑟(ℎ)] Rescher (1958)
𝑃 𝑟(ℎ | 𝑒)− 𝑃 𝑟(ℎ | ¬𝑒) Nozick (1981)
𝑃 𝑟(ℎ | 𝑒)− 𝑃 𝑟(ℎ) Mortimer (1988)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑒 | ℎ)− 𝑃 𝑟(𝑒 | ¬ℎ) Christensen (1999)
𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑃 𝑟(𝑒|ℎ), 𝑃 𝑟(𝑒)]/𝑃 𝑟(𝑒)−𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑃 𝑟(¬𝐸|𝐻), 𝑃 (¬𝑒)]/𝑃 (¬𝑒) Crupi et al. (2007)
[𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑃 𝑟(𝑒|ℎ)− 𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑃 𝑟(𝑒)]/ − 𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑃 𝑟(𝑒) Shogenji (2012)
probability of the conjunction can be understood as the relevance between these
propositions. One may see that both Shogenji and Olsson’s measures are relevance-
sensitive. The confirmation-based measures go another route by taking the average
degree of mutual confirmation between a set of propositions as the coherence of
that set. Since the degree of confirmation is determined in part by the probability
of the conjunction between propositions, what we are measuring is still the rele-
vance between a set of propositions. We may thus conclude that all these measures
are relevance-sensitive.
Although the idea of measuring coherence in term of relevance looks promis-
ing, Koscholke and Schippers (2019) point out that all the relevance-sensitive mea-
sures of coherence generate a counterintuitive outcome when we consider cases
involving a common cause. Suppose that a proposition 𝑝3 is the common cause
of two relevant propositions 𝑝1 and 𝑝2. Given these assumptions, the relations
between 𝑝1, 𝑝2 and 𝑝3 satisfy the following conditions:
(1)] 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1) > 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1) and 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝2) > 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝2)
(2)] 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2) > 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1) · 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝2)
(3)] 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2) = 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1) · 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝2)
where 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3 is the probability function 𝑃 conditioned on 𝑝3. Put formally, it is
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just the proposition that 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(·) = 𝑃 𝑟(·|𝑝3). Condition (1) states that 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are
both confirmed by their cause 𝑝3. This condition is a natural consequence of the
fact that 𝑝3 is the cause of both 𝑝1 and 𝑝2. Condition (2) state that 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are
not probabilistically independent. As we have assumed, 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are relevant to
a certain extent. Hence, the probability of their conjunction is greater than the
product of the probabilities of each. As 𝑝3 is the cause of both 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, the
relation between them must satisfy the third condition that, given 𝑝3, 𝑝1 and 𝑝2
are no longer probabilistically relevant. That is, the relevance between 𝑝1 and
𝑝2 is screened-off by the presence of the common cause 𝑝3. Before we know that
𝑝1 and 𝑝2 have a common cause, we take them as relevant as they are, in some
occasions, jointly true. Given a common cause, we know that both 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are
consequences of this common cause and would no longer see them as mutually
relevant. They are, given the common cause, two independent consequences of
the common cause. It is not the case that 𝑝2 is true by virtue of 𝑝1 being true or
the other way round. What makes 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 jointly true in some occasions is their
common cause 𝑝3. Hence, when we know that 𝑝3, 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 would no longer be
seen as relevant. This result can be presented formally. The probability of the
conjunction of 𝑝1 and 𝑝3, conditioned on 𝑝3, can be expanded as
𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2) = 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2|𝑝3) =
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2 ∧ 𝑝3)
𝑃 𝑟(𝑝3)
Since 𝑝3 is the common cause of 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝1∧ 𝑝2∧ 𝑝3) is equivalent to 𝑃 𝑟(𝑝3).
We may derive the result that 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1∧𝑝2) is 1. On the other hand, since 𝑝3 causes
both 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1) and 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝2) are both 1. Hence, 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2) is equivalent
to 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1) · 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝2), which implies that 𝑝1 is irrelevant to 𝑝2.
27
This kind of case reveals a problem of the relevance-sensitive coherence mea-
sures. Consider a set of two propositions {𝑝1,𝑝2}. The degree of coherence of the
set, according to the relevance-sensitive measures, is the average of the degree 𝑝1
confirms 𝑝2 and the degree 𝑝2 confirms 𝑝1. When a common cause 𝑝3 appears,
27Here is it implicitly assumed that 𝑝3 is a deterministic, rather than probabilistic, cause of both
𝑝1 and 𝑝2.
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one should take it as background knowledge and update the probability function
with 𝑝3. The coherence of the set {𝑝1,𝑝2}, thus, would be the average degree of
mutual confirmation between 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 conditioned on 𝑝3. Since the relevance be-
tween 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 is screened-off by the appearance of 𝑝3, 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 do not confirm
each other after 𝑝3 is taken as background knowledge. The relevance-sensitive
measures thereby generate the outcome that the set {𝑝1,𝑝2} is neither coherent nor
incoherent when 𝑝3 appears, which is absurd. This problem can be illustrated
with a concrete case. Suppose we adopt Mortimer’s confirmation measure, the
degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2} given 𝑝3 is the average of 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝2|𝑝1)− 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝2) and
𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1|𝑝2)−𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1). From the fact that 𝑝3 is the common cause of 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, 𝑝1 and
𝑝2 are independent under 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3 , namely that 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝2|𝑝1) is equivalent to 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝2)
and 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1|𝑝2) is equivalent to 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1). The degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2}, hence,
is 0. If we do have the intuition that the set {𝑝1,𝑝2} remains fairly coherent when
a common cause 𝑝3 appears, we would have to accept Koscholke and Schippers’
claim that relevance-sensitive coherence measures are incorrect.
One may argue that the problem stems from an incorrect way of treating the
new proposition 𝑝3 and claim that, when a common cause 𝑝3 appears, we should
expand the set {𝑝1,𝑝2} with 𝑝3 instead of conditioning on it. That is, we should
not update our probability function by taking 𝑝3 as background knowledge, but
should simply expand the original set {𝑝1,𝑝2} with their common cause. By doing
so, it would not be the case that 𝑝1 is no longer relevant to 𝑝2 in the presence of
𝑝3 and, consequently, we may still measure the coherence of the set {𝑝1,𝑝2, ,𝑝3}
in terms of the relevance between them. We can thus get rid of the problem
Koscholke and Schippers point out.
To argue against this response, Koscholke and Schippers provide two reasons
to strengthen their argument. First, compared to expanding the set, it is more
natural to update the probability function with conditionalisation when a new
proposition appears. Second, even if we choose not to condition on the common
cause but expand the set with it, the relevance-sensitive measures may still yield














Figure 2-2: A common cause scenario where {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} is less coherent than {𝑝!,𝑝2}.
panded with a common cause of its members, its degree of coherence, given the
relevance-sensitive measures, may decrease. Since a cause is supposed to be very
coherent with its effects, this result again shows that the relevance-sensitive mea-
sures generate mistaken results. This problem can be illustrated with a concrete
case. Consider the probability distribution in Figure 2-2.28 Given this distribu-
tion, the degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} is lower than the coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2}
given most confirmation measures. For instance, if we adopt Mortimer’s confirma-
tion measure, the degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} is approximately 0.30, while
the degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2} is 0.35. Since a cause is supposed to be coherent
with its effect, {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} should not be less coherent than {𝑝1,𝑝2}. Koscholke and
Schippers therefore conclude that the relevance-sensitive measures fail to correctly
capture the notion of coherence.
28This is the same case presented in Koscholke and Schippers (2019).
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2.6 The requirements for an ideal coherence measure
After a survey of the attempts of measuring coherence, we may list some require-
ments a proper coherence measure should meet.
Definition 2.6.1. Size-informativeness
A coherence measure 𝒞 is size-informative if, for any two sets of propositions 𝑆
and 𝑆 ′ and any probability function 𝑃 𝑟, if 𝑆 has more elements than 𝑆 ′ then, other
things being equal, 𝒞(𝑆) > 𝒞(𝑆 ′).29
Given any two sets of propositions of difference sizes, if they are equal in all other
aspects, the one with more elements should be taken as more coherent. Suppose
there are two sets of propositions. One contains two propositions, another con-
tains two hundred. If the extent the propositions overlap in the first set is equal
to the extent they overlap in the second set, we would consider the second set as
more coherent as it contains more elements. The underlying idea is fairly straight-
forward. Compared with a small set, it is less likely for the propositions of a bigger
set to agree with each other. When it happens that the contents of a big set agree
with each other to the same extent as the agreement of the contents of a smaller
set, the bigger set should be taken as more coherent.
Definition 2.6.2. Specificity-informativeness
A coherence measure 𝒞 is size-informative if, for any two sets of propositions 𝑆
and 𝑆 ′ and any probability function 𝑃 𝑟, if the elements of 𝑆 are more specific than
the elements of 𝑆 ′, then, other things being equal, 𝒞(𝑆) > 𝒞(𝑆 ′).
This requirement states that if the information conveyed by a set of propositions is
very specific, namely of low probability, then it should be taken as more coherent
than another set which provides less specific information. The underlying idea
of this requirement is the same as the one for size-informativeness. As it is less
likely for a set of highly specific propositions to agree with each other, when it
29The crucial factors that need to be held fixed here are the extent of the overlapping part be-
tween propositions and the specificity of these propositions.
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happens to be so, such a set should be regarded as highly coherent. However,
this requirement is not equally convincing as size-informativeness. One might
consider a set of equivalent but unspecific propositions as more coherent than a set
of specific but not completely equivalent propositions. Whether this requirement
should be adopted, thus, is still an open question.
Definition 2.6.3. Maximal coherence
A coherence measure 𝒞 satisfies maximal coherence if it renders any set of
equivalent propositions maximally coherent.
This requirement may be more doubtful than the former ones. At first glance, it
does not seem problematic that a coherence measure has no maximal value. How-
ever, if a coherence measure 𝒞 fails to satisfy this condition, then, according to
𝒞, it is always possible to make a set more coherent by expanding it with a new
proposition. We may consider a simple case in which one measures the degree of
coherence of a set 𝑆 with Shogenji’s measure 𝒞𝑆ℎ which has no upper bound. Sup-
pose one expands a set 𝑆 with a non-tautologous proposition 𝑝 equivalent to some
element in 𝑆. The numerator of the measure, namely the probability of the con-
junction of all propositions in 𝑆, remains the same. But since 𝑝 is not a tautology,
the denominator of the measure decreases. Thus, the overall degree of coherence
increases.
If the primary purpose of measuring the coherence of a set is to tell whether
the propositions in the set are justified, adopting a coherence measure having no
upper bound implies that the propositions can never be fully justified. That is,
for any set of propositions, no matter how justified they are, it is always possible
to make them more justified by expanding the set with some new propositions.30
Similarly, if the purpose of measuring coherence is to measure the likelihood of
truth of a set of propositions, adopting a measure with no upper bound implies
30It is possible to get rid of this problem by setting a threshold for justification. That is, one may
take a value 𝑥 to be the threshold and claim that if the degree of coherence of a set 𝑆 is greater than
𝑥, then 𝑆 is justified. However, if the coherence measure one adopts has no upper bound, it would
be rather difficult to set the threshold since the range is too broad.
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that the propositions can never be absolutely true. For any set of true proposi-
tions, no matter how likely to be true they are, there exists an arbitrary set which
does not differ significantly from the set, but is more likely to be true. Hence, an
ideal coherence measure should have an upper bound. If there is no upper bound,
we would have to accept the undesirable consequence that the notion of coher-
ence cannot correctly inform us about the degree of justification of a set, nor its
likelihood of truth.
Definition 2.6.4. Irrelevant additions
A coherence measure 𝒞 is sensitive to irrelevant additions if, given a set of
propositions 𝑆 and a proposition 𝑝 which is irrelevant to all the propositions in 𝑆,
𝒞(𝑆) > 𝒞(𝑆 ∪ {𝑝}).
Here what is meant by an ‘irrelevant proposition’ is one which is independent
from every proposition in the original set. This requirement is in accordance with
BonJour’s fifth criterion of coherence. Given a set of propositions 𝑆, an irrelevant
proposition 𝑝 does not confirm any element in that set. Hence, when the irrele-
vant proposition 𝑝 is added to the set 𝑆, the overall coherence of the set 𝑆 should
decrease.
All these requirements reflects some of our intuitive understanding of the no-
tion of coherence. For a measure to correctly capture the notion of coherence, it
should meet all the requirements listed. However, some of these requirements are
incompatible. For example, the requirement of maximal coherence contradicts the
requirement of size-informativeness. Suppose that a coherence measure 𝒞 has an
upper bound. We may arbitrarily construct a set 𝑆 such that 𝑆 is maximally co-
herent. For any set 𝑆 ′ bigger than 𝑆, it is at best equally coherent to 𝑆 since 𝑆 is
maximally coherent. Hence, any coherence measure which has an upper bound
would fail to be size-informative. Similarly, the requirement is incompatible with
the requirement of specificity-informativeness. Since there is no measure which
satisfies all these requirement, we could give up the idea of finding one which
perfectly satisfies all requirements but instead aim at finding a measure which
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satisfies some weaker version of these requirements.
2.7 Saving the relevance-sensitive coherence measures
We have seen that, given all these requirements and test cases, the measures that
are the most likely to meet most of them are the confirmation-based measures,
namely the variants of Fitelson’s measure. However, Koscholke and Schippers’
criticism has shown that all relevance-sensitive measures, including the confirmation-
based ones, fail to generate the correct result when a common cause appears. Their
argument is significant for the following reasons. First, Koscholke and Schippers’
criticism is based on the appearance of a common cause of a set, which is a very
general phenomenon. One cannot get rid of this problem simply by arbitrarily ex-
cluding the sets involving propositions with a common cause. Second, relevance
is a crucial, if not the most crucial, factor when measuring coherence. Their criti-
cism does not only imply that we have to abandon most coherence measures that
have been developed, but also that, when trying to develop new coherence mea-
sures, the relevance between propositions should not be taken as a factor. Formally
speaking, we can no longer appeal to the probability of the conjunction between
propositions as a factor determining the coherence of a set. We would then have to
find another notion which characterises the notion of coherence, which is appar-
ently very difficult. For these reasons, Koscholke and Schippers’ argument seems
to bring an end to the project of searching for an ideal coherence measure.
Although Koscholke and Schippers’ argument is convincing, there is still hope
for a relevance-sensitive coherence measure. The strategy I am going to take here is
to show that the second problem they point out, namely the problem of expanding
a set with its common cause, can be avoided by adopting a different average func-
tion. After introducing this function and show how to avoid the problem, I will
further argue that the first problem does not really pose a threat to the relevance-
sensitive measures. With both arguments rejected, the confirmation-based coher-
ence measures can be saved.
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To solve the problem of expanding a set with a common cause, a thorough anal-
ysis of the problem is required. What the problem shows is that expanding a set
with a common cause of its elements may make the set less coherent. This is actu-
ally not a surprising result. Let us, for sake of simplicity, call the relation between
a proposition 𝑝 and another proposition which 𝑝 confirms a confirmation relation.
Recall that the confirmation-based measures are motivated by the idea that the
degree of coherence of a set is the average degree of mutual confirmation between
its elements. When one expands a set with a new proposition, the new proposition
may confirm many propositions or combinations of propositions in the original
set. Thus, the number of confirmation relations that we need to consider increases
significantly. For a set of two elements, there are only two relations that we need
to take into account. But for a set of three elements, there are twelve confirmation
relations to consider. If one expands a set of two elements with a new proposi-
tion, the number of the confirmation relations to consider increases significantly.
For the new set to be of greater coherence, the average strength of all these new
confirmation relations, brought in by the new proposition, needs to be higher than
the average degree of confirmation of the set prior to the expansion. To see this,
consider a set 𝑆1 containing two elements 𝑝1 and 𝑝2. Suppose that the degree of
coherence of 𝑆1, according to a confirmation-based measure, is 𝑘. What this means
is that the linear average of the degree 𝑝1 confirms 𝑝2 and the degree 𝑝2 confirms
𝑝1 is 𝑘. When the set is expanded with a common cause 𝑝3, there are ten more
confirmation relations in the set. Thus, we need to consider many more combina-
tions of propositions.31 For the new set, call it 𝑆2, to be more coherent than 𝑆1,
the average degree of all ten new confirmation relations need to be greater than 𝑘.
However, this requirement cannot always be satisfied as nothing guarantees that
the average of these new confirmation relations would be greater than 𝑘. Hence,
we may derive the strange result that expanding a set with a common cause of all
the propositions in the set may lead to a drop in its coherence.
31Check the example in Section 2 to see all the confirmation relations that need to be taken into
account.
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This problem does not only occur when a set is expanded with a common cause,
but also happens with a proposition confirming every element. That is, given a set
of propositions, it is possible to find a new proposition which confirms every el-
ement of the set but, when the set is expanded with this proposition, the overall
coherence of the set decreases. We may call this the problem of set expansion. Con-
sider the probability distribution in Figure 2-3. The degree to which 𝑝3 confirms
both 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 is stronger than the degree of mutual confirmation of 𝑝1 and 𝑝2.
Based on the idea that coherence is the strength of mutual confirmation between
the elements, {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} is supposed to be more coherent than {𝑝1,𝑝2}. However,
the degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3}, given all the confirmation measures in Table
2.2, is lower than the degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2}. For example, adopting Ke-
meny and Oppenheim’s confirmation measure leads to the result that the degree of
coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2} is approximately 0.2, while the coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} is ap-
proximately 0.12. Given this case, we can see the core of the problem of expansion
more clearly. Although the degree to which 𝑝3 confirms both 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 is stronger
than the mutual confirmation between 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, expanding the set {𝑝1,𝑝2} with
𝑝3 brings in some much weaker confirmation relations and results in a decrease of
the overall degree of coherence.
The root of the problem of set expansion is that the confirmation-based mea-
sures take only the average strength, but not the number of confirmation relations
into account. When 𝑝3 is added to the set {𝑝1,𝑝2}, it brings in ten more posi-
tive confirmation relations. According to BonJour’s third coherence criterion, the
degree of coherence of this set should increase. When a set is expanded with a
new proposition which confirms many elements of a set, the set should, in or-
dinary cases, become more coherent as there are now many more confirmation
relations.32 Since the confirmation-based measures of coherence take the average
degree of confirmation as the coherence of a set, they fail to capture this intuition
and generate unacceptable results. The solution to the problem of set expansion,
32It is possible for there to be a case such that a proposition 𝑝3 confirms both 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 but not
𝑝1∧𝑝2. In such a case, the degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} could be lower than {𝑝1,𝑝2}. However,









Figure 2-3: A probability distribution where 𝑝3 confirms both 𝑝1 and 𝑝2
hence, is to construct a measure such that the degree of coherence increases not
only with the average degree of confirmation, but also with the number of confir-
mation relations.
2.8 Changing the way of averaging
A widely discussed function in the literature of opinion pooling is multiplicative
averaging.33 This function takes the normalised product of a set of values as its
outcome and has the property of synergy: when the input values are above a certain
threshold, the outcome generated by this function would be higher than the linear
average of the inputs. Moreover, synergy gets stronger when the number of inputs
increases. This feature allows us to capture the idea that the degree of coherence
of a set should increase with the number of confirmation relations in the set.34
To measure the degree of coherence with multiplicative averaging, what we
33See Dietrich (2010); Easwaran et al. (2016) and Dietrich and List (2016).
34The result is correct in some cases. If 𝑝3 confirms both 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 but does not confirm 𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2,
it should be correct that the set {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} is less coherent than {𝑝1,𝑝2}. Nevertheless, the problem
remains significant. We may think of a case in which a proposition 𝑝𝑖 confirms a set of propositions
𝑝1, ...,𝑝𝑛 and their conjunction 𝑝1 ∧ ...∧ 𝑝𝑛. Expanding the set {𝑝1, ...𝑝𝑛} with 𝑝𝑖 may still lead to a
decrease of the overall coherence of the set because of the reason mentioned here.
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need is a simple modification of the scheme of confirmation-based measures. In-
stead of summing up the strength of confirmation relations and divide it by the
number of confirmation relations, we take the product of the degrees of them and
normalise it with a factor 𝜁. Suppose 𝑆 is a set of propositions, the scheme of









where 𝑀 is the set of all pairs of non-empty and non-overlapping subsets of 𝑆
defined as before and 𝑐 is a Bayesian confirmation measure which generates the
degree ∧𝑆𝑗 confirms ∧𝑆𝑖 . 𝜁 is a normalisation factor which guarantees that the














This normalisation factor guarantees that the value generated by 𝒞ℳ falls in the
interval [0,1]. There are several reasons for us to normalise the outcome. First,
since most confirmation measures takes [0,1] as range, the product of the degrees
of confirmation decreases with the number of input values. That is, the more in-
puts there are, the lower the average of them. Such a feature contradicts with
the ordinary understanding that the degree of coherence of a set increases with
the number of confirmation relations in the set. If we normalise the result, this
problem can be eliminated.
An even stronger reason for normalising the result is that normalisation brings
us with a significant feature that the values synergise with each other. If, among all
the input values, there are multiple values greater than 0.5, the outcome would be
greater than the linear average of these values. A toy example may illustrate the
difference between the multiplicative confirmation-based measures and the linear
confirmation-based measures. For the sake of simplicity, we only calculate the
pairwise coherence, namely the coherence between singletons here. Consider a set
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{𝑝1,𝑝2} such that for some confirmation measure 𝑐, 𝑐(𝑝1,𝑝2) = 𝑐(𝑝2,𝑝1) = 0.7. Ac-
cording to the standard confirmation-based measure, the degree of coherence of
{𝑝1,𝑝2} is 0.7. Suppose we add a new proposition 𝑝3 to the set such that 𝑐(𝑝1,𝑝3) =
𝑐(𝑝2,𝑝3) = 𝑐(𝑝3,𝑝2) = 𝑐(𝑝3,𝑝1) = 0.6, the degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} would be
0.64, which is lower than the degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2}. As we have seen, this
is the primary problem of confirmation-based measures of coherence. Although 𝑝3
does confirm both 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, the overall coherence of the set, after expanding with
𝑝3, is lower than the original set {𝑝1,𝑝2}. If we calculate the degree of coherence
with multiplicative averaging, the coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2} would be approximately
0.84, whereas the coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} is roughly 0.96. We can thus see that the
positive confirmation relations synergize with each other and generate the more
intuitive result that the coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} is greater than the coherence of
{𝑝1,𝑝2}. The number of confirmation relations in a set, given multiplicative av-
eraging, is positively correlated with its overall degree of coherence. With the
property of synergy, we may get rid of the problem of set expansion.
There are, however, several technical worries concerning the multiplicative
confirmation-based measures that need to be addressed. The first problem is that
synergy goes in both directions. Without any modification, the break-even point
of the multiplicative average function is 0.5. When the input values are greater
than the threshold 0.5, their multiplicative average would be greater than their
linear average. But if the values are below 0.5, the outcome would be lower than
the linear average. Hence, if the degrees of the confirmation relations involved in
a set are all below 0.5, the number of confirmation relations would be negatively
correlated to the degree of coherence of a set. This is an undesirable result, as
the degree of confirmation between two propositions is, in many cases, below 0.5.
Adopting the multiplicative coherence measures would thus lead to the absurd
consequence that the more confirmation relations there are, the less coherent the
set is. Take the probability distribution in Figure 2-3 for example. If we plug in
Kemeny and Oppenheim’s confirmation measure and calculate the degree of co-
herence of the set {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3}, the outcome would be 7.93347917× 10−14, while the
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degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2} is 0.061. In this case, the set {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} involves far
more confirmation relations than the set {𝑝1,𝑝2}. However, as the degree of these
confirmation relations are all below 0.5, the effect of synergy goes downwards and
generates the undesirable result that {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} is much less coherent than {𝑝1,𝑝2}.
Another problem of this new coherence measure is that there may be propo-
sitions which disconfirm other propositions. In such cases, the degree of confir-
mation would be lower than 0. If we adopt multiplicative averaging, the overall
degree of coherence would be negative when the number of input values below 0 is
odd. This is obviously an undesirable result. If one highly coherent set happens to
contain a proposition which slightly disconfirms another proposition, the overall
degree of coherence of the set becomes negative.
To solve the two problems, we should move the input values from [−1,1] to
[0,1] with the following function:
𝑓 (𝑥) = 0.5𝑥+ 0.5
The use of this function can be illustrated with a simple example. Suppose that the
degree 𝑝1 confirms 𝑝2 is −0.2. Given 𝑓 (𝑥), 𝑐(𝑝1,𝑝2) becomes 0.4. With 𝑓 (𝑥), we may
move every possible value in the range [−1,1] to the range [0,1]. The break-even
point, as previously explained, is 0.5. After calculating the multiplicative average
of all these values, we may use the inverse of 𝑓 (𝑥) to move the outcome back to
the original range. If we calculate the degree of coherence this way, the problem
of negative degree of confirmation can be avoided. Also, we do not need to worry
that the break-even point is too high.35
If one is unhappy with the natural break-even point of 0.5, there is also a way
to shift it. Easwaran et al. (2016) show that this could be done by adding another
value to calibrate the function. Suppose we want to shift the break-even point to
𝑘, we can multiply every input value with (1−𝑘). The multiplicative confirmation-
based measures should thus be reformulated as the following:











The normalisation factor should be revised accordingly as:
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With such a modification, we may set the break-even point at 𝑘. Any value greater
than 𝑘, when averaged with some other values also greater than 𝑘, would synergise
and generates an outcome greater than their linear average. Suppose we plug in
Mortimer’s confirmation measure for 𝑐 and set the break-even point to 0.01, the
degree of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} in Figure 2-2 would be 0.9999, while the degree
of coherence of {𝑝1,𝑝2} is 0.9289. The multiplicative confirmation-based coherence
measures generates the correct result that {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3} is more coherent than {𝑝1,𝑝2}.
There is another technical issue concerning the choice of confirmation mea-
sures. It should be noted that multiplicative averaging is originally used to calcu-
late the average of a set of credences, which are values within the interval (0,1).36
If the input value is beyond this scope, there would be undesirable formal conse-
quences. Since Keynes (1921) and Rescher’s (1958) confirmation measures gener-
ate values greater than 1 for some cases, they cannot be adopted to measure the
degree of coherence of a set.37 Also, Kemeny and Oppenheim (1952), Crupi et al.
(2007) and Shogenji’s (2012) measures take the degree a cause confirms its conse-
quence as 1. This feature leads to the consequence that the normalisation factor
equals to one for every set which contains a single cause-consequence pair.38 We
would then be unable to normalise the result. For this reason, we should also
36Here I assume the requirement of regularity, namely that one’s credences over propositions
should not take 1 and 0 as its value except logical truths and falsehoods.
37It is possible, of course, to move the values to the interval [0,1] with a linear function. How-
ever, since these confirmation measures have different ranges, there is no unified function to move
the values. It would thus be more complicated to measure coherence with these confirmation mea-
sures.
38If the degree of confirmation between a cause and its consequence is one, when we calculate the
multiplicative average of a set containing a cause-consequence pair, the denominator of the nor-
malisation factor of the multiplicative average would also be one. The value of the normalisation
factor would thus be one.
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abandon these measures. The options we are left with, thus, are Carnap, Nozick,
Mortimer,and Christensen’s confirmation measures.
Apart from all these, there remains a kind of case that may lead to techni-
cal problems: independent propositions. For any pair of independent proposi-
tions, the degree of confirmation between them is 0. Given the multiplicative
confirmation-based measures, the degree of coherence of any set containing a pair
of independent propositions would be 0. This result is somewhat strange. A set
including a pair of independent propositions can still be coherent, as long as other
elements bear strong mutual confirmation. To avoid erroneous outcomes, this kind
of case needs to be treated separately.
To avoid this potential problem, the whole process of measuring the coherence
of a set 𝑆 should be carried out in several steps. First, we collect all the possible
combinations of propositions in 𝑆. Second, we calculate the degree of mutual
confirmation between all these combinations and sort the results into two groups:
the non-independent ones and the independent ones. For any two propositions 𝑝
and 𝑝′, if the degree 𝑝 confirms 𝑝′ is not zero, we categorise the value to the first
group. On the contrary, if the degree 𝑝 confirms 𝑝′ is zero, we put the value into
the group of independent propositions. After sorting all the outcomes into the
two groups, the next step is to move all the values in the non-independent group
from the interval [−1,1] to the interval [0,1]. Once we calculate the multiplicative
average of all these values, we move the result back to the interval [−1,1]. By doing
so, we may derive the overall coherence of the set.
This measure gets us out of the problem of set expansion. Consider the prob-
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ability distribution in Figure 2-3.39 The results of adopting the multiplicative
confirmation-based measure is listed in Table 2. As we can see from the table, all
the confirmation measures generate the more intuitive result that the set {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3}
is more coherent than the set {𝑝1,𝑝2}. The problem of set expansion, hence, can be
solved by adopting the multiplicative confirmation-based measures of coherence.
There is a possible doubt concerning this process of measuring coherence. In
the method of measuring coherence I proposed in this section, the confirmation
relations between independent propositions are ignored. If we do so, we may get
the counterintuitive result that expanding a set with an irrelevant proposition does
not make the set less coherent. In other words, the problem of irrelevant addition
rises again. To solve this problem, a possible strategy is to count the number of
such relations, and calibrate the final result with this value. For example, suppose
that there are 𝑥 null confirmation relations in a set 𝑆. We may, after deriving the
degree of coherence of 𝑆 with the confirmation-based measures, calibrate the final
result with 𝑥. By doing so, these null confirmation relations may still change the
overall degree of coherence of 𝑆.
One may claim that it is ad hoc to save the confirmation-based coherence mea-
sures this way. Apart from solving the problem of set expansion, generating the
degree of coherence of a set with multiplicative averaging does not seem to pro-
vide us with any additional feature which better captures the notion of coherence.
This criticism seems to overlook the crucial advantage of this approach. Measur-
ing coherence with multiplicative averaging does not only solves the problem of
set expansion, but also successfully captures the intuition that the coherence of a
set increases with the number of confirmation relations. As it is a better tool for us
to measure coherence, adopting such a tool should not be deemed ad hoc.
39Here I do not consider Koscholke and Schippers’s example. In their original example, as pre-
sented in 2-2, the common cause 𝑝3 disconfirms the conjunction of 𝑝1 and 𝑝2. Hence, it is natural
in their case that {𝑝1,𝑝2} is more coherent than {𝑝1,𝑝2,𝑝3}.
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2.9 Back to the problems of common causes
Since the problem of set expansion can be solved by adopting the multiplicative
confirmation-based measures, we may now come back to reexamine Koscholke and
Schippers’ first criticism that the confirmation-based measures generate counter-
intuitive results when a common cause is taken as background knowledge.
A brief review of their argument is required before I defend my solution here.
Suppose there is a set of propositions {𝑝1, ...,𝑝𝑛}, a probability function 𝑃 𝑟 which
assigns a value to each proposition and a proposition 𝑝 which is the common cause
of 𝑝1, ...,𝑝𝑛. When 𝑝 is given as background knowledge, we should update 𝑃 𝑟 by
conditioning it on 𝑝. By doing so, we may obtain a new function 𝑃 𝑟𝑝(·) which is
equivalent to 𝑃 𝑟(·|𝑝). However, according to the updated probability function 𝑃 𝑟𝑝,
the propositions 𝑝1, ...,𝑝𝑛 are not relevant since their relevance is screened-off by
the appearance of the common cause. Based on such an observation, Koscholke
and Schippers claim that the relevance-sensitive measures of coherence are falla-
cious. If we take the relevance between a set of propositions as a factor determin-
ing its coherence, we would have to accept the result that, once the common cause
of a set appears, the set becomes neither coherent nor incoherent. Since a set, intu-
itively, does not become less coherent when a common cause appears, Koscholke
and Schippers conclude that the relevance-sensitive measures are incorrect.
Koscholke and Schippers’ criticism misses the point of measuring coherence
and hence fails to undermine the relevance-sensitive measures of coherence. As
stated in the very beginning, when one measures the coherence of a set, say {𝑝1, ...,𝑝𝑛},
one either aims to know whether the propositions in the set are justified or whether
they are true. Suppose that one aims to know whether these propositions are true
by measuring the coherence of {𝑝1, ...,𝑝𝑛}. When their common cause 𝑝 appears,
the set {𝑝1, ...,𝑝𝑛} becomes neither coherent nor incoherent. Consequently, we do
not know whether these propositions are true. However, it is pointless to measure
the coherence of {𝑝1, ...,𝑝𝑛} when 𝑝 appears. If one knows that a common cause 𝑝
is true, its consequences 𝑝1, ...,𝑝2 would follow. Hence, there is no need to measure
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the coherence of {𝑝1, ...,𝑝𝑛}. Similarly, if what one wants to know is whether all the
elements of {𝑝1, ...,𝑝𝑛} are justified, one does not have to measure the coherence
between them either. Since 𝑝 is given as background knowledge, {𝑝1, ...,𝑝𝑛} are all
well justified.40
There are cases in which 𝑝 does not necessitate 𝑝1 and 𝑝2. In this kind of case,
the consequences do not follow from the cause and we may still have a reason to
measure the coherence between the propositions in question. My response here,
given the existence of such cases, would be incomplete. However, if the common
cause we consider here is a probabilistic one, Koscholke and Schippers’s argument
would not work. The relevance between the consequences and the common cause,
given standard probability calculus, would not be screened-off. In Koscholke and
Schippers’s original argument, when 𝑝3, a common cause of 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, is taken
as background knowledge, the relevance between 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 would be screened-
off since both 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2) and 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1)𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝2) equal to one. In a case where
𝑝3 does not necessitate 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, it is possible that 𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1 ∧ 𝑝2) differs from
𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝1)𝑃 𝑟𝑝3(𝑝2). Hence, Koscholke and Schippers’s argument would fail in such
cases.
In sum, although the appearance of a common cause does screen-off the rele-
vance between the elements in a set, it does not imply that the confirmation-based
measures are fallacious. As long as coherence is taken as a notion which grounds
other notions and is not valuable per se, the confirmation-based measures are free
from Koscholke and Schippers (2019)’ criticism. If one agrees that people do not
measure the coherence of a set for the sake of coherence, Koscholke and Schippers’
criticism does not hold.
2.10 Conclusion
Koscholke and Schippers provide two arguments to show that when the common
40One may argue that a cause may not justify its effect. Here I take it as a separate issue topic is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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causes of a set appears, the relevance-sensitive measures generate counterintuitive
results. I have shown in this paper that, first, their first criticism misses the point
of measuring coherence. In a situation where the common cause of a set is present,
there is no need for one to measure the coherence of that set. Second, although the
second problem they point out does pose threat to the relevance-sensitive mea-
sures, we may get rid of it by measuring the degree of coherence of a set with the
multiplicative averaging function. Both their criticisms, hence, can be dissolved.
What remains to be explored are the other features of this new coherence mea-
sure. If one can show that the multiplicative confirmation-based measures are
conducive to other desirable properties, we may have a proper coherence measure
that is useful in some aspects. If they do not, we should move on to search for
other possible coherence measures that correctly captures all our intuitions. In
any case, the feature of synergy, given by the multiplicative average function, is






The Conciliatory View of peer disagreement holds that when one disagrees with
their epistemic peers, one should compromise with their peers by revising their
credence in the proposition at issue (Christensen, 2007; Elga, 2007a; Feldman,
2006).1 Despite its intuitive plausibility, many epistemologists find this view un-
tenable. Some claim that conciliating is a self-abasing act (Pettit, 2006; van Inwa-
gen, 1996), while others argue that it is not truth-conducive (Kelly, 2010). Among
the arguments against the Conciliatory View, the ones that focus on its formal de-
ficiencies deserve special attention. It has been pointed out that there are three
deficiencies in the Conciliatory View. First, it does not commute with the Bayesian
rule of conditionalisation since the outcome of conciliation is partially determined
by whether one updates before making conciliation (Fitelson and Jehle, 2009; Wil-
son, 2010). Second, the Conciliatory View is path dependent (Gardiner, 2014). In
a case where one makes multiple conciliations with their peers at different times,
the final result is determined by the temporal order in which one makes the concil-
iations with each peer. Third, the Conciliatory View does not preserve one’s judge-
ment concerning the relevance between propositions (Elkin and Wheeler, 2018b).
1The formulation here involves the notion of credence. I will provide a reason for formulating
this way in section 3.
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That is, one’s judgement that two propositions are irrelevant may not be well pre-
served after they conciliates with others. Since all three features bring about some
unacceptable consequences, the Conciliatory View seems seriously flawed.
The criticisms concerning the formal deficiencies of the Conciliatory View,
however, are misguided. Studies in opinion pooling have shown that it is linear
averaging, the function that is generally adopted to make conciliation, that has the
three formal deficiencies. Since linear averaging is by no means the only legitimate
way to make conciliation, one can save the Conciliatory View by adopting nonlin-
ear average functions. To show this, I will first introduce the Conciliatory View
and its most prominent form, the Equal Weight view. After reformulating the two
views in a formal framework, I will demonstrate the three formal deficiencies of
the Conciliatory View and explain how can they be solved by making conciliation
with geometric and multiplicative average functions. To further justify the approach
of nonlinear conciliation, I will point out that some features of the nonlinear av-
erage functions better reflect our intuitions about disagreement. As a result, some
misconceptions in the study of peer disagreement may be clarified. The conclu-
sion, hence, is that we should embrace a pluralistic view concerning conciliation
and give up the idea that there is a single conciliating rule which can be applied
in every case of peer disagreement. Conciliationists should develop a taxonomy of
different kinds of disagreement and find out the proper average function to apply
for each kind.
3.2 Disagreement between peers
Consider the following scenario: Albert, a brilliant historian who specialises in
the Victorian era, wants to solve the mystery of Jack the Ripper. Having spent
years reviewing all the evidence relevant to the Whitechapel murders, he becomes
very confident that it was the Polish barber Aaron Kosminski who committed the
atrocity. However, his colleague Bridget firmly believes the opposite. Like Albert,
Bridget is also an expert in Victorian Britain who has reviewed all the evidence
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related to the murders. Unlike Albert, Bridget considers it extremely unlikely that
Kosminski is Jack the Ripper. Knowing that Bridget, as a historian, is as good as
himself, how should Albert respond to their disagreement concerning this contro-
versy?
Albert and Bridget’s case is a typical example of peer disagreement. Two sym-
metric assumptions need to be highlighted for one to see why these kinds of cir-
cumstances constitute a real problem for epistemologists. First, since it is assumed
that Bridget is Albert’s epistemic peer, they are symmetric with their reliability con-
cerning this issue. We may unpack this assumption a bit further by assuming that
Albert and Bridget were both educated in prestigious universities, trained in sim-
ilar ways and had equally outstanding track records. Given these conditions, they
are equally likely to have the correct credence concerning the historical fact in
question with the same body of evidence. Precisely because of such peerhood, any
reason which allows Albert to cast doubt on Bridget’s credences concerning spe-
cific historical facts should also allow Bridget to cast doubt on Albert’s credences.
Hence, Albert cannot dismiss Bridget’s disagreement but must take it seriously.
Second, they are symmetric with the evidence they possess respectively. The evi-
dence Albert has is to a great extent, if not exactly, identical to the evidence Bridget
has.2 Because of the parity of evidence between them, one cannot expect either of
them to change their mind after reviewing the evidence available to themselves.
It is the two symmetries that make peer disagreement a thorny problem for social
epistemologists.
There are many variants of the standard peer disagreement case that can be
generated by revising the two symmetric assumptions. Regarding the symmetry
of reliability, one may specify the reliability of the interlocutors involved. When
all the interlocutors are highly reliable, we have the case of expert disagreement.
On the contrary, when all the interlocutors are unreliable, we have the case of
layperson disagreement. Regarding the symmetry of evidence, one may assume
2Some epistemologists consider cases in which the individuals have pieces of evidence that are
only accessible to themselves. Here it is assumed that this kind of evidence does not play a crucial
role in their judgement.
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different degrees of information they have concerning the evidence their peers
possess. In some cases, all the interlocutors are fully aware that others have the
same body of evidence as they do. Each of them not only knows that the other
interlocutors do possess some evidence but also knows the content of the evidence.
In a slightly different case, the interlocutors do not share the full content of the
evidence. What they know is that all the interlocutors possess evidence of the
same strength.3 If we relax the notion of peerhood further, we may derive cases
in which the interlocutors know that the other interlocutors have some pieces of
evidence, but have no information concerning the strength of the evidence others
possess. The most radical case would be one where each interlocutor has no idea
whether their peers have any piece of evidence. Due to the highly varied nature
of all these different kinds of cases, we should consider the possibility of dealing
with each case in different ways.
One may doubt whether these variants still count as peer disagreement, es-
pecially cases of the latter kind in which the symmetry of evidence is weakened.
Indeed, without assuming the symmetry of evidence, the problem of peer dis-
agreement might be thought to be overly easy and loses its philosophical signif-
icance. However, as King (2012) points out, a perfect case of peer disagreement,
namely one which satisfies both symmetric assumptions, is rather rare. The ulti-
mate goal of the study of peer disagreement should not be finding a solution that
is only applicable to the hardest cases. If we take it to be the final goal, the study
of peer disagreement may be somewhat trivial as the result is extremely limited.
What we should aim for, instead, is finding out a solution that applies to a wider
set of cases.4 Following this line of thought, then, cases without the symmetry of
evidence, though deviant from the standard cases of peer disagreement, are still
worth to be discussed.
3This definition of peer disagreement can be found in Matheson (2014).
4Matheson (2014) also holds the view that the purpose of studying peer disagreement is to find
a solution applicable to other cases.
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3.3 The Conciliatory View and the Equal Weight View
One of the most widely accepted solutions to peer disagreement is the Concilia-
tory View: Whenever a disagreement occurs among a group of epistemic peers,
each one involved should make a compromise with the others. The motivation is
reasonably straightforward: Since no one is epistemically impeccable, it is always
possible for an individual to have incorrect credence in a proposition. Thus, when
one disagrees with their epistemic peers, one should realise that they might have
made a mistake and revise their credence in the proposition in doubt. We can per-
haps see the plausibility of this view from another perspective. In the face of peer
disagreement, a person who refuses to change their credence can be criticised for
ignoring their own fallibility. To be epistemically modest, one should choose to
conciliate when involved in a disagreement.
A question immediately follows: How, in practice, should one make a concilia-
tion? Conciliation can be made in many different ways. One can conciliate either
by giving up their credence entirely and accept whatever their peers say, or by
making a minimal revision of their original credence concerning the proposition
in question. Although the two ways lead to remarkably different outcomes, they
both count as conciliating. If the Conciliatory View suggests a variety of ways of
dealing with disagreement, it would be overly general and hence lack significance.
Thus, conciliationists cannot merely claim that conciliation is the proper solution
to peer disagreement, but have to provide precise instructions concerning how
people should revise their credence in the face of disagreement.
One way to establish a more elaborate formulation of the Conciliatory View is
to reconsider the core assumption of peer disagreement. Recall that all the individ-
uals involved in disagreement are assumed as equally reliable. All their credences
concerning the proposition in dispute, therefore, are equally likely to be correct
and should be treated in the same way. Thus, the most promising form of the Con-
ciliatory View is to assign equal weight to all the disagreeing peers’ credences and
take the average as the outcome of conciliation. Call this the Equal Weight View
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(henceforth the EWV).5 Take the Jack the Ripper controversy for example. In the
given scenario, Albert is nearly sure that Aaron Kosminski is the one who com-
mitted the Whitechapel murders, while Bridget is almost certain that Kosminski
is not. If Albert adopts the EWV and assigns equal weight to both his credence
and Bridget’s, he would come to have moderate credence in the proposition under
dispute. In the following sections, I will take the EWV as a view representing other
Conciliatory Views since they share all the important formal properties which we
are going to discuss.
The core idea of the EWV, as stated, is to respect the fact that all the individuals
involved in a genuine peer disagreement are equally reliable. Hence, everyone’s
opinion should be given equal weight. From this core claim, one may infer that
the EWV should be formulated within a Bayesian framework which represents an
individual’s doxastic state as credence.6 To see this, consider a case where three
individuals 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝐶 disagree over the truth of a proposition. Both 𝐴 and 𝐵 be-
lieve that the proposition is true, while 𝐶 disbelieves. Suppose that they all adopt
the EWV and intend to revise their credence in the proposition, what would the
outcome be? There is no answer if we adopt the traditional tripartite conception
of belief which says that one either believes, disbelieves or suspends judgement
concerning a proposition. The individuals should not jointly believe or disbelieve
the proposition since there is no consensus among them. The remaining option,
namely suspend judgement, is also incorrect. A joint suspension of judgement
concerning the issue implies that 𝐶’s disbelief outweighs 𝐴 and 𝐵’s beliefs, which
leads to a violation of the EWV. If instead of taking this overly coarse-grained
framework, we choose to represent their doxastic states in terms of credences, this
problem can be solved easily. In brief, since credences can be properly split and
represent all the possible outcomes of conciliation, the EWV should be formulated
formally. Following the same line of reasoning, any non-trivial form of the Con-
5For a detailed introduction to the EWV, see Feldman (2006); Elga (2007a) and Christensen
(2007).
6The EWV can also be formulated in terms of imprecise probability. See Elkin and Wheeler
(2018b).
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ciliatory View is also fundamentally formal.7
Since the EWV is essentially formal, we need to formulate it within a formal
framework. The first item required is the set of all the propositions that can be
subject to disagreement. Take a non-empty finite set of possible worlds Ω as prim-
itive, a single proposition can be defined as a subset of Ω, which is the set of all
the worlds where the proposition is true. The set of all propositions, following this
definition, should be defined as 2Ω, namely the power set of Ω. An individual’s
credence over each proposition can hence be defined as a function. Let 𝑃 𝑟𝑖(·) rep-
resent the credence function of individual 𝑖 which assigns a value in the interval
[0,1] to every possible world 𝜔 in the set Ω, where the sum total of values across
the worlds in Ω is 1. As a direct result, every credence function also assigns a value
to every proposition in 2Ω, namely the sum of its values for the constituent worlds.
Every credence function is formally a probability function.
The most widely accepted version of the EWV takes the linear average of the
disagreeing individuals’ credences as the outcome of conciliation, which can be
formulated as the following:
Definition 3.3.1. The Linear Equal Weight View
Given a case in which 𝑛 individuals 1, ...,𝑛 disagree over the proposition 𝑃 ∈ 2Ω,






That is, one may divide the sum of individual credences with the number of indi-
viduals involved and take the outcome as the result of conciliation.
An example may illustrate how the Linear EWV works. Suppose that, in the
Jack the Ripper case, Albert’s credence in Kosminski being Jack the Ripper (𝑃 ) is
7Kelly (2010, p.187) has another argument supporting the claim that the EWV should be pre-
sented within a formal framework.
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0.9 while Bridget’s is 0.1. Taking their credence functions respectively as 𝑃 𝑟1(·) and
𝑃 𝑟2(·), the result of assigning equal weight to both their credences in 𝑃 is:
1
2
𝑃 𝑟1(𝑃 ) +
1
2
𝑃 𝑟2(𝑃 ) =
1
2
· 0.1 + 1
2
· 0.9 = 0.5.
According to the Linear EWV, they should have 0.5 credence in Kosminski being
the real murderer. This result correctly captures our intuition that they should
both have moderate credence over 𝑃 after conciliating with each other.
3.4 Three formal deficiencies of the Linear Concilia-
tory View
3.4.1 Non-commutativity with conditionalisation
Although the Linear EWV seems to be an ideal rule for making conciliation, it has
three major formal deficiencies. First of all, it fails to commute with the Bayesian
rule of conditionalisation. As one of the defining features of Bayesianism, condi-
tionalisation suggests any individual who acquires a piece of evidence 𝐸 update
their credence by conditioning their credence in any proposition on 𝐸. Apart from
being a handy and plausible rule for updating credence, conditionalisation is also
the Bayesian norm for the diachronic coherence of one’s credences. If one does
not update their credence with the rule of conditionalisation upon receiving new
evidence, one takes the risk of having diachronically incoherent credences over a
set of propositions.8
It has been pointed out by many epistemologists that the Linear EWV fails to
commute with conditionalisation as switching the order between conciliating and
updating leads to different outcomes (Fitelson and Jehle, 2009; Wilson, 2010). To
illustrate, consider the Jack the Ripper example. Let 𝑃 𝑟1(·) stand for Albert’s cre-
dence function, 𝑃 𝑟2(·) for Bridget’s and 𝑃 𝑟1+2(·) for their joint credence function
8Although the rule of conditionalisation is a core Bayesian norm, it is not undoubtedly true.
Some philosophers argue that one may reject conditionalisation yet still be rational.(Bacchus et al.,
1990; Hild, 1998; Arntzenius, 2003) For the projects aiming at vindicating conditionalisation, see
Greaves and Wallace (2005); Briggs and Pettigrew (2020) and Pettigrew (2019).
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obtained by conciliating with the Linear EWV. Assume that they have the follow-
ing credences over the proposition 𝑃 and a piece of evidence 𝐸:
𝑃 𝐸 𝑃 𝑟1(·) 𝑃 𝑟2(·) 𝑃 𝑟1+2(·)
T T 0.285 0.05 0.1675
T F 0.615 0.05 0.3325
F T 0.015 0.15 0.0825
F F 0.085 0.75 0.4175
Table 3.1: Albert and Bridget’s credences over 𝑃 and 𝐸
The first row stands for the possible world in which 𝑃 and 𝐸 are both true. The
value given by 𝑃 𝑟1(·), hence, is Albert’s credence in 𝑃&𝐸. Given this credence
distribution, if Albert and Bridget decide to first make a conciliation concerning





















((0.285 + 0.015) + (0.05 + 0.15)) = 0.25.
By applying the rule of conditionalisation, we may derive their joint credence of 𝑃
conditional on 𝐸:






(𝑃 𝑟1(𝑃&𝐸) + 𝑃 𝑟2(𝑃&𝐸))
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On the other hand, if Albert and Bridget choose to first update their credences on
the evidence 𝐸 respectively, they would have the following credences in 𝑃 condi-
tional on 𝐸:















If they, after updating with 𝐸 respectively, make a conciliation, their joint credence
would be the linear average of the two values:
𝑃 𝑟1+2(𝑃 |𝐸) =
1
2
𝑃 𝑟1(𝑃 |𝐸) +
1
2
𝑃 𝑟2(𝑃 |𝐸)) =
1
2
(0.95 + 0.25) = 0.6.
This case shows that if the individuals make conciliation with the Linear EWV, the
order of conciliating and updating determines the outcome of their conciliation.
What is wrong with the Linear EWV failing to commute with conditionalisa-
tion? First, the order of updating and conciliating is, in most cases, irrelevant to
the disagreement itself. It is unacceptable to let an irrelevant factor determine
the outcome of conciliation. Suppose that, in the Jack the Ripper case, Albert and
Bridget decide to conciliate with each other and have moderate credence in Kos-
minski being the murderer. After the conciliation, they find a ledger containing
the names of suspects that they have never seen. Both Albert and Bridget update
with this new piece of evidence and come to have a new credence in Kosminski
being the murderer. In a different case, they find the ledger and each update their
credence before they conciliate. Since conciliation does not commute with con-
ditionalisation, the result of conciliation in the second case may differ from the
result in the first case. This is rather problematic since the time they receive the
ledger is irrelevant to whether Kosminski is Jack the Ripper. If the purpose of con-
ciliating is to make disagreeing peers come to have credences that are as close to
the truth as possible, we should not take an irrelevant factor into account. Second,
if the outcome of conciliation is sensitive to the time of updating, the individu-
als involved in disagreement would be vulnerable to manipulation. Suppose that,
in the Jack the Ripper case, another historian Claire possesses a new piece of ev-
idence 𝐸′ which is unknown to both Albert and Bridget. Further suppose that
Claire intends the outcome of Albert and Bridget’s conciliation to be as close to 1
as possible. Knowing that Albert and Bridget are about to conciliate, Claire would
choose to conceal 𝐸′ until the conciliation is made. By revealing 𝐸′ to Albert and
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Bridget after they make a conciliation, she can make their joint credence closer to
1, which is the result she intends. This feature is again undesirable, as an ideal
rule should leave no space for manipulation. In other words, conciliating with the
Linear EWV puts people under the risk of being manipulated. The Linear EWV,
therefore, is a problematic way of resolving peer disagreement.
3.4.2 Path dependence
Apart from failing to commute with conditionalisation, the Linear EWV also fails
to be path independent (Gardiner, 2014). That is, if one makes multiple concili-
ations according to the Linear EWV, the final outcome would be sensitive to the
order of conciliation. Imagine a revised Jack the Ripper case in which another
historian Claire has credence 0.7 in the proposition 𝑃 that Kosminski is Jack the
Ripper. Suppose, as before, that Albert’s credence in 𝑃 is 0.9 while Bridget’s is 0.1.
If Albert first makes a conciliation with Claire and subsequently with Bridget, his
credence in 𝑃 , according to the Linear EWV, would be 0.45. Let Claire’s credence
function be 𝑃 𝑟3(·), the process can be formulated as the following:








After Albert conciliates with Claire, they obtain the joint credence function
𝑃1+3(·) which assigns 𝑃 with credence 0.8. When they subsequently make a con-
ciliation with Bridget, the resulting credence function is 𝑃 𝑟1+3+2(·) which assigns
0.45 to 𝑃 . In a slightly different story, Albert first conciliates with Bridget and
subsequently with Claire. His credence in 𝑃 , given the Linear EWV, would be 0.6.
That is,









Given this example, we may see that the order Albert conciliates with his peers
determines the outcome of conciliation.
Path dependence is undesirable for two reasons. First, the order one makes
conciliation with their peers is, in most cases, irrelevant to the proposition in dis-
pute and should not affect the outcome of conciliation in any way. Consider the
Jack the Ripper case again. Whether Kosminski committed the Whitechapel mur-
ders is a historical event that has already obtained. The temporal order Albert
makes conciliation with his peers has nothing to do with the real identity of Jack
the Ripper. Hence, it would be absurd to let the order Albert conciliates be a fac-
tor determining the outcome of conciliation. Moreover, the result shows that the
Linear EWV is diachronically incoherent. The core claim of the EWV is that every
individual’s credence should be treated equally. If one adopts the Linear EWV and
makes conciliation with their peers one at a time, the testimonies that are received
at some early stage would be weighted less than the testimonies that come later,
as earlier testimonies have been mixed up with new testimonies for more times.
In other words, the importance of a single testimony would be gradually diluted
as new pieces of testimonial evidence emerge. As this result violates the core idea
of the EWV that one should weight all their peers’ credences equally, the Linear
EWV runs the risk of being self-refuting.
One might attempt to defend the Linear EWV by arguing that people can as-
sign weights in a more sophisticated way. Instead of reassigning equal weight in
every single conciliation, an individual should keep track of all the conciliations
they have made and assign the correct weight to new peers. In the given exam-
ple, after Albert conciliates with Bridget, he should be aware of the fact that his
credence has already been mixed up with Bridget’s prior credence. When Albert
subsequently meets Claire and makes another conciliation, he should know that
the correct weight to assign to Claire’s credence is one-third rather than a half.
In short, if Albert is smart enough, he should know the correct weight to assign
to his peers’ credence. The problem of path dependence only occurs to stubborn
individuals.
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Although the solution is rather convincing, it is difficult to implement in most
cases of peer disagreement. In a simple case which involves only a small number
of individuals, it is relatively easy for one to remember the details of all the con-
ciliations they have made. However, in a slightly complicated case, it would be
overly demanding to ask an individual to memorise all the details of every con-
ciliation that has taken place. Suppose that Albert, in the searching of the true
identity of Jack the Ripper, consults twenty peers at different times. It would be
extremely tough for him to remember every peer’s prior credence and assign the
correct weight to each of them. Hence, it is pragmatically impossible for one to
always conciliate with their peers this way.9 For this reason, path dependence
remains a defect of the Linear EWV.
Another way of saving the Linear EWV is to deny that one would ever need to
make multiple conciliations with their peers. In the given scenario, after Albert
conciliates with Bridget, it can be said that Claire is no longer his peer since, after
the conciliating with a peer, Albert’s credence has become more likely to be cor-
rect. Hence, Albert is no longer Claire’s peer and does not have to assign equal
weight to her credence. The problem of path dependence, therefore, would not
occur in the first place. However, this solution is based on a volatile notion of
peerhood. In any ordinary case of peer disagreement, one does not become supe-
rior immediately after they conciliate with a single peer. Imagine a case where a
panel of scientists aims to make a joint decision concerning government policies.
Two among them have a private conversation and, right after they make a concili-
ation, announce that their credence over the proposition in question is the correct
one since they have become superior to all other scientists. If one agrees that this
case is absurd, they would have to admit that a proper notion of peerhood should
prevent this kind of things from happening. For this reason, we may conclude that
path dependence remains a shortcoming of the EWV.
9Gardiner (2014) provides a thorough review of the possible solutions to this problem.
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𝑃 𝑟1(· ∧ ·) 𝑃 𝑟2(· ∧ ·) 𝑃 𝑟1+2(· ∧ ·) 𝑃 𝑟1+2(·)𝑃 𝑟1+2(·)
𝐾,𝑅 0.08 0.33 0.205 0.19
𝐾,¬𝑅 0.12 0.27 0.195 0.21
¬𝐾,𝑅 0.32 0.22 0.27 0.285
¬𝐾,¬𝑅 0.48 0.18 0.33 0.315
Table 3.3: Albert (𝑃 𝑟1(·)) and Bridget’s (𝑃 𝑟2(·)) credences in 𝐾 and 𝑅.
3.4.3 The problem of independence preservation
Another crucial problem of the Linear Conciliatory View is that it fails to preserve
their judgement of independence (Bradley et al., 2014; Elkin and Wheeler, 2018b).
Let us consider a concrete example provided by Elkin and Wheeler: Albert, based
on his evidence, does not find it likely that it will rain in Kyoto tomorrow (𝐾)
and has 0.2 credence in the proposition. On the other hand, with some evidence,
he thinks that there may be an unpublished volume of The Lord of the Rings (𝑅)
and has 0.4 credence in its existence. Based on the same background knowledge
and evidence, Bridget has 0.6 credence in the former proposition and 0.55 in the
latter. Further suppose that Albert judges 𝐾 and 𝑅 as mutually independent. His
credence in the conjunction of 𝐾 and 𝑅, thus, is equal to the product of his credence
in 𝐾 and his credence in 𝑅, namely 0.16. Bridget also judges 𝐾 and 𝑅 as mutually
independent and has 0.33 credence in the conjunction of 𝐾 and 𝑅. When they
conciliate with each other according to the Linear EWV, they come to accept a new
credence function 𝑃 𝑟1+2(·) which does not assign equal value to the conjunction of
𝐾 and 𝑅 and the product of their respective joint credence in 𝐾 and 𝑅. That is, 𝐾
and 𝑅 are not independent according to their joint credence function 𝑃 𝑟1+2(·). The
distribution of their credences is presented in Table 3.3.10
Intuitively, this result is strange. As both Albert and Bridget judge 𝐾 and 𝑅 as
mutually independent, the joint judgement that 𝐾 and 𝑅 are relevant, revealed by
the joint credence function 𝑃 𝑟1+2(·), comes from nowhere. A more serious prob-
lem is that failing to preserve ones’ judgement of independence may make them
10Thanks to an anonymous referee for indicating that this problem should be discussed.
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irrational. Suppose that Albert and Bridget do make conciliation according to the
Linear EWV and adopt 𝑃 𝑟1+2(·) as their new credence function. A witty gambler
can sell them two bets: The first bet costs them £20.5 on the condition that they
receive £100 from the gambler if 𝐾 and 𝑅 are both true. The second bet costs them
£33 on the condition that the gambler pays them £100 if 𝐾 and 𝑅 are both false.
Since, according to the function 𝑃 𝑟1+2(· ∧ ·), Albert and Bridget’s joint credence in
both 𝐾 and 𝑅 being true is 0.205, the expected return of the first bet for them is
0. Similarly, since their joint credence in 𝐾 and 𝑅 both being false is 0.33, the
expected return of the second bet is also 0. As both bets are fair for Albert and
Bridget, they will accept both bets.
The gambler can go further and sell Albert and Bridget two other bets: One
costs them £21 and pays back £100 if 𝐾 is true and 𝑅 is false. Another costs them
£28.5 and pays back £100 if 𝐾 is false and 𝑅 is true. Since both Albert and Bridget
judge 𝐾 and 𝑅 as independent, their credence in 𝐾 and 𝑅 can also be represented
by the function 𝑃 𝑟1+2(·)𝑃 𝑟1+2(·). Given this credence function, the two new bets are
fair. Hence, Albert and Bridget would also accept this proposal. With the four bets,
it is guaranteed that Albert and Bridget are going to lose £3 to the gambler. This
case shows that adopting the Linear EWV may lead to a sure loss of money, which
indicates that the individuals are irrational. The linear EWV, therefore, should be
abandoned.
3.5 Opinion pooling and peer disagreement
One way of saving the Conciliatory View is to change the way we conciliate while
retaining the core idea that one should make conciliation with their peers. Since
it has been proved that there are nonlinear average functions that are free from
the three formal problems, we may adopt the nonlinear average functions to make
conciliation and thereby derive alternative Conciliatory Views that are free from
99
the three formal deficiencies.11
The study of probabilistic opinion pooling aims to answer one central question:
Given a profile of credence functions across a set of individuals, what is the proper
way of merging them into a single joint credence function which satisfies specific
requirements? To correctly respond to this question, philosophers have examined
a variety of possibilities and proposed different pooling functions. Since, as we
have seen, the Conciliatory View is essentially formal, we may apply the results
in the study of opinion pooling to save this view. In the following sections, I will
show that nonlinear average functions are free from the three formal deficiencies
of the Linear EWV. As the formal results derived can be generalised to other forms
of conciliation, the Conciliatory View can be rescued.
It has been proven that the geometric averaging does commute with condi-
tionalisation (Genest, 1984). Hence, we may adopt geometric averaging to make
conciliation and thereby derive a rule of conciliation that commutes with condi-
tionalisation:
Definition 3.5.1. The Geometric Conciliatory View
Given a case in which 𝑛 individuals 1, ...,𝑛 disagree over the proposition 𝑃 , the
Geometric Conciliatory View suggests the individuals involved to have credence
∑︁
𝜔∈𝑃
𝑐 · 𝑃 𝑟1(𝜔)𝛼1 · · ·𝑃 𝑟𝑛(𝜔)𝛼𝑛
in the proposition 𝑃 , where the factors 𝛼1, ...,𝛼𝑛 are the weights assigned to each
individual which sum up to 1, and the constant 𝑐 is a normalisation factor which
guarantees that the sum of joint credences across all worlds equals 1:
𝑐 =
1∑︀
𝜔′∈Ω 𝑃 𝑟1(𝜔′)𝛼1 · · ·𝑃 𝑟𝑛(𝜔′)𝛼𝑛
.
A technical point to be highlighted is that the credence functions here take a single
11This idea is first proposed by Martini et al. (2013). However, they did not fully explore the
possible outcomes of adopting nonlinear functions to make conciliation.
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possible world, rather than a proposition, as its input.12 The credence each indi-
vidual has in a proposition can be derived by summing up the credence over each
possible worlds included in the proposition.13
To show that the Geometric Conciliatory View does commute with conditional-
isation, we need to reformulate the rule of conditionalisation.14 Given any piece of
evidence 𝐸, the information it carries allows the individuals to derive a likelihood
function 𝐿 which assigns either the value 1 or 0 to each possible world. If a world
𝜔𝑘 is in 𝐸, then 𝐿(·) assigns 1 to 𝜔𝑘. An individual 𝑖 can then update their credence
function 𝑃 as
𝑃 𝑟𝐿𝑖 (𝜔) =
𝑃 𝑟𝑖(𝜔)𝐿(𝜔)∑︀
𝜔′∈Ω 𝑃 𝑟𝑖(𝜔′)𝐿(𝜔′)
which is equivalent to
𝑃 𝑟𝐸𝑖 (𝜔) =
𝑃 𝑟𝑖(𝜔)𝑃 𝑟𝑖(𝐸|𝜔)∑︀
𝜔′∈Ω 𝑃 𝑟𝑖(𝜔′)𝑃 𝑟𝑖(𝐸|𝜔′)
.
Since this formula is the rule of conditionalisation in a different form, updating
with a likelihood function is equivalent to updating with conditionalisation.
With the new form of conditionalisation, we can now show that the Geometric
Conciliatory View commutes with conditionalisation. Take 𝑃 𝑟𝐿𝑃 𝑟1,...,𝑃 𝑟𝑛(·) as the joint
credence function obtained in the case where the individuals first conciliate with
all others and subsequently update with a likelihood function 𝐿. 𝑃 𝑟𝑃 𝑟𝐿1 ,...,𝑃 𝑟𝐿𝑛 (·), on
the other hand, stands for the joint credence function obtained in the case where
the individuals first update with the likelihood function 𝐿(·) and then conciliate
with the others. To show that the two functions yield the same outcome, it suf-
fices to show that the two functions are proportional since any two probability
functions that are proportional to one another must be identical. Consider the
12This is in line with the definition that each credence function assigns a value to each possible
world.
13For a detailed explanation, see Dietrich and List (2016, p.8).
14The likelihood function, compared to Bayesian conditionalisation, is actually a more general
update rule, as it can take any possible value, rather than the discrete values 1 and 0. From this
perspective, Bayesian conditionalisation is a limiting case of updating by a likelihood function. See
Dietrich and List (2016).
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case in which the individuals make a conciliation first. Suppose there are 𝑛 in-
dividuals who disagree over their credence of a single possible world 𝜔. If they
adopt the Geometric Conciliatory View and make a conciliation, the result would
be 𝑃 𝑟1(𝜔)𝛼1 · · ·𝑃 𝑟𝑛(𝜔)𝛼𝑛 . When they jointly receive a piece of evidence 𝐸 and derive
a likelihood function 𝐿(·) from it, the outcome of updating would then be propor-
tional to 𝑃 𝑟1(𝜔)𝛼1 · · ·𝑃 𝑟𝑛(𝜔)𝛼𝑛𝐿(𝜔). On the other hand, when the individuals first
update their credence functions with 𝐿(·), we have a set of updated credence func-
tions 𝑃 𝑟𝐿𝑖 (𝜔). Each function in the set is equivalent to 𝑃 𝑟𝑖(𝜔)𝐿(𝜔). The individuals
later conciliate with the others and get the result (𝑃 𝑟1(𝜔)𝐿(𝜔))𝛼1 · · · (𝑃 𝑟𝑛(𝜔)𝐿(𝜔))𝛼𝑛 ,
which is equivalent to 𝑃 𝑟1(𝜔)𝛼1 · · ·𝑃 𝑟𝑛(𝜔)𝛼𝑛 · 𝐿(𝜔)𝛼1+···+𝛼𝑛 . Since 𝛼1, ...,𝛼𝑛 sum up
to one, this result is proportional to 𝑃 𝑟1(𝜔)𝛼1 · · ·𝑃 𝑟𝑛(𝜔)𝛼𝑛𝐿(𝜔), namely the result in
the first case. We may hence conclude that the Geometric Conciliatory View does
commute with conditionalisation.15
The problem of path dependence can be solved by adopting the Multiplicative
Conciliatory View which suggests individuals to conciliate with multiplicative av-
eraging:16
Definition 3.5.2. The Multiplicative Conciliatory View
Given a case in which 𝑛 individuals 1, ...,𝑛 disagree over the proposition 𝑃 , the
Multiplicative EWV suggests the individuals involved to have credence
∑︁
𝑤∈𝑃
𝑐 · 𝑃 𝑟1(𝜔) · · ·𝑃 𝑟𝑛(𝜔)
in the proposition 𝑃 . The constant 𝑐 is a normalisation factor which guarantees
that the sum of joint credences of all propositions equals to 1.
𝑐 =
1∑︀
𝜔′∈Ω 𝑃 𝑟1(𝜔′) · · ·𝑃 𝑟𝑛(𝜔′)
.
Two points should be noted: First, the Multiplicative Conciliatory View, like the
15This simplified proof is presented by Dietrich and List (2016). The original proof that geomet-
ric averaging commutes with conditionalisation is provided by Genest (1984).
16Dietrich (2010) and Easwaran et al. (2016) both provide detailed analysis of the features of the
multiplicative average function.
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Geometric Conciliatory View, also takes a single world as the input instead of a
proposition. Second, this view assigns equal weight to all the credence functions
involved. Hence, we do not have to explicitly assign weight to each credence func-
tion.
It need not be proved that the Multiplicative Conciliatory View is path in-
dependent. Since multiplication is associative, it trivially holds that any con-
ciliation made this way is also associative.17 The problem of path dependence,
hence, would not occur for anyone conciliating with the Multiplicative Concilia-
tory View.1819
Both the Geometric EWV and the Multiplicative EWV preserve one’s judge-
ment that two events are independent. The proof is also trivial. According to
both the Geometric and the Multiplicative Conciliatory View, individuals should
multiply their credences to make conciliation. Hence, the joint credence function
of a group of peers assign a value which is equivalent to the product of the cre-
dences of each individual. The problem of independence preservation can thus
be solved. This point can be illustrated with a toy example: Consider a case in-
volving two peers whose credences are represented respectively by the function
𝑃 𝑟1(·) and 𝑃 𝑟2(·). Let their joint credence function be 𝑃 𝑟1+2(·). To show that both
the Geometric and the Multiplicative Conciliatory View preserve their judgement
that two propositions are independent, what we need to prove is that 𝑃 𝑟1+2(· ∧ ·) is
equivalent to 𝑃 𝑟1+2(·)𝑃 𝑟1+2(·) when the inputs are independent. According to the
17One may wonder whether the process of normalisation make the Multiplicative Conciliatory
View path dependent. To show that it does not, it suffices to show that the normalisation factors
do not vary with the path. Consider a toy example in which 𝑃 𝑟1(𝜔) = 𝛼, 𝑃 𝑟2(𝜔) = 𝛽 and 𝑃 𝑟3(𝜔) = 𝛾 .
Given the Multiplicative Conciliatory View, one may obtain the result that 𝑃 𝑟1+2(𝜔) = 𝑐 · 𝛼𝛽 and
𝑃 𝑟1+2+3(𝜔) = 𝑐′ · 𝑐 ·𝛼𝛽𝛾 where 𝑐 and 𝑐′ stand respectively for the normalisation factor at each stage
of conciliation. If we change the order of conciliation, we may derive the final result 𝑃 𝑟1+3+2(𝜔) =
𝑐′′ · 𝑐′′′ ·𝛼𝛽𝛾 . By expanding the normalisation factors, one can see that 𝑐 · 𝑐′ is equivalent to 𝑐′′ · 𝑐′′′ .
We may see that the process of normalisation does not make the Multiplicative Conciliatory View
path dependent.
18Easwaran et al. (2016, p.16) provides a different proof to show the same result.
19It should be noted that multiplicative averaging does not commute with conditionalisation.
Suppose that a group of five individuals conciliate with multiplicative averaging and obtain a result
𝑥. Upon receiving a piece of evidence 𝑒, they update with conditionalisation and get the final result
𝑥𝐿(𝑒). If they change the order and update before conciliation, the result would be 𝑥𝐿(𝑒)5, which
differs from 𝑥𝐿(𝑒).
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definition of the Geometric and the Multiplicative Conciliatory View, 𝑃 𝑟1+2(· ∧ ·)
is equivalent to 𝑃 𝑟1(· ∧ ·)𝑃 𝑟2(· ∧ ·). When the inputs are independent for both in-
dividuals, 𝑃 𝑟1+2(· ∧ ·) is equivalent to 𝑃 𝑟1(·)𝑃 𝑟1(·)𝑃 𝑟2(·)𝑃 𝑟2(·). Since this formula is
equivalent to 𝑃 𝑟1+2(·)𝑃 𝑟1+2(·), one’s judgement that two propositions are indepen-
dent can be well preserved.
In sum, the three formal deficiencies of the Linear EWV can be solved respec-
tively by making conciliation with different nonlinear average functions. Since the
proofs do not assume that all credence function involved are assigned with equal
weight, the same formal result holds for every possible weight distribution. The
Conciliatory View, hence, is free from the three formal deficiencies.20
3.6 Other features of nonlinear conciliation
Although switching to nonlinear average functions may save the Conciliatory View
from the three formal deficiencies, there is a standing worry that both nonlinear
average functions introduced are far from ideal. The Geometric Conciliatory View,
despite commuting with conditionalisation, is still path dependent. The Multi-
plicative Conciliatory View, on the contrary, is path independent but not commu-
tative with conditionalisation. Also, it should be noted that both nonlinear Con-
ciliatory Views fail to be eventwise independent. That is, if we adopt the nonlinear
Conciliatory Views, the collective credences of a group do not depend solely on
the conciliating individuals’ credences of the proposition but would be influenced
by some other factors, such as the content of the agenda (Aczél and Wagner, 1980;
McConway, 1981; Stewart and Quintana, 2018; Dietrich and List, 2016).21 Since
20One may think of a case where one needs several features. For instance, one may expect their
average function to commute both with the acquisition of new testimonial evidence and the rule of
conditionalisation. In such a case, no single average function is proper. This is indeed a problem
to the current approach. A possible solution which I have not yet fully explored is to develop a
hybrid average rule which mixes the outcomes of different nonlinear average functions and keep
the valuable features as much as possible.
21A practical consequence of adopting the nonlinear Conciliatory Views is that the result of
conciliation would be partly determined by the agenda, namely the set of propositions people dis-
agree on. Since the nonlinear average functions are not eventwise independent, the joint credence
a group has in a proposition may differ under different agendas. See McConway (1981) for the
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no average function is perfect, some might still consider the Conciliatory View
untenable.
This worry does not undermine the current approach but instead motivates us
to embrace a pluralistic conception of conciliation. Since there does not exist a per-
fect average function which is applicable in every case, we should, in each specific
case, adopt the average function that is most likely to avoid potential problems.
For instance, if I am involved in a disagreement where I am sure that no further
conciliation would take place but some new evidence may appear, I should adopt
the Geometric Conciliatory View. By doing so, I can guarantee that the time I re-
ceive the evidence does not determine the outcome of conciliation. Similarly, if I
know that someone owns the power of changing the agenda and I do not want the
result of conciliation to be manipulated by the agenda setter, I should adopt the
Linear Conciliatory View. The next step the conciliationists should take, therefore,
is to create a taxonomy of disagreements. By attentively categorising various cases
of disagreement, we may apply the right rule of conciliation when a disagreement
occurs. The primary aim of this section, hence, is to demonstrate some features
of the Geometric and Multiplicative EWV and specify the conditions under which
they should be applied.22
To see other features of different average functions, we should first compare the
outcomes of adopting different average functions in a simple scenario. Suppose
proof that linear averaging is the only function which satisfies the requirement of being eventwise
independent. Adopting nonlinear Conciliatory Views, thus, makes the conciliating individuals
vulnerable to manipulation by the agenda setters. An agenda setter may decide their joint cre-
dences in propositions by setting the agenda in a specific way. The reason is that given different
agendas, the underlying set of worlds may change. Imagine a panel of climate scientists negotiating
about a set of propositions on an agenda with the intention to decide their joint credences over the
propositions. When someone expands the agenda with one more proposition, say whether there
will be a hurricane next year, each world 𝜔 in the underlying set of possible worlds Ω would have
to be replaced by two worlds: one which is a combination of 𝜔 and there being hurricane next yest,
and another which combines 𝜔 and there being no hurricane next year. If one adopts the nonlinear
Conciliatory Views, a change of agenda may lead to different outcomes of conciliation. Hence, the
agenda setter may manipulate the result by setting the agenda in a specific way. This is another
unacceptable result since, as indicated before, an ideal rule of conciliation should not leave space
for manipulation.
22For the sake of simplicity, here I consider different EWVs, rather than different Conciliatory
Views. The formal properties of different EWVs can be generalised to other forms of the Concilia-
tory View.
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Figure 3-1: Individual with credence 0.5 compromises with a peer whose credence
is 𝑥
one has 0.5 credence in a proposition and conciliates with a peer whose credence
is 𝑥.23 The outcomes of one’s conciliation according to different average functions
can be seen in Figure 3-1. The value on the 𝑥 axis stands for one’s peer’s credence
in the proposition under dispute, while the value on the 𝑦 axis stands for the out-
come of conciliation. The solid and dotted lines respectively represent the result
of adopting the Linear and Multiplicative EWV, while the S-curve represents the
Geometric EWV.
The Linear EWV, compared to the other two average functions, is the most
resolute one since the disagreeing individuals who adopt this view never defer, in
any sense, to each other. What they do is just split the difference between their
credences.
The Multiplicative EWV generates a different result in this case. When one has
0.5 credence in a proposition and conciliates with their peer according to the Mul-
tiplicative EWV, the outcome would always equal to their peer’s credence. That is,
23It should be noted that one having a credence of a proposition is an abbreviation of one having
a set of credences in the worlds where the proposition is true.
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one always completely yields to their peer.24
The outcome of adopting the Geometric EWV is the most intriguing. It behaves
like the Linear EWV when the peer’s credence is moderate, but gradually deviates
from the Linear EWV as the peer’s credence gets close to the extreme. Suppose
that an individual 𝐴 has a 0.5 credence in a proposition 𝑝 and conciliates with geo-
metric averaging. Let A’s peer’s credence be 𝑥, A’s credence after to the conciliation




2 · 0.5 12
𝑥
1
2 · 0.5 12 + (1− 𝑥) 12 · (1− 0.5) 12
If one conciliates with geometric averaging, one yields to one’s peer to some extent
in all the cases where my peer’s credence is not 0.5. For example, if we plug 𝑥 = 0.3
in the equation, the outcome is approximately 0.3956 which is slightly closer to 0.3
than 0.5. This feature gets stronger as the peer’s credence gets more extremal. If
we plug in 𝑥 = 0.95 in the equation, the outcome would be approximately 0.8133.
This result, compared to the former one, is closer to the value we plug in for 𝑥 then
0.5. That is, |0.8133−0.5|−|0.8133−0.95| is greater than |0.3956−0.5|−|0.3956−0.3|.
Having 0.5 credence in the disputed claim is a special case. If we relax this
assumption and consider other credences, we may find a rather intriguing feature:
Based on the Geometric EWV, if one’s peer’s credence is closer to the extreme, one’s
credence after conciliating with the peer would be closer to the peer’s credence
than one’s own prior credence. For example, assume that one has a 0.6 credence.
If one’s peer has a more extreme credence, say 0.2, then the outcome of conciliation
would be closer to 0.2 then to 0.6.25 We may interpret this as a form of deference:
When one’s peer has a stronger opinion in a dispute, one would defer to the peer.26
24Easwaran et al. (2016) also mentioned this result.










2 + (1− 0.2)
1




. This result is closer to 0.2 then to 0.6.
26A solid proof, however, is unavailable here as cases involving more than two individuals should
be considered. Thanks to Catrin Campbell-Moore and Julien Dutant for their comments on this
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Figure 3-2: Individual with credence 0.9 compromises with a peer whose credence
is 𝑥
Figure 3-2 presents a case in which one’s credence in the proposition under dis-
pute is 0.9, while their peer’s credence is again 𝑥. In this case, the Linear and the
Geometric EWV behave in the same way, while the outcome of adopting the Mul-
tiplicative EWV is significantly different. When both the individual and their peer
have 0.9 credence in the proposition, the outcome of conciliation, given the Multi-
plicative EWV, would be greater than 0.9. This is a property Easwaran et al. (2016)
call synergy. When both the individuals’ credences are high, the outcome would
be even higher. Because of this property, the result generated by the Multiplicative
EWV, compared to the other two EWVs, is always closer to the extreme.
What, then, is the correct way of making conciliation? Should one adopt the
Geometric EWV and make a radical change of credence only when the peer is
strongly opinionated? Or, should one adopt the Multiplicative EWV and some-
times completely surrender to the peer? As previously indicated, one should pick
the EWV which is free from foreseeable problems. Moreover, a general guideline
is to pick the rule according to how resolute one wants to be. As I point out, the
point.
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Linear EWV, compared to the other two, is the most unwavering one. Individuals
who adopt this view never completely surrender to their peers. The Multiplicative
EWV, as we have seen, is the least resilient among the three, as it makes the in-
dividuals yield to their peers more frequently than any other views. Bearing this
feature in mind, one may, in each specific scenario, choose the one that best suits
the case.
One may think that in a standard case of peer disagreement, there is a perfect
symmetry between the disagreeing individuals. Hence, the individuals involved
should never yield to the others’ opinion, which implies that the Linear EWV is
the only acceptable option. In fact, even in these cases, one may choose to be less
resilient about their credence. Here I want to highlight two factors that are crucial
in deciding which EWV to adopt. One is the strength of the evidence one possesses
which decides how resilient their credence is. The stronger their evidence is, the
more unwilling one is to revise their credence. Another factor is the extent the
evidence is shared. The more one knows about their peers’ evidence before the
conciliation, the more likely that one retains their original credence.27 This point
can be illustrated by considering the case in which the individuals do not share
their evidence. If one does not know whether their peer has evidence concerning
a proposition, when one realises that their peer has some credence different from
their own, one should be able to infer that their peer does have some evidence.
One may hence be inclined to defer to their peer. If one knows all the evidence
their peer possesses, there is no reason to defer. With the two factors explained,
we may see how different EWVs capture these intuitions.28
Case 1. An individual has no evidence concerning a proposition 𝑝 and has 0.5 credence
27As noted before, although deviate from the standard cases of disagreement in the literature,
cases in which the individuals do not share all their evidence are still worth discussing. See Math-
eson (2014).
28Note that we focus on the evidence each individual possesses here. It is also possible that, upon
realising that a peer has a different credence, an individual chooses to deem the peer unreliable.
However, this would be a case in which the individual adopts the Steadfast View. If one aims to
stick to the Conciliatory View, the more appropriate reaction is to infer that the peer possesses
different evidence.
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in it.29 They do not know if their peer has any evidence.
From the individual’s perspective, their peer is equally likely to have the cor-
rect credence as the individual, When the individual realises that their peer has
a different credence in the same proposition and hence disagrees with them, it is
reasonable for them to think that there are some underlying reasons. Otherwise,
their peer would not have a different credence. The most probable reason, given
the peerhood between them, is that their peer has better evidence and come up
with more definite credence. In such a case, one should completely defer to their
peer. After all, the individual has no evidence concerning the dispute. The Multi-
plicative EWV generates the correct result in this specific circumstance.
Case 2. An individual has some evidence concerning a proposition 𝑝 and has 0.5 cre-
dence in it. They know that their peer has some evidence, but do not know the strength
of their peer’s evidence.
When the individual realises that their peer’s credence is not radically different
from theirs, they could conciliate by moderately deferring to their peer. If one
finds out that their peer’s credence is very strong, they may realise that their peer’s
evidence must be rather conclusive. After all, they are equally good in evaluating
the strength of the evidence they each possess. Hence, they should yield to their
peer. Adopting the Geometric EWV generates the correct result.
One possible challenge to the solution is that their peer might come to have
high credence with some weak evidence. If it is so, then it would be wrong for
the individual to defer to their peer. However, by assuming the peerhood between
them, this kind of cases should not occur. That is, a genuine epistemic peer would
not come to have high credence based on insufficient evidence. True epistemic
peers should be equally careful in evaluating the evidence available to them.
Apart from the two factors, there are some other important aspects that should
be considered when choosing the proper rule for conciliation.
29It should be noted that I do not intend to imply that whenever one has no evidence concerning
a proposition, one comes to have 0.5 credence over that proposition.
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3.6.1 Joint decision making
The purpose of conciliation should be taken as a crucial factor in choosing the
rule. On some occasions, the primary purpose of conciliation is to come up with
a joint decision on whether to take a certain action. These cases are called action-
disagreement. Different from belief-disagreement, a true resolution of an action-
disagreement is an all or nothing thing, namely that the individuals involved
either take action or not. There is no middle ground between the two options.
Hence, an ideal rule of conciliation for an action-disagreement should be one
which helps the individuals arriving at a consensus about whether to take action.
Recall that the Multiplicative EWV has the feature of synergy, namely that one’s
credence enhances another if they point to the same direction. Because of this fea-
ture, when all the individuals’ credences are above 0.5, the outcome of conciliation
with the Multiplicative EWV, compared to the other rules of conciliation, would
be much closer to 1. Similarly, when all the individuals’ credences are below 0.5,
the outcome of adopting the Multiplicative EWV would be very close to 0.
Imagine that a group of people set the following rule: when their joint credence
in whether they should perform an act is above 0.7, they will take action. If the
joint credence is below 0.7, they would choose to do nothing. The feature of synergy
would make it more likely for such a group to take an action. Compared to the
unanimity preserving Linear EWV, the Multiplicative EWV better tackles some
cases of action-disagreement.30
3.6.2 Polarisation
A further application of nonlinear average functions is to take them as ways of
forming group beliefs. However, doing so may lead to some undesirable conse-
quences. A phenomenon that worries many social epistemologists is belief polari-
sation. Consider a case where two individuals disagree about a controversial fact.
30Still, whether this feature is desirable could be doubted. It is possible that a group wants to be
conservative when making decisions concerning whether to act. In this kind of case, the individuals
involved should not conciliate with multiplicative averaging.
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When they are both exposed to some pieces of evidence concerning the disputed
fact, it is natural for one to expect that the disagreement between them to be mit-
igated. However, empirical studies have shown that such expectation differs from
what happens in reality.31 When the individuals are presented with evidence of a
mixed character, they tend to strengthen their prior credence on the controversy.
That is, one who believes that the disputed fact obtains would become even more
certain about the fact, while the other one behaves in precisely the opposite way.
Hence, sharing evidence may lead to an increase in the difference between their
credences.
Polarisation gets even more severe when we escalate to the level of group dis-
agreement. Suppose that two groups disagree over a proposition 𝑝. Members of
group 𝐴 believe that 𝑝 is more likely to be true than not, while members of group
𝐵 believe the opposite. When the members of the two groups are exposed to some
evidence concerning 𝑝, it can be expected that the two groups become more po-
larised than two individuals. First, what happens in the individual level would
occur again: the members of 𝐴 come to have stronger credence in 𝑝, while mem-
bers of 𝐵 revise their credences in the opposite way. Second, since the members
are now grouped with others who share similar ideas, they would communicate
with others and consolidate their credence over the disputed proposition. The two
mechanisms make belief polarisation even more intense at the group level.
With the phenomenon of belief polarisation stated, we may now ask the ques-
tion: Which rule should one adopt when the members of group 𝐴 intends to come
up with a joint credence over 𝑝? The Multiplicative EWV is a bad option as its
result is comparatively extreme.32 Suppose that group 𝐴 consists of four mem-
bers. After being exposed to the evidence, half of the members have 0.7 credence
in 𝑝 while another half have 0.8. Adopting the Multiplicative EWV, the outcome
of their conciliation would be approximately 0.99. Since this result is much higher
31See Kelly (2008) and Sunstein (2017) for a full-fledged discussion about polarisation.
32Here I assume that the members of a group do not come up with their credences independently.
If they do, the Multiplicative EWV can be a good option for them to derive their joint credence as
their credences can be amplified.
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than each of their prior credence, the difference between the the joint credence of
group 𝐴 and group 𝐵 becomes greater. Polarisation is further intensified with no
substantial reason.33
The Geometric EWV performs slightly better in this case. If members of group
𝐴 conciliate with the geometric EWV, the outcome would be approximately 0.78,
which is not very distant from their original credence. However, the Geometric
EWV has the feature that when one of the members is strongly opinionated, oth-
ers tend to defer to their credence. When one of the members have very high
credence, the outcome would be dragged toward their credence. Hence, adopting
the Geometric EWV may still heighten polarisation in certain situations.
The Linear EWV, compared to the nonlinear ones, is the most conservative rule
of conciliation. In cases where people have a strong intention to avoid polarisation,
the Linear EWV is the appropriate one to adopt. In sum, both the Geometric and
the Multiplicative EWV run the risk of intensifying polarisation. Anyone involved
in a disagreement which may lead to polarisation should be aware of the outcome
of adopting a rule of conciliation.
Although there are still many other cases that could be discussed, the conclu-
sion I would like to draw has been clearly illustrated by reviewing these possible
cases of disagreement. There are cases where one should conditionally defer to
their peers. Yet there are also cases where one should not defer in any sense. We
may therefore conclude that there is no ultimately correct method of making con-
ciliation. The decision concerning the average function one is supposed to apply
must be based upon the specific situation one is involved.
33A question arises here: sometimes we do want synergy. But in many other occasions, we prefer
to avoid polarisation. There is supposed to be a more concrete criteria for us to decide whether to
adopt multiplicative averaging or not. I think this is a question about specific types of disagree-
ment. For example, people should avoid polarisation when it comes to political issues. Since the




The formal deficiencies of the Conciliatory View, as we have seen, stem from the
misconception that there is only one way, namely linear averaging, that could be
adopted to make conciliation. By selecting alternative average functions to make
conciliation, the problems dissolve naturally.
Conciliating in a nonlinear way leads to some intriguing results. The most
prominent one is that an individual may assign equal weight to all their epistemic
peers yet be resilient and makes a marginal revision of their own credence. If we
interpret the weight one assigns to their peers as the extent one trusts the peers, we
may derive the result that an individual can fully respect their peers’ competence
in a subject matter, but still retain their credence concerning the proposition in
question. From this result, we may see that previous discussion concerning the
Equal Weight View and the Conciliatory View are misguided. Before we argue
whether we should conciliate, we should elaborate on the notion of conciliation
we are using.
The study of different kinds of conciliation motivates us to embrace a pluralis-
tic conception of conciliation. What we should do, hence, is to construct a taxon-
omy of disagreements carefully. By correctly sorting different cases, we may apply
the right function to make conciliation for each case. The discussion over whether




Escaping an Echo Chamber
4.1 Introduction
The core issue in the study of disagreement is whether one should conciliate with
one’s peer in a case of disagreement. On one side of the debate stand the concili-
ationists, claiming that one should conciliate with a peer except in extreme cases.
On the other side stand the steadfasters, arguing for the position that one should
remain steadfast in most cases of disagreement. As both views are supported by
various deliberate arguments, epistemologists have not yet reached a consensus
about whether one should conciliate in a case of disagreement.
It would be good to have a clear way of defining the views in this debate. But
the Steadfast View does not always recommend that one remain steadfast as it
sometimes requires one to conciliate with one’s peer. Similarly, the Conciliatory
View does not always recommend that you conciliate: it allows you to remain
steadfast in some extreme cases. Without a precise distinction between the two
views, epistemologists may talk past each other while seeking the proper solution
to disagreement.
Christensen (2011) points out that the two views are divided by the Principle of
Independence, which can be reformulated as the following:
‘In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another’s expressed belief
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about 𝑃 , in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own be-
lief about 𝑃 , I should do so in a way that does not rely on the reasoning
behind my initial belief about 𝑃 .’ (Christensen, 2011, p.1)
This principle restricts the way one reacts to a disagreement. To see the restric-
tion it sets, consider an example of peer disagreement. Suppose that an individual
wants to decide whether to believe 𝑃 . After she reasons with the evidence she has,
she comes to believe that 𝑃 . One of her peers, on the contrary, does not believe 𝑃
despite having the same evidence. When the individual realises that her peer does
not believe 𝑃 , she can see that her peer reasons in a different way and comes up
with a different belief. From her perspective, she may infer that her peer fails to
perform the correct reasoning and thus forms an incorrect belief about 𝑃 . Follow-
ing this line of thought, a natural response for her is to deem her peer unreliable,
as her peer fails to reason correctly. Thus, she would hold her original belief con-
cerning 𝑃 in the face of her peer’s disagreement. The Principle of Independence
prohibits such a line of reasoning. When an individual is involved in a disagree-
ment, what is implied by the very existence of the disagreement is that the indi-
vidual may have made a mistake in her reasoning about the disputed claim. Since
the existence of disagreement implies such a possibility, the individual should not
insist that her initial reasoning is correct and deem her peer unreliable for having
a different belief. If she does so, she takes what is shown to be possibly mistaken,
namely her own reasoning behind 𝑃 , as a reason to dismiss her peer’s belief. In
other words, she refutes the challenge to her reasoning behind 𝑃 with her reason-
ing behind 𝑃 . To avoid such circularity, she needs to find a reason independent
from her initial reasoning about 𝑃 to show that her peer is unreliable. If she can-
not find an independent reason, she should conciliate with her peer by suspending
her judgement concerning 𝑃 .
How does the Principle of Independence separate the two views? It is generally
agreed that the views conforming to this principle should be categorised into the
group of the Conciliatory Views. If an individual accepts this principle, she cannot
deem her peer unreliable simply because her peer reasons differently. Thus, in the
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absence of an independent reason, one who conforms to this principle should con-
ciliate with one’s peer. On the other hand, an individual who rejects the Principle
of Independence can, when involved in disagreement, deem her peer unreliable
without an independent reason. Hence, there is nothing which prohibits the in-
dividual to remain steadfast in the face of her peer’s disagreement. Rejecting the
Principle of Independence thereby allows one to remain steadfast in a disagree-
ment.
As this principle marks the distinction between the two prominent views about
disagreement, the debate can hopefully be settled if epistemologists can agree on
whether the principle is correct. Like many other tasks in philosophy, this task
has not been done yet. The purpose of this chapter is to approach this decade-old
problem from a new perspective. Instead of reflecting on the underlying ratio-
nale behind the Principle of Independence, I will consider the pragmatic results of
adopting and rejecting this principle. More specifically, I will focus on the features
of the epistemic communities that will be formed given this principle. A striking
discovery is that both conforming to and violating this principle may lead to a de-
fective epistemic network. If an individual follows the Principle of Independence
and conciliates with her peer whenever they disagree, it is highly likely for her
to end up in an epistemic bubble, an epistemic network where all the members
unknowingly share some false belief. On the other hand, if an individual rejects
this principle and deems her peer unreliable when they disagree, she would be
trapped in an epistemic echo chamber, an epistemic network where members re-
ject any information from sources outside of the network. As both results are
undesirable, epistemologists face a potential dilemma concerning the Principle of
Independence.
The key notion for dissolving the dilemma is one’s estimate of the reliability
of one’s peer. It should be noted that the notion of reliability here differs from
the normal understanding. What I refer by the term ‘reliability’ is the probability
one comes up with the correct credence concerning a proposition. That is, if the
probability for me to have the correct credence concerning in a proposition 𝑝 is
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0.8, I would assume that the probability for my peer to have the correct credence
is also 0.8. Suppose that an individual conforms to the Principle of Independence.
When she disagrees with a peer whom she originally recognises as very reliable,
she would conciliate with the peer and adjust her belief. Despite the disagree-
ment between them, she still sees her peer as a very reliable person. Therefore,
she chooses not to downgrade her estimate of her peer’s reliability even when they
disagree. That is, she still assumes that it is very probable for her peer to have
the correct credence over the dispute. If, on the contrary, an individual rejects the
principle, it would then be legitimate for her to remain steadfast and keep her ini-
tial belief. What is implied by such an act is that the individual, because of the
disagreement, no longer sees her peer as a reliable person and thus downgrades
her estimate of her peer’s reliability. With this line of reasoning, we may charac-
terise the conflict between the conciliationists and the steadfasters as a problem
concerning whether an individual should downgrade her estimate of her peer’s
reliability in a disagreement. What epistemologists seem to miss is that the two
responses are actually compatible. When involved in a disagreement, an individ-
ual can both conciliate with her peer and downgrade her estimate of her peer’s
reliability, as long as she takes the two actions at different times.
The overall project, hence, is to argue for a different type of the Conciliatory
View. When one is involved in disagreement, one should on the one hand concil-
iate with one’s peer and revise one’s credence over the disputed proposition and,
on the other hand, also revise one’s estimate of the probability one’s peer comes up
with the correct credence. If we can develop a systematic method for updating the
two values in disagreement, we may have a solution to disagreement which is free
from possible negative outcomes.
In the following sections, I will first outline the prominent debate in the study
of disagreement, introduce the mainstream solutions and narrow the problem
down to the discussion concerning the Principle of Independence. With a clear
presentation of the motivation behind the principle, I will illustrate how the prin-
ciple leads to a potential dilemma for social epistemologists. A possible solution
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to the dilemma, as I will argue, is to adopt a diachronic strategy for adjusting
one’s estimate of the peer’s reliability. When one is involved in a disagreement,
one should make a conciliation and also update one’s estimate of the interlocutor’s
reliability at different times. Given this idea, I develop a new strategy for updating
one’s estimate of a peer’s reliability. We can, with this strategy, avoid being trapped
in a defective epistemic network and approach the core problem of disagreement
from a different perspective.
4.2 Disagreement
Disagreement, as a phenomenon, has existed for thousands of years. It might be
an exaggeration saying that all human beings by nature desire to quarrel, but it
is definitely fair to claim that this phenomenon has accompanied human beings
since the very beginning of history. Examples are ubiquitous. Aristotle disagreed
with Plato on issues in metaphysics. Lavoisier disagreed with Priestley about the
cause of combustion. Keynes disagreed with Hayek over the cure for the Great
Depression. Disagreement can be found in nearly all disciplines between all kinds
of people. One of the reasons for this phenomenon being so common is that it plays
a crucial role in the growth of human knowledge. When an individual disagrees
with another, she would, on the one hand, reexamine her own view and, on the
other hand, scrutinise her interlocutor’s claim. Without this process of mutual
assessment, the discovery of new knowledge would at best be greatly decelerated
and fail at worst.
Despite its importance, disagreement has not been discussed philosophically
until recent years. Due to its presence in the philosophy of religion and the rise of
social epistemology, disagreement has gradually become a prominent topic in con-
temporary epistemology.1 By analysing the very notion of disagreement, philoso-
phers aim to find an ideal way of responding to information about a range of rele-
1van Inwagen (1996) is the first one who considers this issue in the context of the philosophy of
religion.
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vant opinions. To achieve this goal, we must first clarify a fundamental question:
what is disagreement?
The simplest form of disagreement involves two individuals and a proposition.
One of the individuals believes that the proposition is true, while another believes
that it is false. When both individuals realise that the other holds a different dox-
astic attitude towards the proposition in question, the disagreement between them
becomes manifest.2 This mutual recognition of disagreement motivates both to re-
act in some ways. Without this moment of recognition, people may not think that
a solution to disagreement is required.3 We can also frame this problem in terms
of credences: when two individuals differ in their credences over a proposition
and realise this fact, they disagree over that proposition. Given this basic form, we
may generate different instances of disagreement by altering the basic setting or
supplementing specific details. Disagreement can happen between large groups
of people, instead of just two individuals. The most noticeable instance of a large
scale disagreement is political disagreement, where supporters of different politi-
cal parties hold extremely different attitudes towards a proposition. Disagreement
may also happen between specific types of individuals. Suppose there is a group
of individuals having great expertise in a subject. When they have different opin-
ions concerning a proposition in that area of study, a case of expert disagreement
arises. If, on the contrary, a group of people lacking expertise in a field disagree
over a proposition in that field, we have a case of layperson disagreement. When a
group of individuals disagree on whether to jointly believe a proposition, we have
a standard case of belief disagreement. If a group of individuals disagree over
whether to perform an act together, we have a case of action disagreement. All
these different kinds of disagreements are significant and hence deserve further
2One may argue that intrapersonal disagreement, namely the kind of case in which an indi-
vidual has a contradictory pair of beliefs, is also a form of disagreement. As it involves only one
individual, it should be taken as the simplest form disagreement. It is without doubt true that
intrapersonal disagreement is also a kind of disagreement. However, the solution to intrapersonal
disagreement is substantially different from the solution to other kinds of disagreements. For this
reason, taking it as the simplest case may bring in unnecessary confusion to the discussion.
3There are cases in which only one of the two individuals notices they disagree over a proposi-
tion. Still, the one aware of the disagreement needs to react somehow.
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discussion.
With the basic understanding of disagreement, we may formulate the core
question as the following: what should an individual do when she is involved in a
disagreement? More specifically, how should an individual react when she realises
that her interlocutor does not share her belief but instead denies it? At first glance,
this question is quite simple. If the individual involved in disagreement believes
that she is far superior to her interlocutor in the ability to find the truth, she does
not need to do anything but retain her original belief. If she believes that she is
inferior, she should listen to her interlocutor who performs better in finding the
truth. To see this, consider the following example:
Example 4.2.1. Dermatologist
Stephanie, a qualified dermatologist, examines her patient who has a skin con-
dition. After the examination, Stephanie makes the judgement that the patient
has atopic eczema. The patient, however, believes that what he has is not eczema
but psoriasis. Stephanie is fully aware of the fact that her patient has no exper-
tise in dermatology. The patient also knows that, compared to a dermatologist, his
knowledge in dermatology is insufficient.
Since Stephanie knows that the patient has never received any training in der-
matology, she can infer that she is superior, compared to the patient, in making
diagnoses about skin conditions. Hence, when Stephanie realises that the patient
does not believe that he has atopic eczema, it is rational for her to ignore the pa-
tient’s judgement and keep her original belief that the patient does have atopic
eczema. The patient, ideally, should follow the same line of reasoning. Before
seeing the dermatologist, the patient believes that he has psoriasis. When the der-
matologist tells him that what he has is atopic eczema, the patient, knowing that
he has not been trained in dermatology, should give up his belief that what both-
ers him is psoriasis. The disagreement between the dermatologist and the patient,
hence, can be immediately solved.
One’s superiority over one’s interlocutor may stem from several different sources.
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The dermatologist case shows that when all the disagreeing individuals know that
one among them performs better in finding the truth concerning the issue, the in-
ferior one should defer and the superior one should remain steadfast. In this kind
of case, the superiority comes from the training one has received. Since the derma-
tologist went to medical school, she is more reliable in making judgements about
skin conditions. One can also be superior than another by having better evidence
concerning the dispute.4 This point can be illustrated by another example.
Example 4.2.2. Disagreeing dermatologists
Stephanie and Conor are both qualified dermatologists. One day, they assess a
patient together. After talking with the patient, Conor comes to believe that the
patient has psoriasis. Stephanie also talks with the patient but finds it difficult
to make a diagnosis merely with the testimonial evidence collected from the con-
versation. To play safe, she asks the patient to show her the affected areas. With
this additional piece of evidence, Stephanie makes the judgement that what the
patient has is not psoriasis but atopic eczema. The two dermatologists later meet
up to discuss their findings.
At the very beginning of their meeting, Conor may find it strange that Stephanie
holds a belief which differs from his. When Conor later realises that Stephanie
disagrees with him because she possesses an extra piece of evidence concerning
the patient’s skin condition, he should give up his judgement that the patient has
psoriasis and accept Stephanie’s belief. Based on the fact that they are equally
good as dermatologists, the one who has more evidence is more likely to make a
correct judgement. On the contrary, Stephanie, upon realising that her colleague
Conor makes a judgement without really seeing the affected areas, should retain
her judgement that the patient has atopic eczema. Since she possesses a piece of ev-
idence which Conor does not have, she does have a good reason to dismiss Conor’s
4Some people might think that the notion of evidence can be interpreted broadly so as to include
the information one receives from other kind of sources. For example, the training one receives at
school could be, in a broad sense, understood as a type of evidence. To be precise, the evidence
referred here is the direct evidence concerning the proposition at issue.
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judgement. In this case, Stephanie’s superiority over Conor stems from the addi-
tional piece of evidence she possesses, rather than the training she received.
Given these examples of disagreement, it might be confusing why it has been
taken as an important topic in epistemology. As most instances of disagreement
can be easily solved, it is natural for one to think that the study of this phenomenon
bears little philosophical significance. Indeed, most disagreements that happen in
our daily life can be easily solved. When one disagrees with another, one can, in
ordinary cases, spot a difference in either their reliability or the evidence they each
possesses. When all the disagreeing individuals recognise the difference between
them, the disagreement between them can be easily dissolved.
Spotting the difference, however, is not always possible. What makes disagree-
ment a real issue in epistemology is the existence of cases where people cannot find
any difference in either the reliability or the evidence yet still have different opin-
ions. Philosophers call such cases peer disagreement. To get an idea of what such
disagreement looks like, we may consider a modified version of the dermatologist
case:
Example 4.2.3. Dermatologists with the same evidence
Stephanie and Conor are both dermatologists. They went to the same medical
school, received the same training and had equally good track records in making
correct diagnosis. All these factors combined, one can infer that they are equally
likely to make a correct diagnosis when it comes to skin diseases. Both dermatol-
ogists know that they are equal in all these aspects, therefore recognise each other
as an epistemic peer. One day, they assess a patient with a skin condition together.
There is no difference in the evidence they each possess. However, Stephanie be-
lieves that the patient has atopic eczema, while Conor believes that the patient has
psoriasis.
When the two dermatologists realise that they hold different beliefs, what are they
supposed to do? Since they recognise each other as epistemic peers, they would
both think that their own judgement and their peer’s judgement are equally likely
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to be correct.5 Hence, the peer’s judgement cannot be dismissed. They also share
all their evidence, which implies that there is no difference between the evidence
they each possess. Consequently, there is nothing they can refer to dismiss their
peer’s judgement.
In this chapter, I choose to focus on this sort of hard case of disagreement for
two reasons. First, since they are the hardest ones to solve, these cases have aroused
the interest of many epistemologists. Second, focusing on the hardest cases is the
most efficient way of solving the problem of disagreement. If one finds the ideal
response to peer disagreement, the same response should also be applicable to the
easier cases.6 Even if the solution to peer disagreement is not directly applicable
to the easier cases, it may shed some light to an overall solution to disagreement.
We may now go one step further and formulate the most crucial question in the
study of disagreement: when a group of equally reliable individuals disagree over
a proposition based on the same body of evidence, what is the proper response
for each of them? Before we delve into different views about this problem, there
are two preliminary remarks about how the responses can be evaluated. First, a
response can be evaluated with at least two standards. An ideal solution to dis-
agreement could either be truth-tracking, rational or both. If a solution is truth-
tracking, an individual who adopts this solution would have a better ratio of true
beliefs to false ones than those who do not adopt this solution. Under a proba-
bilistic framework of belief, one who adopts a truth-tracking solution, compared
to the others who do not, would have credences that are closer to the truth. In
contrast, if a solution to disagreement is rational, it conforms to the requirement
of rationality. Those who accept this solution would be comparatively more ratio-
nal than those who reject the solution. Although most epistemologists focus on
the second ideal when searching for the correct solution to peer disagreement, the
first ideal should not be ignored. When we move on to evaluate different solutions
5This is a crucial assumption. Even if they actually differ in reliability, as long as they see each
other as an epistemic peer, the disagreement between them is a peer disagreement.
6Matheson (2014) compares everyday disagreement to idealised cases and points out that the
aim of studying the latter is to solve other type of cases, including the former.
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to disagreement, we must bear this distinction in mind as some of them focus on
the first, while some others focus on the second.
Another important remark is that the traditional framework of doxastic states,
under which one either believes, disbelieves or suspends judgement concerning
a proposition, is too coarse-grained to capture the subtle differences between dif-
ferent views. Hence, we have to adopt a probabilistic framework and represent
one’s doxastic states in terms of credences.7 Here I will adopt the framework con-
structed in Chapter three.
There are several mainstream solutions to peer disagreement. The most coarse-
grained distinction lies between whether an individual should defer to her peer
to some extent and make a conciliation by revising her credences concerning the
disputed proposition (Feldman, 2006; Elga, 2007b; Christensen, 2007). The view
that an individual should conciliate with her peers whenever disagreement occurs
is the Conciliatory View. On the contrary, the view requiring an individual to
retain her initial credence is the Steadfast View. Both views are prominent in the
literature and supported by many convincing arguments. Here I will begin with
an introduction to the Steadfast View.
4.3 The Steadfast View
Some individuals, when confronted by their epistemic peer, choose to retain their
original credence in the proposition under dispute. This reaction seems quite intu-
itive at first glance. People form their credences with some reasons or evidence. As
one’s credences do not come from nowhere, it is natural for one to defend one’s cre-
dences when confronted by other people. The Steadfast View provides substantial
support to such response.
A deliberate argument for the Steadfast View can be constructed by reformu-
lating the core question of disagreement from a first person perspective: when an
7Kelly (2010) provides an argument supporting the idea of dealing with disagreement under a
probabilistic framework.
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individual, whom I consider as my epistemic peer, disagrees with me over a propo-
sition based on the same body of evidence which I possess, what should I do? In
this kind of situation, I know that at least one of us made an incorrect inference
concerning the proposition in question.8 I am also very confident that one of the
interlocutors, namely me, derives my credence over that proposition under a nor-
mal situation. That is, I am highly confident that I am sober, wide-awake and not
suffering from any noticeable cognitive defect. Hence, I am at least as likely to
have the correct credence as my peer. However, I cannot make sure that my peer
also reasons under a normal condition like I do. My peer may be drunk, drowsy or
having hallucinations while forming her credence concerning the proposition we
disagree with. Since I have no access to my peer’s subjective experience, I am in
no position to tell if my peer reasons normally. If I choose to revise my credence,
it would be possible for me to end up having an incorrect credence because of my
peer’s cognitive defect. Hence, sticking with my original credence seems to be the
best option from my first-person perspective.
One may object to this argument by claiming that when an individual adopts
this line of reasoning, she ignores the possibility that she is the one suffering from
cognitive defects while her peer reasons correctly. Whilst it is true that an individ-
ual cannot know whether her peer reasons without any cognitive defect, she also
cannot know whether she reasons properly either since, if she is the one having
a cognitive defect, she could fail to notice it. The existence of this latter possibil-
ity implies that an individual should not dismiss her peer’s credence when they
disagree.
Supporters of the Steadfast View reject this argument by claiming that remain-
ing steadfast, despite being flawed, is the only rational option for one involved in
disagreement. An individual involved in disagreement needs to consider two pos-
sibilities. First, it may be that her interlocutor reasons in an abnormal way, thereby
derives an incorrect credence which results in the disagreement. Second, the indi-
vidual herself may reason in an abnormal way and obtains an incorrect credence
8Here the Uniqueness Thesis is implicitly assumed. I will discuss this thesis later in this section.
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in the disputed claim. The steadfasters argue that the two possibilities are not
equiprobable from the individual’s first-person perspective. Her subjective expe-
rience shows that the latter possibility, compared to the former one, is less likely
to be true. The individual thinks of herself as reasoning in a normal and hence
reliable way. It is without doubt possible that this piece of personal evidence mis-
leads her to consider herself as reasoning normally, but she is in no position to tell
whether the evidence is misleading. Since her evidence indicates that she reasons
normally, retaining the initial credence is the only rational response to a disagree-
ment. In other words, one would be irrational if she does have evidence that she
reasons normally but still thinks that she has made a mistake.
Another argument based on one’s subjective reasoning, provided by Plantinga
(2000), states that an individual cannot deny what appears as true for her. If an
individual sees a proposition 𝑃 as true, asking her to change her mind seems like a
inappropriate requirement. Consider the dermatologist example where Stephanie
in very confident that the patient has atopic eczema. Based on the same body of
evidence, Conor tells Stephanie that the patient has psoriasis. If Stephanie checks
the patient’s affected area again, it would not suddenly appear to her that the pa-
tient has psoriasis.9 She should reason with the evidence in the same way and form
the same credence concerning the patient’s skin condition because of the peerhodd
between them. To further illustrate this argument, let us consider a simplified sce-
nario. Suppose that there is a very easy way for one to check whether a person has
atopic eczema: if there are exactly three dark red spots in the affected area, then
the patient has atopic eczema. On the contrary, if there is only one red spot in the
affected area, the patient has psoriasis. In the given example, Stephanie sees three
red spots and thus comes to be very confident in the patient having atopic eczema.
Upon realising that Conor holds a much lower credence, Stephanie checks the pa-
tient’s affected area again and still sees three red spots. She thereby remains highly
9One might think that this action removes the peerhood between them as Stephanie has more
evidence. What I would like to highlight is that Stephanie makes her inference based on the same
body of evidence. All she does is simply review the evidence again. Hence, it should not remove
the peerhood between the two dermatologists.
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confident in the patient having atopic eczema. As the evidence Stephanie sees re-
mains the same, asking her to change her credence implies that she has to adopt
a credence which her evidence does not support. Since the requirement is rather
counterintuitive, the steadfasters conclude that an individual should not give up
her initial credence when involved in a disagreement.
Both arguments aim to show that, from one’s first-person perspective, remain-
ing steadfast is the only ideal response to peer disagreement. Different from the
two arguments, recent discussion on Permissivism, the doctrine that a given body
of evidence may justify multiple credences, provides a reason to remain stead-
fast which does not depend on one’s first-person experience. Permissivism can
be characterised as the rejection of the Uniqueness Thesis, which is defined as the
following:
Definition 4.3.1. The Uniqueness Thesis
For any body of evidence 𝐸 and proposition 𝑃 , 𝐸 justifies at most one competi-
tor doxastic attitude toward 𝑃 .
According to the Uniqueness Thesis, a body of evidence 𝐸 supports at most one cre-
dence concerning a proposition. If the thesis is right, when two individuals differ
in their credences over a proposition, at most one of them is correct. Permissivists
reject this thesis and claim that a body of evidence can support more than one
credence over a proposition, thereby offering a reason for people to remain stead-
fast when involved in a disagreement. In a case where two individuals possess the
same body of evidence, it is possible, according to Permissivism, that both their
credences are justified by the evidence they have. From this fact, it is possible that
both individuals are rational in retaining their initial credence. If both are indeed
rational, there is no need for either of them to revise their credence.10
Still, the fact that disagreeing individuals could all be rational does not im-
10It should be noted that Permissivism does not directly support the Steadfast View. The role
it plays is that, if it is true, the steadfasters may have another reason to argue that one could
be rational in retaining one’s credence in a disputed claim. For a detailed discussion concerning
Permissivism, see Schoenfield (2014), Ballantyne (2018) and White (2005).
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ply that all the disagreeing individuals are rational.11 Supporters of the Steadfast
View, thus, need to provide additional reasons to justify their solution. One of the
attempts is the Right Reasons View (Kelly, 2005; Titelbaum, 2015, 2019).
4.4 The Right Reasons View
Some epistemologists argue for the Steadfast View by claiming that an individ-
ual who makes inference with the right reason need not defer to her peer. This
claim, although intuitively correct, sounds a bit trivial. Titelbaum (2015) provides
a substantive argument for this view based on his Fixed Point Thesis:
Definition 4.4.1. The Fixed Point Thesis of Rationality
Mistakes about the requirements of rationality are mistakes of rationality.
This thesis states that if one gets the requirement of rationality wrong, one is ir-
rational. To understand the scenario this thesis describes, consider a case where
an individual makes an inference concerning whether a proposition 𝑃 is true with
a piece of misleading evidence indicating that 𝑃 is false. As a rational agent, the
individual reasons in an impeccable way and comes to believe that 𝑃 is false. In
this kind of situation, we would say that the individual is mistaken for having a
false belief. However, since the individual makes her inference correctly, she is still
rational. The Fixed Point Thesis shows that there is an exception. If the proposi-
tion 𝑃 is about the requirement of rationality, one who makes a mistake about its
truth-value is irrational. In other words, if one is misled by a piece of evidence
concerning the requirement of rationality, one is irrational.12
With the Fixed Point Thesis, Titelbaum argues that one should remain steadfast
when involved in a disagreement. We may reconstruct his argument with a re-
11It should be noted that the Steadfast View can be interpreted in two ways. In the first sense,
it is reasonable for an individual to stick to their initial credence upon realising that their peer
disagrees, given that their pre-disagreement credence is rational. The second sense of the view
says that an individual should stick to their initial credence even if the initial credence is irrational.
However, an individual may fail to notice that his or her own irrationality and still stick to the
initial credence.
12Fur further details, see Titelbaum (2015, 2019).
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vised version of the dermatologist case. Suppose that Stephanie, based on a body
of evidence 𝐸 she shares with Conor, has a very high credence in the patient hav-
ing atopic eczema. Further suppose that 𝐸 does entail that the patient has atopic
eczema and, as a direct result, 𝐸 rationally requires one to have a high credence
in the patient having atopic eczema.13 However, her peer Conor has an extremely
low credence in the claim with the same evidence. If, upon realising that Conor
has a different credence, Stephanie does not choose to remain steadfast but makes
a conciliation, she would change her mind and come to have a moderate credence
concerning the patient’s skin condition. She would no longer be highly confident
in the patient having atopic eczema but would take other possibilities as proba-
ble. When Stephanie gives up her initial credence over the dispute, she does not
only think that her initial credence concerning the patient’s skin condition is false,
but also thinks that the evidence 𝐸 does not support that the patient has atopic
eczema.14 She would, because of Conor’s testimony, believe that rationality re-
quires her to have a moderate credence in the patient having atopic eczema based
on her initial evidence 𝐸. That is, Conor’s testimony let Stephanie believe that
she has made a mistake in taking 𝐸 as entailing the patient having eczema. In
this scenario, Stephanie’s conciliation leads to a mistake about the requirement of
rationality concerning 𝐸. According to the Fixed Point Thesis, Stephanie is irra-
tional for failing to correctly recognise what rationality requires. To avoid being
irrational, one should act upon the right reason and remain steadfast instead of
changing one’s opinion when one is involved in a disagreement.
One may claim that Titelbaum’s argument merely shows that an individual
should stick to her initial credence when she makes inference with the right rea-
son, but does not tell an individual what is the right reason. As an individual does
not always know whether her reason is right, she does not know what rationality
requires and thus does not know whether she should conciliate with her peers.
13Here I am not assuming that the Uniqueness Thesis is true. One may reject the Uniqueness
Thesis yet still admit that, in some cases, there is only one rational response to a body of evidence.
14Some people claim that Conor’s disagreement alone cannot support not 𝑝 for Stephanie. One
may think of a scenario where there are many more dermatologists who share Conor’s credence
and in turn force Stephanie to make such a revision.
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Remaining steadfast, hence, may make one irrational. In response to this criti-
cism, Titelbaum claims that the purpose of the Right Reasons View is to evaluate
whether one is rational, not to provide actual guidance for one to judge if her re-
action is rational. The Right Reasons View aims to show that acting with the right
reason is rational. What is indeed a rational response to a specific body of evidence
is beyond its scope. Hence, a single case where an individual fails to recognise the
right reason does not undermine the Right Reason view.
Although the Right Reasons View generates the correct verdict that an individ-
ual is irrational if she fails to stick to the right reason, it does not tell us how an
individual should react to disagreement when she is unsure what the right reason
is. One would need some other factors to tell what counts as the right reason. We
may turn to other views for some further considerations.
4.5 The Justificationist View
A comparatively moderate view, proposed by Lackey (2008), states that whether
one should conciliate depends on whether one has justification for one’s credence.
It is thus called the Justificationist View. Different from the steadfasters who re-
quire people to always remain steadfast in a disagreement, Lackey admits that
there do exist cases in which one should make a conciliation. As there are also
cases in which one should not conciliate, Lackey concludes that there is no single
strategy applicable to all kinds of disagreements. What we should do, instead of
searching for an ultimate solution applicable to all kinds of cases, is to find the
key factor governing our intuition about whether to conciliate. The factor, Lackey
claims, is one’s justification in one’s credence. When one has justification in one’s
credence before the disagreement, one does not have to conciliate. On the other
hand, if one is not justified in having one’s credence, one should conciliate when
involved in disagreement.
To see how Lackey arrives at her conclusion, we need to first compare cases of
disagreement that elicit contradictory intuitions. Consider the most widely dis-
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cussed example in the study of disagreement:
Example 4.5.1. Restaurant Check
Suppose that five of us go out to dinner. It’s time to pay the check, so
the question we are interested in is how much we each owe. We can
all see the bill total clearly, we all agree to give a 20 percent tip, and
we further agree to split the whole cost evenly, not worrying over who
asked for imported water, or skipped desert, or drank more of the wine.
I do the math in my head and become highly confident that our shares
are $43 each. Meanwhile, my friend does the math in her head and
becomes highly confident that our shares are $45 each (Christensen,
2007, p.193).
An implicit assumption in this case is that the disagreeing individuals are epis-
temic peers on this problem. That is, they are equally competent and have equally
good track records in making this kind of calculation. This assumption should
be quite natural, as splitting the bill does not involve any advanced knowledge in
mathematics. As long as they can do basic addition and division, they should both
be regarded as having expertise in this subject. Since, as we have assumed, they
are equally likely to be correct, one would be inclined to think that the disagreeing
individuals should assign equal weight to both their conclusions. If they do so,
they would end up being highly confident that the price for each to pay is $44.
After all, they are equally good at doing simple math and make their calculation
with the same evidence. There is no factor which indicates an asymmetry between
the circumstance they are in. It is thus claimed that making a conciliation is the
only rational solution.
The intuitive response to Restaurant Check is that one should make a concilia-
tion when involved in a disagreement. However, there exists another case which
elicits a different intuition:
Example 4.5.2. Mental Math
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Harry and I, who have been colleagues for the past six years, were drinking
coffee at Starbucks and trying to determine how many people from our depart-
ment will be attending the upcoming APA. I, reasoning aloud, say, ‘Well, Mark
and Mary are going on Wednesday, and Sam and Stacey are going on Thursday,
and, since 2 + 2 = 4, there will be four other members of our department at that
conference’. In response, Harry asserts, ‘But 2 + 2 does not equal 4’. Prior to this
disagreement, neither Harry nor I had any reason to think that the other is evi-
dentially or cognitively deficient in any way, and we both sincerely avowed our
respective conflicting beliefs (Lackey, 2008).
Suppose Harry insists that two plus two equals six, do I have to make a conciliation
and conclude that there are five people in the department attending the APA? The
answer, intuitively, is no. Since the correlated mathematical fact is extremely basic,
it is bizarre for me to respond by conciliating with Harry. Instead of inferring that
both of us are making some minor mistakes as we did in Restaurant Check, it is
more reasonable for me to think that at least one of us is cognitively deficient. As
I am extremely certain that two plus two is not six, I have a very high credence in
Harry being the one who gets things wrong. The intuitively rational response for
me, thus, is to retain my initial credence without making any compromise.
Since the two cases elicit different intuitions concerning the proper response to
disagreement, we seem to have a dilemma. If we reject the Steadfast View and in-
sist that one should conciliate whenever one disagrees with one’s peers, we would
have to, in Mental Math, conciliate with Harry and come to be just moderately
confident in two plus two equals four. If we take remaining steadfast as the ideal
solution, we would have to, in Restaurant Check, remain highly confident that each
one in the restaurant case should pay $43. As we have seen, both consequences are
quite counterintuitive.
Instead of choosing between the two horns of this dilemma, Lackey points out
that the two cases are substantially different. In Restaurant Check, both individuals
have no strong justification for their credences before the disagreement. That is,
since I performed the calculation in my head, there is no way I can make sure
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that I have not made any mistake in my calculation.15 Hence, I am not strongly
justified to have a high credence in the result being $43. Similarly, my friend is
not strongly justified in having a high credence in the result being $45. Since both
our credences about the final result are not well justified, we ought to make a
conciliation in the disagreement. On the contrary, I do have a strong justification
that two plus two equals four prior to my disagreement with Harry in Mental Math.
It is a simple mathematical fact that I have known for years. Due to the fact that I
am strongly justified in my belief about the result of two plus two, I do not have to
make a conciliation with Harry. By pointing out this difference, Lackey argues that
the proper solution to disagreement hinges on whether one is justified in having
one’s credence. In a case where no one has strong justification for one’s credence,
the best option is to make a conciliation. In a case where one is strongly justified
in one’s credence, one should choose to retain one’s initial credence.16
Although Lackey’s explanation is quite convincing, it does not settle the debate
as it may collapse into the Steadfast View. In a standard case of peer disagree-
ment where all the individuals involved have the same evidence, each individual
thinks that her credence is justified but the opponent’s credence is not. When one
is involved in this kind of situation, should one remain steadfast? According to
the Justificationist View, the answer is yes. When one’s credence is justified, one
need not make a conciliation. Even in a case where one’s peer claims that she is
justified in having her credence, one could, given that one’s credence is justified,
infer that one’s peer fails to reason properly and mistakenly takes her credence
as justified. The Justificationist View, hence, generates the result that one should
remain steadfast in an idealised case of peer disagreement. If one adopts the Jus-
tificationist View, one’s response to the standard case of disagreement would be
the same as a steadfaster. The arguments against the Steadfast View would thus
15It can be seen that the supporters of the Conciliatory View are more sympathetic to a form of
skepticism. An individual does not have to accept the strong claim that they can never make a mis-
take with their reasoning. However, when there is strong evidence, namely some peers’ testimony,
that an individual may have made a mistake in their reasoning, they should not insist that they
have not.
16Some people take this view as the standard Steadfast View. Here I take the Steadfast View as
any view which may violate the Principle of Independence.
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also be arguments against the Justificationist View. What the Justificationist View
does, hence, is to provide an explanation for one to remain steadfast. Since the
action of remaining steadfast is what the conciliationists are dissatisfied with, the
Justificationist View does not bring an end to the debate. We still need to explore
other possibilities to solve the problem of peer disagreement.
4.6 The Total Evidence View
Another theory which provides reasons for one to remain steadfast is the Total Ev-
idence View which says that one should form one’s credence with the total evidence
one has (Kelly, 2010). Consider a revised version of Equally Reliable Dermatologists
in which Stephanie has 0.9 credence in the patient having atopic eczema while
Conor has 0.1 credence in the same proposition. When Stephanie and Conor re-
alise that they disagree over the patient’s skin condition, they each possess three
pieces of evidence:
𝐸 The original evidence 𝐸 they share.
𝐸𝑆 Stephanie has 0.9 credence in the patient having atopic eczema.
𝐸𝐶 Conor has 0.1 credence in the patient having atopic eczema.
Here the first piece of evidence 𝐸 is substantially different from the rest since it is a
piece of first-order evidence concerning the patient’s skin condition. It may include
the appearance of the patient’s affected area, the description of the symptoms pro-
vided by the patient and other relevant facts the dermatologists share. The two
pieces of testimonial evidence, relative to 𝐸, are higher-order evidence that reveal
each dermatologist’s credence based on 𝐸. They should be taken as higher-order
evidence because they indicate some properties of the dermatologists. With such
information, we may have some indirect evidence concerning the patient’s skin
condition. Given the setting, should one make a conciliation and hold a credence
of 0.5 in the patient having atopic eczema? There is one line of reasoning which
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requires one to do so. Since the two pieces of higher-order evidence point to very
different facts, they cancel each other out. One should thus split the difference be-
tween the two dermatologists’ credences and end up with the average, namely 0.5
credence, concerning the patient’s skin condition. We can easily spot the problem
of this result: if one does end up splitting the difference between the credences of
both, one makes a mistake for letting the higher-order evidence swamp the first-
order evidence. That is, the significance of the first-order evidence would be totally
dismissed if one ended up having 0.5 credence in the claim.
A more natural way of reasoning is to take all the relevant evidence into ac-
count. Let us consider the same case again from Stephanie’s perspective. Before
the disagreement takes place, she possesses the evidence 𝐸 and, based on 𝐸, comes
to have 0.9 credence in the patient having atopic eczema. Upon realising that
Conor disagrees with her, she obtains an additional piece of evidence 𝐸𝐶 that her
peer has 0.1 credence in the patient having atopic eczema. This piece of higher-
order evidence, combined with Stephanie’s own higher-order evidence 𝐸𝑆 , indi-
cates that she should have 0.5 credence concerning the patient’s skin condition.17
Still, she has to take the first-order evidence 𝐸 into account. For Stephanie, 𝐸
shows that the patient does have atopic eczema. Thus, her credence should be
higher than 0.5, which shows that she considers it more likely than not that the
patient has atopic eczema. In sum, because of Conor’s testimony that he has 0.1
credence in the patient having atopic eczema, Stephanie’s new credence should be
lower than her initial credence 0.9, but higher than the result of a full conciliation,
namely 0.5.18
It should be noted that Kelly does not see dismissing every piece of first-order
evidence and split the difference as a wrong response in disagreement. When one
is presented with a vast amount of higher-order evidence pointing to different di-
17Here the way one updates with higher-order evidence plays is left unexplained since it plays
no role in our discussion.
18From this case, we can see that the Total Evidence View can only be presented under a prob-
abilistic framework of beliefs. If we adopt the tripartite conception of beliefs which states that
one can only believe, disbelieve or suspend judgement concerning a proposition, we cannot cor-
rectly capture the result that Stephanie, after acquiring 𝐸𝐶 , should have a credence between a full
conciliation and her initial credence.
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rections, the weight of the first-order evidence would be very small. In such cases,
it is acceptable for one to make a conciliation with one’s peer and take the sig-
nificance of the first-order evidence as negligible. Understood this way, the Total
Evidence View requires neither to always conciliate with the peers nor to always
remain steadfast. Whet one should do, according to the Total Evidence View, is to
carefully consider every piece of evidence and act upon the total evidence.
4.7 The Conciliatory View
So far, we have seen several different views that provide reasons against simply
making conciliation with a peer. Given these arguments, the Conciliatory View
(henceforth the CV), on which one should always conciliate with one’s peers, seems
very implausible. In fact, quite the opposite. People attack this view exactly be-
cause it is one of the most promising solutions to peer disagreement. Broadly
construed, any view which recommends one to conciliate with one’s peers can be
categorised as a version of the CV.19 We can easily think of the crucial reason
which motivates this view. If an individual refuses to conciliate with a peer who
disagrees with her, she can be criticised for being overly confident with their own
credence. In order to be epistemically modest, one should conciliate with their
peers whenever they disagree.
Since there are many different ways one could make a conciliation, equating the
CV with any view requiring one to conciliate leads to an overly broad definition.
We may take the dermatologist Stephanie for example. When she realises that she
disagrees with Conor and wants to conciliate with him, she can either abandon
her credence in the disputed matter and come to have an extremely low credence
in the patient having atopic eczema, or make a marginal revision and still have a
very high credence in the patient having eczema. Although the two responses lead
to radically different outcomes, both count as conciliation. If the CV is defined
19One may wonder whether the CV really differs from the other views. This point will be ad-
dressed later this section.
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simply as a view requiring one to make conciliation, it provides little guidance
for the ones involved in a disagreement. For the CV to be substantial, one must
provide further detail about how to conciliate.
The most significant form of the CV is the Equal Weight View which requires
one to assign equal weight to all the disagreeing peers’ credences. Recall the case
where two dermatologists disagree over the patient’s skin condition. One of them
has a high credence in the patient having atopic eczema while another has a very
low credence in the same proposition. It is assumed that they are not only equally
good as dermatologists, but also possess the same evidence concerning the pa-
tient’s skin condition. Both of them are aware of their parity in reliability and
evidence, and thus see each other as an epistemic peer. This last assumption is
crucial. Even if they are slightly different regarding some factors, as long as they
recognise each other as an epistemic peer, this case can be taken as a peer disagree-
ment. When the two dermatologists realise that they disagree over the patient’s
skin condition, they should, according to the Equal Weight View, make a concili-
ation on this issue by assigning equal weight to each other’s credence. The reason
behind this is quite intuitive. Given the symmetry in all these aspects, there is
no way for one to tell where the difference between the individuals lies. They are
equal in every aspect relevant to their credence. Thus, they must be equally likely
to be correct, and their credences should be valued in the same way.
One may wonder whether the CV really differs from the other views. We have
seen that the Justificationist View also requires the disagreeing individuals to con-
ciliate on some occasions. When an individual finds that her credence and her op-
ponent’s credence are equally unjustified, she should make a conciliation with her
peer. On the Total Evidence View, an individual’s total evidence may require her to
make a conciliation by assigning equal weight to each interlocutor’s credence. On
these occasions, the views that are normally categorised as non-conciliatory gener-
ate the same verdict as the CV. One might hence take the Equal Weight View as a
special case of these non-conciliatory views which happens to assign equal weight
to all the disagreeing parties in all cases of peer disagreement. If we agree that the
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difference between these views lies merely in the extent one should conciliate, we
can put these views on a spectrum. On the one end, we have the Steadfast View,
which requires one to remain steadfast in all possible cases of disagreement. Right
next to the Steadfast View is the Right Reasons View, which requires one to act
upon the right reason. As one does not always know which reason is the right one,
asking one to follow the right reason often leads to the same result as asking one
to follow one’s initial reason. The response it requires of the disagreeing peers,
hence, would be to remain steadfast. The Justificationist View, compared to the
Right Reasons View, is somewhat closer to the other end since it requires one to
conciliate when one has no strong justification of one’s credence. The view which
stands closest to the other end is the Total Evidence view. Since one’s total evi-
dence includes the higher-order evidence from one’s peer, this view usually leads
to a conciliation, albeit an unequal one.20 On the opposite end is the Equal Weight
View, which requires the disagreeing peers to make a conciliation by assigning
equal weight to the credences of each individual involved.21
The spectrum, however, does not correctly portray the relationships between
these different views. The difference between the non-conciliatory views and the
CV is categorical one, marked by the Principle of Independence:
Definition 4.7.1. The Principle of Independence
In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another’s expressed credence about
𝑃 , in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own credence about 𝑃 , I
should do so in a way that does not rely on the reasoning behind my initial cre-
dence about 𝑃 .22
Rejecting the Principle of Independence amounts to accepting the following line
of reasoning: given a body of evidence 𝐸, I form a credence in a proposition 𝑃 .
20Although I present the non-conciliatory views in this order, I am not claiming that, necessarily,
the views that are closer to the CV on the spectrum requires one to make a greater conciliation with
one’s peer. It is possible that the Total Evidence View requires one to make a conciliation that is
smaller than what the Justificationist View requires.
21Christensen (2013, p.78) mentioned the idea of aligning the views on a spectrum.
22The original formulation of this principle provided by Christensen (2011), as presented in the
first section, focuses on the reasoning behind one’s belief instead of credences. Here what I present
is a revised version.
139
When I realise that my peer, who also possesses 𝐸, has a credence that differs from
mine, I can infer that her reasoning behind 𝑃 differs from mine. The fact that she
disagrees with me shows that either her or my reasoning must be incorrect. Since
my reasoning is actually the correct one, I can infer that my peer is wrong in her
reasoning. Hence, I can deem my peer unreliable and retain my credence in 𝑃 .
This pattern of reasoning, as one can see, is circular. What is shown by the very
existence of the disagreement is that my reasoning might be incorrect. If I deem
my peer unreliable, I implicitly take my reasoning to be the correct one. Since the
correctness of my reasoning is challenged by my peer, I cannot insist that I am
correct based on my belief that I am correct. I have to provide some other reason
which does not rely on my contested reasoning to show its correctness.
The Right Reasons View violates the principle of independence since it allows
one to dismiss one’s peer’s credence when one has the right reason. If an individual
adopts the Right Reasons View and, when involved in a disagreement, does have
the right reason for her credence in the disputed claim, the Right Reasons View
requires her to retain her credence and refuse to conciliate. When she does so,
her action implies that her peer is unreliable for failing to come up with the right
reason. Since the Right Reasons View allows the individual to see her peer as
an unreliable person if she has the right reason concerning the disputed claim, it
does not conform to the Principle of Independence. The Justificationist view also
violates the Principle of Independence. If an individual’s credence in the disputed
proposition is justified, she does not, according to the Justificationist view, have
to conciliate with her peer but can retain her credence. Again, as long as she is
indeed justified in having her credence before the disagreement, she does not need
any reason independent from her initial reasoning behind the disputed claim to
dismiss her peer’s credence. Thus, the Justificationist View violates the Principle
of Independence. Likewise, the Total Evidence View does not conform to this
principle. Suppose the total evidence I have supports my credence in a disputed
proposition 𝑃 . When a peer of mine disagrees with me over 𝑃 , I am allowed,
according to the Total Evidence View, to retain my credence in 𝑃 if that is what my
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total evidence supports. That is, the Total Evidence View allows me to ignore my
peer’s contest if that is what my total evidence supports.
Given this brief review of the three non-conciliatory views, we can see a cate-
gorical difference between the CV and the other views.23
Now we have a clear criteria for distinguishing between the CV and the non-
conciliatory views. The question of disagreement, hence, can be narrowed down to
whether we should adopt the Principle of Independence. If the principle is right,
then the CV is the correct solution to the problem of disagreement. If the principle
is wrong, the Steadfast View prevails.
4.8 Challenging the Principle of Independence
Although the motivating idea behind the Principle of Independence is pretty con-
vincing, it is far from uncontroversial. Kelly (2010) points out that following this
principle may lead to several counterintuitive results. Consider the following ex-
ample:
Example 4.8.1. Right Dermatologist
Stephanie and Conor acknowledge each other as an epistemic peer in dermatol-
ogy. One day, they diagnose a patient together. After viewing a body of evidence
𝐸 concerning the patient’s skin condition, Stephanie forms a 0.8 credence in the
patient having atopic eczema (abbreviated as 𝑃 ) while Conor has 0.2 credence in
𝑃 . The evidence available to them actually supports one to have a 0.8 credence in
the patient having atopic eczema. Stephanie and Conor then compare their notes
and realise that they disagree.
According to the CV, the rational reaction for both Stephanie and Conor is to
make a conciliation. That is, the CV indicates that if both Stephanie and Conor are
rational, they should conciliate and end up with 0.5 credence in 𝑃 . Kelly points
out that this verdict is counterintuitive. In this case, Stephanie correctly responds
23Both Christensen (2011) and Kelly (2010) accept taking the Principle of Independence as the
criteria for the CV.
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to the evidence and forms the correct credence in 𝑃 . Conor, on the contrary, mis-
takenly takes the evidence as supporting a 0.2 credence in 𝑃 . When they conciliate
with each other, Stephanie moves from the correct credence to an incorrect one,
while Conor’s credence gets closer to the correct credence. Such difference be-
tween the two, according to Kelly, shows that conciliating could not be the rational
response for both of them. Hence, the CV is wrong for generating the incorrect ver-
dict that conciliating is the only rational response for both Stephanie and Conor.
Kelly moves on to provide another case which shows that the CV lowers the
standard of rationality too much:
Example 4.8.2. Wrong Dermatologists
Stephanie and Conor are mutually acknowledged peers concerning 𝑃 . After
viewing a body of evidence 𝐸 together, Stephanie forms a 0.02 credence in 𝑃 while
Conor has 0.04 credence in 𝑃 . The evidence 𝐸 actually supports a 0.99 credence in
𝑃 . Stephanie and Conor then compare notes and realise that they disagree. They
follow the dictates of the Equal Weight View and compromise at 0.03.
In this case, again, the CV generates the verdict that the rational response for
both of them is to make a conciliation. However, their 0.03 credence is still very
far from the correct credence given 𝐸. If we adopt the CV, we would have to admit
that Stephanie and Conor are rational despite having extremely wrong credences
in 𝑃 . This result, as Kelly sees, is absurd. If we accept that people become rational
simply by conciliating with others regardless of how accurate their credences are,
we are adopting a overly low standard of rationality. Rationality should require
something more than a conciliation.
For Christensen, the two cases do not really pose a serious challenge to the CV.
We may begin with the first case in which an individual is right while another is
wrong. Christensen argues that the CV does not grant them with equal rationality
in this case. It is true that, according to the CV, they both react rationally to the
disagreement. But both reacting rationally to the disagreement is different from
being equally rational. Let the time before their conciliation be 𝑡1 and the time af-
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ter their conciliation be 𝑡2. At 𝑡1, Stephanie correctly reasons with 𝐸 and forms the
right credence in the disputed claim. When she meets Conor later and compare
their notes, she again reacts rationally, according to the CV, with the testimony
Conor provides and ends up having a 0.5 credence in the disputed proposition at
time 𝑡2. With the reconstruction, we may see that Stephanie’s reasoning in this
case is perfectly rational. What makes her end up with an incorrect credence is
not the reasoning, but the misleading evidence she receives from Conor. Conor,
on the other hand, begins with an incorrect credence at 𝑡1 and, after conciliating
with Stephanie, gets closer to the correct credence at 𝑡2. Although he is irrational
at 𝑡1, he responds to the disagreement rationally and comes to be rational at 𝑡2.
Still, since he is irrational at 𝑡1, he is not as rational as Stephanie. With such ex-
plication, Christensen argues that the CV does generate the verdict that they are
both rational in responding by conciliating, but does not generate the problematic
verdict that they are equally rational.
The second case, similarly, poses no real threat to the CV. When both dermatol-
ogists have incorrect credences concerning 𝑃 , they both fall short of being rational.
However, this fact does not imply that making a conciliation is not the rational re-
sponse to them. Supporters of the CV may claim that, by conciliating, they react
rationally to the disagreement but are still not fully rational. In other words, the
fact that the outcome of their conciliation fails to satisfy the requirement of ratio-
nality does not imply that conciliating is not the rational response to disagreement.
Hence, the CV does not lower the standard for rationality.
Still, Christensen has to respond to the intuitively correct verdict generated
by the Total Evidence View that, in Right Dermatologist, Stephanie should have a
credence between her initial credence and the credence after a conciliation. Recall
that there are three pieces of evidence in this case:
𝐸 The original evidence 𝐸 they share which supports 0.8 credence in 𝑃 .
𝐸𝑆 Stephanie has 0.8 credence in 𝑃 .
𝐸𝐶 Conor has 0.2 credence in 𝑃 .
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According to the Total Evidence View, 𝐸𝑆 and 𝐸𝐶 combined should be taken as a
piece of evidence requiring one to have 0.5 credence in 𝑃 . If we further consider
the evidence 𝐸, we would have two pieces of evidence. The first one is the com-
bination of 𝐸𝑠 and 𝐸𝐶 which requires one to have 0.5 credence in 𝑃 . The second
one is the evidence 𝐸 which requires one to have 0.8 credence in 𝑃 . The credence
one should have, given the two pieces of evidence, should lie between 0.5 and 0.8.
This result contradicts the verdict of the CV which requires both dermatologists
to have 0.5 credence in 𝑃 . Supporters of the CV, hence, need to explain what goes
wrong with this result.
As a response, Christensen (2011) claims that the significance of a piece of ev-
idence is agent-sensitive. For any third party who does not generate any of 𝐸, 𝐸𝑆
and 𝐸𝐶 , the rational credence to have is, as the Total Evidence View indicates, be-
tween 0.5 and 0.8. On the other hand, if we view the three pieces of evidence from
either Stephanie or Conor’s perspective instead, we may derive a different result.
When a person reasons with a set of evidence, she normally takes her first-person
psychological evidence as inert. Suppose that an individual comes to have a cre-
dence in a proposition with her evidence. When she realises that a peer has the
same credence as she does, she would consider her peer’s credence as a piece of
evidence showing that she assessed her original evidence correctly. She would not,
however, take her own original psychological state as a piece of evidence confirm-
ing that she has assessed the evidence correctly. In the example given, Stephanie
would not take 𝐸𝑆 as a piece of evidence supporting the credence she formed. That
is, her psychological state is not treated as a piece of evidence.24 From this abstract
example, we can see that an ordinary individual would ignore her first-person psy-
chological evidence while checking if her reasoning is correct. Following this line
of thought, in Right Dermatologist, the total evidence Stephanie has should involve
only 𝐸 and 𝐸𝐶 . Her first-person psychological evidence 𝐸𝑆 which shows that 𝐸
supports 0.8 credence would be inert and does not count as part of her total evi-
dence. With 𝐸 and 𝐸𝐶 , Stephanie would end up having 0.5 credence in 𝑃 , which
24Note here that this line of reasoning is inconsistent with the Steadfast View.
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matches the right credence for her to have at 𝑡2 according to the CV. Similarly,
Conor would also take his first-person psychological evidence as inert and forms
a 0.5 credence in 𝑃 at 𝑡2, as the evidence he possesses are 𝐸 and 𝐸𝑆 . Given such
reasoning, we may see that if they do adopt the CV, they would end up with the
correct credence to have in 𝑃 at 𝑡2.
A more threatening case to the CV, compared to the previous ones, involves
individuals with extremely high credences. In Mental Math, when Harry makes a
very simple mistake in math, should I, as his peer, refuse to make a conciliation
with him? It seems that I should refuse, since I am very confident that Henry has
made a mistake. However, the only evidence I have is my very simple reasoning in
some basic proposition in math. Apart from this, I do not have any other evidence
concerning the proposition. If I conform to the Principle of Independence, I can
take my reasoning on this simple fact as evidence for my confidence, but cannot
take my reasoning as evidence to deem Harry unreliable. As stated, what has
been shown with Harry’s disagreement is that I might have made a mistake in my
reasoning concerning the simple math problem. Thus, I should not insist the I have
not made a mistake with the reason that my reasoning about the math problem is
correct. Conforming to the Principle of Independence leads to a bizarre result that
I ought to conciliate in this kind of case.
To counter this argument, Christensen provides a detailed analysis of cases in-
volving individuals with extremely high credences. When an individual has a very
high credence in a proposition, it is unlikely for her peer to have a very low cre-
dence in the same proposition. When it does turn out that her peer has a credence
that is radically different from her extremely high credence, she can infer that her
peer fails to reason in the normal way. Given such fact, she should be allowed to
remain steadfast. It should be noted that the original reasoning behind her ex-
tremely high credence is not involved in this line of reasoning. In this case, the
fact that Harry’s credence is radically different from mine may provide me with
an independent reason to deem Harry unreliable. Hence, Harry is no longer a
genuine epistemic peer for me. By arguing that this kind of case is extraordinary,
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Christensen claims that the Principle of Independence could be saved.
There remains another problem for the Principle of Independence. Consider
the example provided by Moon (2018):
Example 4.8.3. Peggy’s Location
Someone I know to be a reliable testifier tells me,
(𝑃 ) Peggy is at the party
(𝑄) If Peggy is at the party, then Quinn is unreliable about Peggy’s whereabouts.
Apart from 𝑄, I do not have any other information about Quinn. Since the testifier
is very reliable, I come to have a high credence in 𝑃 ∧𝑄. Quinn then comes up
to me and tells me that 𝑃 is very unlikely to be true. Since 𝑃 can be derived from
𝑃∧𝑄, I am very confident that 𝑃 while Quinn is very confident that¬𝑃 . Apart from
𝑃 , I also infer 𝑄 from my high credence in 𝑃 ∧𝑄, and then give a low evaluation of
the epistemic credentials of Quinn’s low credence about 𝑃 on the basis of my high
credence in 𝑄.25
Moon argues that it should be legitimate for me to remain steadfast in this case.
Before I get to know Quinn’s credence in 𝑃 , I already know that she is unreliable
concerning Peggy’s location if 𝑃 is true. I am also told by the reliable testifier that
𝑃 is true. When Quinn reports her credence on Peggy’s location, I am very confi-
dent that she is unreliable about 𝑃 . It should thus be legitimate for me to dismiss
her credence on this issue. If we do agree with Moon on this point, we would
have a counterexample of the Principle of Independence. In this case, Quinn dis-
agrees with me over 𝑃 , namely Peggy’s location. The reason I rely on to dismiss
Quinn’s credence about Peggy’s location is the conjunction of the two things I am
told, namely 𝑃 ∧𝑄. Since the disputed claim 𝑃 can be derived from 𝑃 ∧𝑄, I do
not rely on a reason independent of my reasoning behind the dispute to dismiss
Quinn’s credence. This case, thus, counts as a counterexample of the Principle of
Independence.
25Here I replace every occurrence of the notion belief with credence to fit this example in our
probabilistic framework of doxastic states.
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Although Moon’s problem looks threatening, Christensen (2019) does not take
it as a serious problem of the Principle of Independence. With a more sophisti-
cated formulation of the principle, he claims, we can get rid of this problem easily.
Definition 4.8.1. The Principle of Independence extended
When an agent has formed an initial credence 𝑐 in 𝑃 on the basis of
the first-order bearing of evidence 𝐸, and then gets some evidence that
bears on the reliability of her reasoning from 𝐸 to her credence 𝑐 in
𝑃 , her final credence in 𝑃 should reflect the Independent Hypothetical
Credence (IHC) it would be rational for her to have in 𝑃 : that is, the
rational credence in 𝑃 independent of 𝐸’s first-order bearing on 𝑃 , but
conditional on her having formed credence 𝑐 in 𝑃 on the basis of 𝐸, and
on the reliability evidence the agent has about herself.26 (Christensen,
2019, p.18)
To see the difference between this new formulation of the Principle of Indepen-
dence and the rudimentary ones, we need to introduce a distinction concerning
the different roles a piece of evidence can play. Christensen points out that a piece
of evidence could have two roles. It may, on the one hand, serve as a first-order ev-
idence which directly supports a proposition and, on the other hand, be a higher-
order evidence which provides indirect support to a proposition by indicating the
reliability of an individual. We may illustrate the distinction with an example.
Recall that in Restaurant Check, my peer disagrees with me about the result of
splitting the check. Her testimony that the correct result should be $45, as a piece
of first-order evidence, supports the belief that the result is not $43. Also, her
testimony is a higher-order evidence showing that my reasoning behind the belief
is wrong, since I come up with an incorrect answer in this case. By showing that
my reasoning is wrong, my peer’s testimony indirectly supports the belief that the
26Note that this is just one of his several different sketches of the Principle of Independence.
He provides other more complicated formulations of this principle in response to other problems.
Given the primary purpose of this paper, we only need to consider this sketch of the principle.
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result is not $43.27
With the distinction between the two roles a single piece of evidence plays, we
may see the difference between the extended and the original formulation of the
Principle of Independence. What has been highlighted by the new formulation
is that in evaluating one’s reliability, we should exclude the first-order support of
the evidence but not the higher-order support. We do have to consider what the
evidence reveals about the peer’s reliability. Given this distinction, we may see
that I do not violate the Principle of Independence in Peggy’s Location. At the very
beginning, I received the testimony from a reliable source and formed a high cre-
dence in 𝑃 ∧𝑄. The testimony involves both a piece of higher-order evidence about
Quinn’s reliability and a first-order evidence about Peggy’s location. Later I met
Quinn and realised that she has a high credence in ¬𝑃 . According to the higher-
order evidence I gathered from the reliable source, the fact that Quinn is highly
confident in ¬𝑃 shows that she is unreliable regarding Peggy’s location. Based on
my assessment of Quinn’s reliability, I decide to dismiss her credence about ¬𝑃 .
The reasoning here does not involve my initial reasoning behind Peggy’s real loca-
tion. In other words, the reason I dismiss Quinn’s testimony about Peggy’s location
is not based on my reasoning about Peggy’s location, but based on a piece of evi-
dence about Quinn’s reliability concerning Peggy’s location. My high credence in
𝑃 is not the reason for me to dismiss Quinn’s low credence, but the reason for me
to deem Quinn unreliable. Since the Principle of Independence only forbids one to
make an inference concerning one’s peer’s reliability with one’s original reasoning
behind the proposition in dispute, Christensen does not take the case of Peggy’s
Location as a real threat to the Principle of Independence.
So far, we have considered various arguments against the Principle of Indepen-
dence. As none of these arguments really knocks the principle down, the Principle
of Independence seems to be correct. As a direct result, the CV should be adopted
as the solution to all kinds of disagreements. We should conform to the Principle
27Christensen admits that the distinction is quite rough. Nevertheless, we do seem to have an
intuitive distinction between what a piece of evidence directly supports and what it indirectly
supports.
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of Independence and conciliate with our peers whenever a disagreement occurs.
This conclusion, however, is a bit hasty. There are some other aspects of the prin-
ciple that have not been properly examined. One of them is the actual influence it
brings to the society. To make a more thorough examination, we should turn our
focus to an important question: what would happen if everyone in a community
conforms to this principle? Put it more precisely: if all the members in a com-
munity follow this principle, what kind of epistemic community will be formed?
By exploring the pragmatic consequence of conforming to this principle, we may
approach the problem in a new way and come up with a complete analysis of this
principle. To accomplish this goal, we may begin with a brief introduction to two
widely discussed phenomena: epistemic bubbles and epistemic echo chambers.
4.9 Epistemic Bubble or Echo Chamber?
The phenomena of epistemic bubbles and epistemic echo chambers have both been
widely discussed in recent years. In this section, I will introduce Nguyen’s (2018)
analysis of both phenomena and focus on some crucial features of them that are
related to the Principle of Independence. With these features, we may evaluate the
Principle of Independence from a different perspective.
4.9.1 Epistemic bubble
To characterise the phenomenon of an epistemic bubble, we need to begin with the
notion of an epistemic network. An epistemic network can be defined as a group of
individuals sharing credences with the others. Members in a network collect in-
formation from various sources, form credences with the information in hand and
pass the information on to the others. With the process of information exchange,
members in an epistemic network may come to have some new information and,
based on this information, derive credences in some further propositions. A toy
model may illustrate how an epistemic network works: Suppose that I have a piece
of evidence supporting a high credence in the claim that a new virus is spreading
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in East Asia. Having such credence, I meet my two friends Stephanie and Conor
and tell them about the new virus. Both of them trust what I say and come to
be very confident in there being a new virus spreading in East Asia. They could
also share the information they have with me and let me form a credence with the
information they provide. As we share our information, the three of us together
form an epistemic network.
A crucial point needs to be highlighted for us to see the prominent feature of
an epistemic network. When one gathers information from other members in an
epistemic network, what one acquires are pieces of testimonial evidence. We may
illustrate the difference between testimonial and other types of evidence with a
simple case. Suppose that a car accident happened near my house. I look out
from the window and see a crashed car. After seeing the car, I tell my sister that
there was a car accident near our house. My sister accepts what I say and comes
to be very confident that a car accident just happened. In this case, we are both
confident that a car accident happened near our house. The difference between us
lies in the evidence we have to form our credences. I see the crashed car through
the window and witness the car accident. With this piece of perceptual evidence, I
come to be very confident that there was a car accident. On the contrary, my sister
does not see the car accident with her eyes but merely accepts my report on the car
accident. Her credence over this, hence, is formed with the testimonial evidence
she collected from me. Although we are both highly confident that there was a car
accident, we formed our credence with different types of evidence.
Given the distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence, we
may elaborate our definition of an epistemic network: an epistemic network is a
group of individuals sharing testimonial evidence with the others. By doing so,
members of an epistemic network can get to know things without making obser-
vations themselves. In the example given, my sister does not have to see through
the window herself to form a credence about what happened outside but can do so
with the testimonial evidence she gained from me. Moreover, testimonial evidence
may provide one with information that is not directly accessible. Consider another
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scenario where a friend of mine applied for the PhD program in my department
and would like to know the result. After consulting an admission committee, I
know that his application was successful and inform him about this. In this case,
my friend did not have access to the information which he would like to know. He
does not know any of the committee members and has no way to gather evidence
about the result himself. With the help of another member in the epistemic net-
work he is in, he can reach an information source that is not directly accessible
for him, namely the committee member, and get the information he needs. We
can therefore see that an epistemic network can provide its members with some
information beyond their reach.
An epistemic network is, in ordinary cases, beneficial for its members since the
number of information sources one can access can be greatly increased with the
help of others. If we agree that having access to more information sources and
gaining more information is in general better than having access to less sources,
we have to accept the direct result that an epistemic network has a positive ef-
fect to its members. However, there are some types of epistemic networks which
bring about negative effects. The most widely known one is the epistemic bubble
(Sunstein, 2017; Nguyen, 2018). Consider the following case: Geoff, a university
lecturer and a life-long Labour supporter, reads the Guardian everyday. Apart
from the Guardian, he does not gather information from any other source. Need-
less to say, he has never read the Daily Mail or the Sun as he stands against the
ideology behind these newspapers. He works in a department where all his col-
leagues share Geoff’s political views and, similarly, do not gather information from
any source other than the Guardian. As a loner, Geoff does not interact with any-
one except his colleagues. All his colleagues, like Geoff, are quite unsociable and
rarely talk with people outside of their department. The range of sources they
gather information from, thus, is very limited. Suppose that the Guardian never
reports anything about space projects for some unknown reasons. Since Geoff only
reads the Guardian, he knows nothing about ongoing space projects. Also, he can-
not find out about space projects by talking to his colleagues because, like Geoff,
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they only read the Guardian. In this kind of epistemic network, every member
lacks information about a specific topic because they collect information from a
small range of sources. Consequently, the information spreading in the network
is very limited. People describe the members of this network as being trapped in
an epistemic bubble where some facts are completely left out in the network they
are in. Nguyen (2018) defines an epistemic bubble as ‘a social epistemic structure
which has inadequate coverage through a process of exclusion by omission’. By the
term ‘coverage’, Nguyen refers to the variety of information sources the members
consult. When a group of individuals fail to gather information from a sufficiently
wide range of information sources, they would miss certain types of information
and be trapped in an epistemic bubble. An analogy may illustrate the problem of
an epistemic bubble: the members in an epistemic bubble are like picky eaters.
They only consume information from some specific sources and thereby know lit-
tle about things not reported by these sources.
If the only problem of an epistemic bubble is the lack of access to some kinds
of knowledge, we do not have to be too worried about this phenomenon. Since it
is impossible for one to know everything, there is no blame if one does not know
something.28 Likewise, it should be acceptable for the members of an epistemic
network to lack some knowledge. To see this, consider a Buddhist sangha. Al-
though none of its members has any knowledge in meat cooking, we would not
say that it is a defective epistemic network. The members of this group simply do
not need to know how to cook meat. Hence, it would be absurd to blame them for
lacking the knowledge they find useless. The sangha is indeed an epistemic bub-
ble, but not a culpable one. Compared to the lack of knowledge of some category, a
more serious problem, as Nguyen points out, is that people in an epistemic bubble
may have incorrect credences due to insufficient exposure to a diverse set of in-
formation sources. Consider another hypothetical scenario where an article on the
28On some occasions, one may be blamed for lacking knowledge. For instance, if a person claims
to be an expert in a field, she could be blamed if she does not know the fundamentals in that field.
This kind of case, however, does not undermine the point I want to address here. In most occasions,
one should not be blamed for failing to know certain things.
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Guardian mistakenly reports that the probability for there being more than three
hurricanes in the Atlantic this year (abbreviated as 𝑃 ) is 70%. Having read this
article, Geoff has a 0.7 credence in 𝑃 at time 𝑡1 and shares this news with one of his
colleagues. His colleague, who has also read the Guardian on that day, tells Geoff
that she has 0.7 credence in 𝑃 . With no access to any other information sources,
there is no way for Geoff to change his mind and obtain the correct credence in 𝑃 .
In addition to the problem raised by Nguyen, I here raise an even more prob-
lematic feature of an epistemic bubble. The members of an epistemic bubble,
compared to members in a normal epistemic network, are more likely to mistak-
enly hold their credences resiliently. Since they collect information from a limited
range of information sources, they are more likely to misjudge the real number
of independent information sources they consult and would thus mistakenly hold
their credences resiliently.29 Let us look at the given example again. Upon receiv-
ing his colleague’s testimony at time 𝑡2, Geoff holds his 0.7 credence in 𝑃 more
resiliently at time 𝑡2 than at 𝑡1. That is, it is harder to change Geoff’s credence
in 𝑃 at 𝑡2 than 𝑡1. Geoff’s reasoning here seems perfectly rational. He gets the
information about the expected number of hurricanes in the Atlantic from two
different sources. As the evidence provided by both sources indicates that a 0.7
credence is right, 0.7 is very likely to be the correct credence to have on this pre-
diction. Following this line of reasoning, he should hold his credence in 𝑃 more
resiliently. What he does not know is that since he is trapped in an epistemic bub-
ble together with his colleague, his colleague is not an independent information
source but one relying solely on the Guardian like he does. Failing to notice this,
Geoff does not know that the information supporting his 0.7 credence is given by
one, instead of two different information sources. Hence, he is wrong in hold-
ing his credence more resiliently at 𝑡2. From this case, we can see a much deeper
problem of epistemic bubbles. Since the members in an epistemic bubble collect
29This problem is similar to what Nguyen calls bootstrapped corroboration. Members of an epis-
temic bubble may come to be overly confident in their beliefs since every other individual they
meet share the same belief. Here what I point out is that they may not be overly confident in their
beliefs, but hold their credences overly resiliently.
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information from a limited range of sources, these sources are less likely to be in-
dependent compared to members in a normal epistemic network. This point can
be illustrated by comparing an epistemic bubble with an ideal epistemic network.
In an ideal epistemic network with 𝑛 members, every member collects informa-
tion from a different information source. Thus, the network is linked with at least
𝑛 different and mutually independent information sources. Suppose that 𝑛 is suf-
ficiently large so that the information sources are sufficiently diverse. If a mem-
ber of such a network takes every other member as an independent information
source and exchanges information with each of them, she may come to have a very
accurate credence over the proposition in question. Also, if a member of such a
network holds her credence resiliently because of the testimonies she received, she
is quite likely to be right in doing so. On the contrary, in an epistemic bubble
with 𝑛 members, the number of information sources attached to the network 𝑚 is
much smaller than 𝑛. It is then inevitable for there to be subgroups that collect
information from the same source. Hence, if the members in an epistemic bubble
exchange information with the others and take every other member as an inde-
pendent source of information, they would misjudge the number of independent
information sources they consult and mistakenly hold their credences resiliently.
From this observation, we may derive what I consider to be the key problem of
an epistemic bubble: its members do not know that they collect information from
a limited range of information sources. If the members of an epistemic network do
know that their friends and interlocutors collect information from a limited range
of sources, they would, when exchanging information with the others, know that
it is quite likely that the other members collect information from the same source
which they consult. Thus, when they receive information from other members,
they would not revise their credence as if these information comes from a new
independent source. Although these members may still have incorrect credences,
they would not mistakenly amplify the significance of the information they receive
from the others and would not hold their credences resiliently.
What makes an epistemic bubble? Nguyen points out two primary causes. If
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an individual only interacts with like-minded people, it is very likely for her to
end up in an epistemic bubble. Like-minded people have similar backgrounds
and tend to collect information from similar sources. We may think about the
previous example where Geoff, as one who only reads the Guardian, knows nothing
about space projects. He is trapped in an epistemic bubble not only because he is
picky when it comes to choosing newspaper, but also because he only interacts
with his colleagues who have the same taste in newspaper. Like-minded people
gather information from a limited set and, since a limited set of sources cannot
cover every kind of information, it is very likely for a network formed by like-
minded people to be incomplete. Put differently, like-minded people tend to omit
information of the same sort, thereby forming an epistemic bubble together.
Another major cause for epistemic bubbles is information filtering. This pro-
cess takes place whenever one intentionally picks the information for another to
consume. For instance, if a non-democratic government censors every piece of
information about democracy, its citizens would know little about other forms of
government and tend to wholeheartedly embrace a non-democratic system. A no-
table present-day example is algorithmic personal filtering, a process which filters
information for an individual based on her online browsing history. With modern
technology, websites can present its users with only the topics they are interested
in and reduce the probability for them to receive different type of information.
Such filtering blocks one away from some types of information and thus results in
epistemic bubbles.
A possible cause which Nguyen did not mention is the effect of conformity
(Asch, 1955, 1956). When people get to know the others’ credence in a propo-
sition, they tend to conform to the others and have a similar credence in the same
proposition. Asch (1955) claims that this effect is undesirable as it undermines the
significance of consensus. To see this, compare the following two cases:
Example 4.9.1. A group of 𝑛 scientists aim to find out whether a substance has
the property 𝑋. Each of them conducts an experiment and derives an outcome
about the claim they aim to verify. After everyone completes the experiment, the
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scientists meet up to share their credences and, at the end, reach a consensus.
In this kind of epistemic network, each individual verifies the claim indepen-
dently. If they end up agreeing that it is very likely that the substance does have
the property 𝑋, we may take this result as very plausible as it has been checked
with 𝑛 independently conducted experiments.30 However, the effect of conformity
contaminates this ideal picture. Consider another epistemic network:
Example 4.9.2. A group of scientists aim to find out whether a substance has the
property 𝑋. Some of them independently conduct experiments and generate out-
comes about the disputed claim, while some others choose to do nothing. After
the first group of scientists complete their experiment, the lazy scientists adopt
what they say. They come together to share their credences and, at the end, reach
a consensus.
In the first network, each member makes an experiment to test the claim sepa-
rately and hence derive their initial credences without the information provided
by the others. The final consensus they arrive at, hence, has undergone careful
scrutiny. In the second network, some members choose not to conduct any exper-
iment but simply form their credences based on the credences of the others. If
we take the process of making an experiment as consulting an independent infor-
mation source, we may infer that the second network involves less independent
information sources. Other things being equal, the diversity of the information
sources in the second network is lower than the diversity in the first. The consen-
sus reached in the second network, thus, would be less accurate compared to the
first. However, the members in the second group may not be aware of this fact.
When people exchange their beliefs in an epistemic network, they do not always
check where their peers collect their information. This result resembles an epis-
temic bubble as the members misjudge the number of information sources they
consult. In brief, the effect of conformity may reduce the number of information
sources which the members of a network consult and leads to an epistemic bubble.
30The underlying idea here is the same as Condorcet’s Jury Theorem.
156
The observation that conformity creates epistemic bubbles is pretty striking.
As the effect of conformity is quite common in real life, such discovery implies
that epistemic bubbles appear frequently. Combined with the other two major
causes Nguyen pointed out, we can conclude that we are actually very likely to
be trapped in an epistemic bubble. We all, more or less, misjudge the number of
information sources we consult and make incorrect evaluation about the resilience
of some of our credences. Consequently, we are all at high-risk from an epistemic
bubble.
4.9.2 Epistemic echo chamber
Fortunately, it is possible to get people out from an epistemic bubble. Recall that
an epistemic bubble appears when a group of people gather information from a
limited range of sources. What people in an epistemic bubble lack is not the ability
to distinguish misinformation from true information, but access to a sufficiently
diverse set of information sources. When they are exposed to a greater variety of
information sources, they would correct their credences and get out of an epis-
temic bubble.
Compared to an epistemic bubble, an epistemic echo chamber is much harder to
break. A archetypal echo chamber consists of a set of core members, call them the
gurus, and a set of peripheral members who follow the gurus. The followers take
the gurus as extremely reliable sources of information and are very confident in
all the gurus’ teachings. As one can easily see, this basic structure is very common.
For most groups, there exist some key opinion leaders whose words, for the other
members in the group, weigh much more than any other person in the world. What
makes an echo chamber distinct from other epistemic networks is that in an echo
chamber, the core members’ authority can never be defeated. Typically, the gurus
in an echo chamber tell their followers that all the information sources outside the
chamber are unreliable and seldom provide correct information. The followers,
with their great confidence in the gurus’ reliability, strongly believe what the gurus
say and see all external sources as, in most situations, unreliable. With this belief,
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the followers would never see their gurus as unreliable. To see this, we can think
about what would happen when the followers get information from the external
source. I will first consider a case where the followers get information that agrees
with the gurus, and then information that disagrees with the gurus.
Suppose there is an epistemic echo chamber in which the gurus tell their fol-
lowers that 5G towers spread a new kind of virus. One day, one of the followers
receives a piece of information from an external source, which indicates that 5G
towers do spread viruses. The follower, with the information she collected from
the external source, would think that the gurus’ teaching about 5G towers is right.
As the gurus’ teaching is confirmed, the follower is further reassured that the gu-
rus are extremely reliable. She may not, however, deem the external sources reli-
able for providing information that is in accordance with the gurus’ teachings. For
the followers, the external sources seldom report correctly. Even though one of the
external sources provides a piece of correct information about the 5G towers, they
are still quite unreliable in general and could provide incorrect information.
If, on the contrary, the incoming piece of information shows that 5G towers are
not correlated with the spread of the virus and thus shows the gurus wrong, how
would the follower react? Since they see the external sources as unreliable, they
would take the incoming information as a piece of misinformation. From their
perspective, this line of reasoning is very plausible since the gurus already told
them that the external sources are unreliable. That is, when the followers receive
a piece of information which contradicts the gurus’ teaching, the coherent way
for them to understand this fact is to deem the information incorrect and take it
as evidence showing that the external sources are indeed unreliable. Again, the
gurus’ teaching about the external sources is confirmed. Either way, the follower’s
confidence in the gurus’ reliability remains uninfluenced. They are either right
about 5G towers, or right about the external sources being unreliable.
Moreover, the followers’ beliefs echo with each other. Suppose that a group of
followers respectively receive pieces of information which contradicts the gurus’
teachings from several different sources outside the chamber. Each of them, based
158
on the assumption that the gurus are extremely reliable, derives the conclusion
that the external sources are unreliable. When they meet up to share their finding
about the external information sources, their beliefs would confirm each other’s
belief, as they all infer that the external sources are unreliable. The conclusion
they will end up with, hence, is that the external sources are extremely unreliable.
The members of an echo chamber will gradually come to be extremely confident
that all other members in the chamber, especially the gurus, are very reliable. They
will also end up being extremely confident in any information circulating in the
chamber, as the information comes from some internal sources. On the contrary,
since the external sources are deemed unreliable, members of an echo chamber
would not gather any information from them. Hence, it would be extremely hard
to convince the members of a chamber that they are wrong. Once such an echo
chamber has been established, one cannot expect to correct the members’ mistaken
credences merely by presenting them with the correct information.
4.9.3 A potential dilemma of Independence
Both epistemic bubble and echo chamber, as we have seen, bring negative effects
to their members. Thus, we should avoid being trapped in either of them. This
purpose, however, is much harder than it seems. In this section, I will argue that
if we conform to the Principle of Independence, we could be trapped in an epis-
temic bubble. On the other hand, if we reject the Principle of Independence, we
could end up in an epistemic echo chamber. Since both results are epistemically
undesirable, a dilemma arises.31
We may begin by considering the results of violating the Principle of Indepen-
dence. When an individual disagrees with a peer and chooses to reject the Princi-
ple of Independence, she would, instead of revising her credence in the disputed
claim, revise her estimate of her peer’s reliability. Let us take the two dermatol-
ogists for example again. If Stephanie does not accept the Principle of Indepen-
31Put it more precisely, it is not the case that the Steadfast View leads to an echo chamber but
trying to follow steadfast norms leads to a chamber.
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dence, she would remain steadfast regarding her judgement of the patient’s skin
condition. Still, she needs to react to the fact that Conor disagrees with her.32 As
she chooses not to revise her credence, she must revise her estimate of Conor’s
reliability. The underlying idea is that Conor has made a mistake concerning the
patient’s skin condition and is no longer Stephanie’s peer. In other words, the fact
that Conor mistakenly takes the patient as having psoriasis could be a piece of ev-
idence showing that Conor is not as reliable as Stephanie. Thus, Stephanie should
downgrade her estimate of Conor’s reliability. If she takes this as a general strategy
when involved in disagreement, she would end up in an echo chamber. According
to Nguyen’s analysis, members in an echo chamber respond to disagreement in
exactly this way. Whenever they receive information which contradicts what they
believe, they see the information source as unreliable and downgrade their esti-
mate of the reliability of the source. Consequently, members of a chamber deem
every external source unreliable and only trust the other members in the same
chamber who never reports anything that contradicts what they believe. An echo
chamber is thus formed.
Since violating the Principle of Independence leads to an unacceptable result,
conforming to the principle seems to be the only proper response. A natural re-
sponse is to turn our attention to a different question: what would happen if ev-
eryone in an epistemic network adopted the CV and conciliated with their peers
whenever a disagreement occurs? Zollman’s (2012) model of an epistemic network
provides an answer.33 Consider a group of individuals 1, . . .𝑛. Each individual is
connected to a group of other individuals, namely their neighbours. Let 𝒩𝑖 stand
for the set of 𝑖’s neighbours (𝑖 is also included in𝒩𝑖) and let 𝑐𝑖(·) stand for the func-
tion representing individual 𝑖’s credences. With this setting, we may simulate the
outcome of adopting the CV. When all the individuals conciliate with every other,
32One may argue against this point by claiming that Stephanie does not have to do anything. It
is true that nothing strictly requires Stephanie to react. However, if we take her as a rational agent,
she should react to the disagreement somehow.
33Zollman’s analysis focuses on the features of different network structures, rather than the prac-
tical results of adopting the CV. Nevertheless, his simulation does show how an epistemic network
evolves when all its members adopt the CV.
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each one takes the average of all the neighbours’ credences as their new credence.
For example, suppose that an individual 𝑤 has three neighbours 𝑥, 𝑦 and 𝑧. When
𝑤 conciliates with her neighbours concerning their credences in a proposition 𝑃 ,
she takes the linear average of her credence and all her neighbours’ credences as
her new credence in 𝑃 , which is 14(𝑐𝑤(𝑃 ) + 𝑐𝑥(𝑃 ) + 𝑐𝑦(𝑃 ) + 𝑐𝑧(𝑃 )). With a computer
simulation, Zollman shows that when all the individuals in the network conciliate
with their neighbours regarding their credences over a proposition 𝑃 , every indi-
vidual in the network comes to have the same credence over 𝑃 in a few rounds
of information exchange. That is, they reach a consensus quickly by making con-
ciliations.34 With Zollman’s simulation, we may obtain the expected result that
conforming to the Principle of Independence helps people to reach a consensus.35
Unfortunately, this result seems undesirable. When an individual chooses to
conciliate with every interlocutor whenever she is involved in disagreement, she
implicitly takes every interlocutor as an independent information source. As we
have seen, if one takes everyone else as an independent information source, one
would misjudge the real number of independent information sources one consults.
Making conciliation, thus, leads one into an epistemic bubble. To illustrate, con-
sider an epistemic network with 𝑛 members which is attached to 𝑚 independent
information sources such that 𝑚 < 𝑛. Given this assumption, we may infer that
there exists at least a pair of members in the network who consult the same infor-
mation source. When a member of this network conciliates with the other mem-
bers, what she does is to sum up everyone’s credence and divide the outcome by
𝑛. This action implicitly implies that there are 𝑛 independent information sources,
while in fact there are only 𝑚 sources. We can therefore see that one who adopts the
CV runs the risk of misjudging the number of independent information sources.
A direct result of such misjudgement is that the members would mistakenly
hold the consensus resiliently. Consider an epistemic network with 10 members
34Here I assume that the members conciliate with linear averaging. The result that individuals
reach a consensus quickly via conciliation should remain true for other average functions .
35Given Zollman’s simulation, networks of different structures reach a consensus at different
speed. Here what we care about is whether a network reaches a consensus, not the speed it reaches
consensus.
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(abbreviate as 𝒩 ). Suppose that the first and the second member collect informa-
tion from the same source and the third and the fourth collect information from a
different source. The rest of the group, similarly, form three pairs and collect infor-
mation from three different sources. When a member 𝑘 of this network conciliates
with every other, her credence would be the sum of all the members’ credences







This formula implies that there are 10 information sources, which is wrong. Now
consider another individual who collects information from a new source and meet
the then members. Let the new network be𝒩 ′. In the absence of any additional in-
formation about her reliability, one who adopts the CV would assign her credence







This is again a wrong result. Since the newcomer brings information from the
sixth source, the real weight for her credence should be one-sixth, which is much
greater than the weight assigned here. From this case, we an see that because of
the members conciliate at 𝑡1, they hold their consensus more resiliently at 𝑡2 as
it is harder to change their credence. When a new individual having a different
credence joins the network and conciliates with the others, her credence would
matter much less than it should. This outcome is problematic, as we do want the
new information to be assigned with the correct weight. We may arrive at the
conclusion that conciliating with others may make the consensus overly resilient
and eventually lead to a stubborn epistemic network.
With a review of the results of conforming to the Principle of Independence,
we may derive the result that for any network which is not an epistemic bubble,
162
it may evolve into a bubble if all its members conciliate with the others. If it
is an epistemic bubble, conciliating would make it worse. Here we can find a
potential dilemma which follows from the Principle of Independence. When one
conforms to the Principle of Independence, it would be likely for one to misjudge
the significance of one’s interlocutor’s credences and end up in a situation that
resembles an epistemic bubble. When one violates the Principle of Independence,
one would stick to one’s original credences and downgrade one’s interlocutors’
reliability. Eventually, one would get trapped in an epistemic echo chamber. We
are hence trapped in a dilemma of the Principle of Independence.
4.10 Breaking an echo chamber
The solution to the dilemma, ideally, is to adopt the Principle of Independence,
conciliate with the peer and always carefully check the number of information
sources. If one does so, one would not be trapped in an echo chamber since one
conciliates with one’s peers in a disagreement. Neither would one end up in an
epistemic bubble, as one does know the number of information sources and would
not mistakenly amplify the weight of the information one received. By doing so,
one may come to have the ideal credence concerning a proposition. However, such
a strategy is pragmatically infeasible. It is extremely difficult for one to always
check whether one’s interlocutors gather information from the same set of sources
as each other, as it is hard for one to trace the source which provides a piece of
information. As an immediate consequence, it is hard for one to always check the
number of sources one gathers information from. With this pragmatic concern, we
have to give up searching for this ideal solution and aim at a practically operable
one.
To find a feasible solution to the dilemma, we need to achieve two goals. On the
one hand, we want to update our estimate of the interlocutors’ reliability according
to the disagreement, thereby avoiding getting trapped in an epistemic bubble. If
we fail to do this, we would have to take every epistemic peer as an independent
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information source and run the risk of misjudging the number of independent
information sources. What we want, thus, is a way to revise the interlocutors’
reliability and perceive them less than fully reliable. On the other hand, we still
want to make conciliation and revise our credence in order to avoid being trapped
in an echo chamber. If we refuse to conciliate, we implicitly deem our interlocutors
unreliable. Making such a judgement merely with the evidence that we disagree,
as we have seen, leads to an epistemic echo chamber. With these concerns, we may
infer that when involved in a disagreement, we should revise both our estimate of
our interlocutors’ reliability and our credence over the disputed matter.
How should we do this? We have seen that if an individual adopts the CV,
she would revise her credence and split the difference when she disagrees with an
interlocutor. When she conciliates, she should not also revise her estimate of her
interlocutor’s reliability since, if she does so, she would contradict herself. When
she revises her estimate of her interlocutor’s reliability because of the disagree-
ment, what is implicitly shown is that she no longer sees the interlocutor as a peer.
Hence, she does not have to conciliate with her interlocutor. Put differently, if an
individual’s interlocutor is not as reliable as she is, she need not conciliate by split-
ting the difference between them. Similarly, if an individual chooses to violate the
CV and downgrade her estimate of the interlocutor’s reliability, she need not also
conciliate by splitting the difference. After all, her interlocutor is no longer her
epistemic peer after she downgrades her estimate of the interlocutor’s reliability.
She should not take her interlocutor as an epistemic peer and, at the same time,
deny her interlocutor’s status as a peer. We may see that making conciliation with
an interlocutor is incompatible with downgrading the reliability estimate of the
interlocutor. Consequently, there does not seem to be an obvious solution to the
dilemma.36
The key to untie the knot is to establish a diachronic update strategy which
36One may think that a possible strategy is do a bit of both, namely to both conciliate with the
interlocutor and downgrade the interlocutor’s reliability to a small extent. If one does so, one may
get rid of the dilemma. This solution appears to me as unacceptable. The crucial point here is that
one should not make the two moves at the same time. Once a factor is changed, there is no reason
for one to change another. Hence, the dilemma cannot be dissolved this way.
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takes the two moves at different times to avoid self-contradiction. Although the
two actions are incompatible, there is no factor which forbids one to take them
separately. When an individual disagrees with her peer, she can make a concili-
ation for the current case and downgrade her estimate of the interlocutor’s relia-
bility after the first disagreement.37 If they disagree again at some later point, she
would have a more precise estimate of the interlocutor’s reliability and would not
take the interlocutor as a peer again. If one follows this strategy, one can make
both moves without contradicting oneself.
The question that naturally follows is how, in reality, should we take the two
moves at different stages? We have already seen the way an individual conciliates,
but have not yet explored the way an individual revises her estimate of her inter-
locutors’ reliability. To develop a way for an individual to revise her estimate of an
interlocutor’s reliability, we must first reflect on the notion of reliability. A possi-
ble way of understanding this notion, albeit not the most widely adopted one, is to
take it as the probability one forms the correct credence concerning a proposition.
Given this interpretation, when two agents are equally reliable, the probability for
them to come up with the correct result is the same. For example, when we say that
one’s reliability is 0.9, what is meant is that one comes up with the correct belief
ninety percent of the time. When two individuals are of equal reliability, they are
equally likely to believe in a true proposition and reject a false one. In spite of the
intuitive plausibility of this way of understanding reliability, it is insufficient when
we adopt a probabilistic framework of doxastic states. According to this definition
of reliability, when we say that one’s reliability is 0.8, what we mean is that person
forms the correct credence for eighty percent of the time. Suppose that, given all
the background conditions, the ideal credence for one to have in 𝑃 is 𝑥. According
to the notion reliability introduced here, an individual with 0.8 reliability would
correctly form a 𝑥 credence eighty percent of the time when she is asked to eval-
37One may think that it is more reasonable to do it the other way round, namely first downgrad-
ing one’s estimate of the interlocutor’s reliability and subsequently conciliate with the interlocutor.
However, doing so implies that the peerhood between them disappears when they disagree. If one
does so, one does not seriously take one’s peer as a genuine peer but one who is likely to be false.
If one takes the assumption that one’s peer is equally reliable, one should conciliate first.
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uate 𝑃 . A problem arises when we consider the cases where the individual gets
her credence wrong. If, in the twenty percent of time in which she gets it wrong,
her credence is very close to the ideal credence 𝑥, we may still see her as a very
reliable person. On the contrary, if her credence is very far from the correct cre-
dence, we would find her unreliable. The characterisation of reliability introduced
is incomplete for failing to capture such a difference. To illustrate, imagine a more
concrete case in which Rachael, one who has rheumatoid arthritis, claims that she
can correctly predict the probability of rain tomorrow. Let us suppose that the
Met Office provides perfect weather predictions. The ideal credence one should
have, thus, should be the same as the report provided by the Met Office. If the
Met Office announces that the probability of raining tomorrow is 60%, one should
have a 0.6 credence in there being a rain tomorrow. When Rachael is asked to pre-
dict the weather, she gets eight correct predictions out of ten tries. For the other
two tries, her prediction deviates from the correct number within a three percent
range. In such a case, Rachael is very reliable in making weather predictions. Her
predictions, although sometimes incorrect, are all very close to the real probabil-
ity of raining. On the contrary, if Rachael is drastically wrong for twenty percent
of time and makes predictions that radically deviate from the reports made by
the Met Office, she would be deemed quite unreliable. However, according to the
definition of reliability, Rachael is equally reliable in the two cases. As this is a
counterintuitive result, the traditional definition should be elaborated if we adopt
a probabilistic framework of doxastic states.
Knowing that the notion of reliability should not merely be construed as the
frequency one has a correct credence, we should reformulate the notion in a way
which takes the magnitude one’s credence deviates from the ideal credence into
account.38 We should not only care about the frequency, but also the magnitude
one’s credence deviates from the correct credence to have over a proposition. More
importantly, we need to know the direction one’s credence deviates from the cor-
38The notion I appeal to here is similar to the notion of accuracy which has been discussed by
the accuracy-first epistemologists. For an explanation of the notion of accuracy, see Leitgeb and
Pettigrew (2010).
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rect credence. Following this line of thought, one’s reliability could be measured
in several new ways. One of the possibilities that I would like to explore here
is to consider the average difference between one’s credence and the correct cre-
dence across a set of propositions. For every proposition in a domain, we may
subtract the ideal credence from one’s credence and calculate the average of the
outcomes. The result may be taken as a factor for us to derive one’s reliability
concerning propositions in this domain. If we define one’s reliability in terms of
the average difference between one’s credence and the ideal credence for a set of
propositions, both the frequency and the magnitude one’s credence deviates from
the ideal credence could be taken as factors determining one’s reliability. For ex-
ample, consider an individual who has a credence 𝑥 over the proposition 𝑃 at time
𝑡1 while the ideal credence to have in 𝑃 is 𝑦. If we know that she gets her credence
wrong by the magnitude 𝑥 − 𝑦 at 𝑡1, when she forms a 𝑧 credence over a similar
proposition 𝑃 ′ at some later time 𝑡2, we can take the value 𝑥 − 𝑦 as a factor for our
estimate of the magnitude 𝑧 deviates from the correct credence at time 𝑡2.3940 By
doing so, our notion of reliability not only involves the frequency one gets thing
wrong, but also the extent one gets thing wrong.
How should we formulate this new notion of reliability? We could answer this
question in a formal setting. Given a set of possible worlds Ω, we may construct a
39Here what I mean by a similar proposition is one concerning a similar subject matter. Since the
propositions are about similar subject matters, one can take the track record of the disagreements
happened between one and one’s peer into account. One may challenge this idea and claim that
one may not be systematically biased. The extent one’s credence deviates from the correct credence
may not be a stable value. One may have an extremely incorrect credence concerning a proposition,
yet have a perfectly right regarding another proposition. I agree that this could happen. However,
it seems to me that the only possible way of capturing such instability of one’s credence is to take
the calculate the average difference between one’s credence and the correct credence.
40It should be noted that the negation of a proposition 𝑃 , although concerning the same subject
matter, should not be counted as a similar one. What we intend to record here is the average
difference between one’s credence and one’s peer’s credence over a set of similar propositions. If the
set contains both a proposition and its negation, the average difference between one’s credence and
the ideal credence would always be zero. For example, if one has 0.2 credence over a proposition
𝑃 , one would have a 0.8 credence over the negation of 𝑃 . If the ideal credence to have over 𝑃 is 𝑥,
the difference between one’s credence and the ideal credence over 𝑃 is 0.8− 𝑥. We may derive that
the difference between one’s credence and the ideal credence over ¬𝑃 is 0.2− (1−𝑥). The sum of the
two values would be 0. It can thus be seen that if we take both a proposition and its negation into
consideration, the information we gather would be useless. Hence, the set we consider needs to be
a consistent one which contains no contradictory pairs.
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set of propositions based on Ω. Let this set of propositions be 2Ω. Suppose there
is an individual 𝐴 whose doxastic state can be represented by a credence func-
tion 𝑐𝐴(·). Further assume that there is an omniscient function 𝑐 which, for every
proposition, generates the ideal credence for one to have. Let 𝑑(·, ·) be a function
which measures the difference between two credences such that 𝑑(𝑥,𝑦) = 𝑥 − 𝑦.41
To tell how reliable 𝐴 is, we need to consider the average difference between the
omniscient function 𝑐(·) and 𝐴’s credence function 𝑐𝐴(·) over a set of propositions







The outcome of this formula is the average difference between 𝐴’s credence and
the ideal credence 𝐴 should have regarding every proposition in 𝑆.43 Suppose the
average difference between 𝐴’s credence and the ideal credence for all the proposi-
tions in 𝑆 is ∆𝐴. When 𝐴 forms a credence concerning a new proposition 𝑃 ′ which
is not in 𝑆, we can anticipate 𝑑(𝑐𝐴(𝑃 ′), 𝑐(𝑃 ′)), namely the difference between 𝐴’s
credence in 𝑃 ′ and the ideal credence to have in 𝑃 ′, to be ∆𝐴. Hence, we may take
𝐴’s credence as an indicator which allows us to derive the ideal credence. Think
about a simple case in which 𝐴’s credence is always 0.3 short of the ideal credence.
The average difference between 𝐴’s credence and the ideal credence ∆𝐴 equals 0.3.
When we find out that 𝐴’s credence in 𝑃 is 𝑥 but do not know the ideal credence to
have, we could derive that 𝑥−(−0.3) is the ideal credence to have based on 𝐴’s track
41Here I take the function as measuring the difference between two values for sake of simplicity,
namely the result the first value subtracts the second. One can pick a different distance measure
based on one’s requirements.
42As previously mentioned, this set should not contain any contradictory pair.
43It should be noted here that the value is generated by 𝐴’s credence minus the ideal credence.
If we switch the order and calculate the average of the outcome 𝑐(·) minus 𝑐𝐴(·), the result would
be the additive inverse of the average of 𝑐𝐴(·) minus 𝑐(·). Another point that need to be mentioned
is that I take the difference between two values, instead of the absolute value of their difference
as the factor determining the outcome. By measuring the difference between them, we can keep
track of the direction one’s credence deviates from the ideal credence. That is, one’s credence is
sometimes higher and sometimes lower than the ideal credence. If we track the absolute value of
their difference, we would not be able to record the direction one’s credence deviates from the ideal
credence.
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record. If it turns out that 𝑑(𝑐𝐴(𝑃 ′), 𝑐(𝑃 ′)) is smaller than ∆𝐴, we should update our
estimate and derive a new estimate ∆′𝐴 which is the updated expected difference
between 𝐴’s credence and the ideal credence. This new estimate is equivalent to:
1





Next time when we see 𝐴 trying to come up with a credence in another proposition,
we would expect the difference between 𝐴’s credence and the ideal credence to
be ∆′𝐴. If 𝑑(𝑐𝐴(𝑃
′), 𝑐(𝑃 ′)) is greater than ∆𝐴, we should revise our expectation in
the same way and derive another value ∆′′𝐴 which is greater than ∆𝐴. When 𝐴
faces a new proposition and needs to come up with a credence, we could expect
the difference between 𝐴’s credence and the ideal credence to be greater than ∆𝐴.
With this process, we can gradually revise the estimated difference between 𝐴’s
credence and the ideal credence. We may, with the notion of average difference,
derive a new notion of reliability to replace the one we discussed.
To see how the overall process works, consider the following example:
Example 4.10.1. Stephanie is a dermatologist whose credences can be represented
by the function 𝑐𝑆 . Let 𝑃𝑖 stand for the proposition that the 𝑖-th patient has atopic
eczema and 𝑐 stand for a omniscient function which generates the ideal credence to
have in a proposition. Suppose that Stephanie’s credences and the ideal credences
in 𝑃𝑖 are distributed as the following:
𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3
𝑐𝑆(·) 0.3 0.2 0.5
𝑐(·) 0.45 0.15 0.55
𝑐𝑆(·)− 𝑐(·) -0.15 0.05 -0.05
Given this distribution, we may derive the following result:
1
|{𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3}|





It can thus be derived that ∆𝑆 in this case is −0.05. That is, the value generated
by 𝑐𝑆 is on average 0.05 lower than the ideal credence. Suppose we, at some later
time, find out that the value of 𝑐𝑆(𝑃4) is 0.3 but do not know the ideal credence to
have over 𝑃4. Given the record of the differences between 𝑐𝑆(·) and 𝑐(·) regarding
𝑃1, 𝑃2 and 𝑃3, we can derive the ideal credence to have over 𝑃4 by subtracting the
average difference ∆𝑆 from 𝑐𝑆(𝑃4), which is is 0.35. If we find out later that the
ideal credence to have over 𝑃4, as generated by 𝑐, turns out to be 0.45, the average
difference between 𝑐𝑆 and 𝑐 would become 0.1. With this result, we need to update
∆𝑆 and take its value as −0.1. When we know Stephanie’s credence over another
proposition 𝑃5, we should take 𝑐𝑆(𝑃5)−∆𝑆 as the ideal credence to have concerning
𝑃5.44
Based on this new definition of one’s reliability, we may now develop a different
response to disagreement which may get us rid of the dilemma of independence.
Recall that the purpose of knowing a person’s reliability is to derive the correct
credence for one to have given that person’s credence. To achieve this goal, we
need to know the average difference between that person’s credence and the ideal
credence. With the information that, in general, a person’s credence is short of
the ideal credence by ∆, we may calibrate a person’s credence and gradually get
closer to the ideal credence. That person’s credence, in such a case, is taken as an
indicator for the ideal credence to have over the proposition in dispute.
Based on the idea that we can obtain the ideal credence by taking the inter-
locutor’s credence as an indicator, we can develop a method which calculates the
expected difference between an individual’s credence and the outcome of the con-
ciliation between that individual and another. Suppose there are two individuals
𝐴 and 𝐵. Let their credence functions respectively be 𝑐𝐴(·) and 𝑐𝐵(·). Both func-
tions, like normal probability functions, assign a value in the interval [0,1] to every
44A potential worry here is that the outcome may violate the axioms of probability. That is, if we
subtract one’s credence with a value, the outcome may be lower than 0 or greater than 1. In such
cases, we should simply take the extreme values, namely 0 and 1, as the outcome. If one’s credence
is always significantly higher than the ideal credence, when one’s credence is very low, it should be
acceptable to just take the outcome as 0.
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proposition in 2Ω. With this basic setting, we can calculate the average difference
between their credences and the outcomes of their conciliations in the same way
we calculate the average difference between one’s credence and the ideal credence.
Suppose that 𝐴 and 𝐵 disagree over a set of propositions 𝑆. 𝐴 conciliates with
𝐵 by splitting the difference and adopts the outcome as her new credence. The
ideal credence for them to have in this case, namely the result of conciliation, is
1
2(𝑐𝐴(𝑃 ) + 𝑐𝐵(𝑃 )) for some 𝑃 ∈ 𝑆. From 𝐴’s perspective, the next time 𝐵 disagrees
with her over a proposition, she needs to calibrate 𝐵’s credence with the average
difference between the result of their conciliation and 𝐵’s credence in the past,










Here I use ∆𝐴𝐵 to stand for the magnitude 𝐴 should calibrate 𝐵’s credence. The
value 12(𝑐𝐴(𝑋) + 𝑐𝐵(𝑋)) is the outcome of their conciliation concerning 𝑋. What we
measure with this formula is the average difference between the values of 𝑐𝐵(𝑋)
and 12(𝑐𝐴(𝑋) + 𝑐𝐵(𝑋)) across all propositions in 𝑆. This outcome is the magnitude
𝐴 should calibrate 𝐵’s credence when they disagree. When 𝐴 disagrees with 𝐵
over a new proposition 𝑃 which is not in 𝑆 but similar to the elements of 𝑆, 𝐴
should conciliate with 𝐵 by calibrating 𝐵’s credence in 𝑃 with the value ∆𝐴𝐵 and
take the outcome as her new credence in 𝑃 . Moreover, she needs to update ∆𝐴𝐵 by
calculating the value of
∆𝐴𝐵 =
1







This updated value is the average difference across all propositions they have dis-
agreed upon, including the new proposition 𝑃 . Next time they disagree over an-
other proposition, 𝐴 should calibrate 𝐵’s credence with this updated ∆𝐴𝐵.
As we can see, the value derived this way is not really one’s reliability. It is a
agent-relative value which varies with the individuals involved. That is, for an-
other individual 𝐶 whose credences differ from 𝐴’s, the magnitude 𝐶 has to cali-
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brate when she disagrees with 𝐵 would be different from ∆𝐴𝐵. Although it is not
the notion of reliability we are familiar with, it does provide an useful guide for
an individual to calibrate her credences.
We may consider a concrete example to see how this update strategy is carried
out. Suppose that the dermatologist Stephanie disagrees with Conor concerning a
patient’s skin condition. Stephanie has a 0.7 credence that the patient has atopic
eczema, while Conor has only 0.3 credence in the claim. Stephanie, as an open-
minded person, wants to make a conciliation. Since they have never disagreed in
the past, Stephanie sees Conor as an epistemic peer who is equally reliable as her-
self. Thus, she conciliates with Conor and forms a 0.5 credence in the patient hav-
ing eczema after realising that Conor’s credence differs from hers. However, this
is not the whole story. Since Stephanie knows that Conor’s credence concerning
the patient’s having atopic eczema is 0.2 short of the outcome of conciliation, she
realises that she has to calibrate Conor’s credence next time when they disagree.
Suppose that, at some later point, they face a different patient who has a skin con-
dition similar to the first patient. After checking the evidence, Conor forms a 0.4
credence over the second patient having atopic eczema, while Stephanie’s credence
is 0.7. In this case, how should Stephanie conciliate with Conor? Stephanie knows
that Conor’s credence is 0.2 lower than the outcome of conciliation on this kind
of problem last time. Knowing that Conor’s credence in the second patient hav-
ing eczema is 0.4, Stephanie should calibrate and take 0.6 as the correct credence.
Also, she needs to update the magnitude she has to calibrate. If, in the second
case, they do conciliate as if they are epistemic peers, the outcome of conciliation
would be 0.55. The difference between Conor’s credence and the outcome is thus
0.15. Knowing this, Stephanie should update the magnitude she should calibrate
by averaging this value and the old one. The result she gets would thus be 0.175. If
they see a third patient, Stephanie should calibrate Conor’s credence by this value
and take the outcome as the correct credence.
By following this update strategy, Stephanie does conciliate with Conor. She
does not retain her original credence, but instead takes Conor’s credence into con-
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sideration when forming her new credence on the dispute. On the other hand, she
also revises her estimate of Conor’s reliability based on the disagreement. The ac-
tion of recalculating the average difference between two credence functions after a
disagreement generates the extent one’s credence deviates from the result of con-
ciliation, and hence tells us how reliable one is. The process of deriving ∆, hence,
could be understood as a process of updating one’s reliability. Following this strat-
egy, one may both conciliate with one’s interlocutor and update the interlocutor’s
reliability.
Given this strategy, how should one deal with cases involving more than two
individuals? Suppose an individual 𝐴 disagrees with two individuals 𝐵 and 𝐶,
how should 𝐴 conciliate with both them and revise her estimate of the reliability
of them? In such a case, 𝐴 should first calibrate both 𝐵 and 𝐶’s credences sepa-
rately. That is, 𝐴 should calibrate 𝐵’s credence with the average difference between
𝐵’s credences and the results of their conciliation, namely ∆𝐴𝐵. Also, 𝐴 should
calibrate 𝐶’s credence in the same way with ∆𝐴𝐶 . The calibrated credence of both
𝐵 and 𝐶, supposedly, are the credences for 𝐴 to adopt. Since both 𝐵 and 𝐶’s cre-
dences are calibrated, the two values should be equally close to the ideal credence
for 𝐴 to have. Hence, 𝐴 should adopt the average of the two values as her credence
over the disputed matter. By expanding the result derived from this case, we may
see how to apply the update strategy to a case involving multiple individuals.
How does this new way of conciliating get rid of the dilemma of Independence?
It should be clear that, if an individual follows this strategy, she conciliates with
her interlocutors when they disagree as she changes her credence. Since she adopts
the others’ view concerning the dispute and does not immediately see others as
unreliable, she would not be trapped in an epistemic echo chamber. On the other
hand, an individual following this strategy would not easily end up in an epis-
temic bubble, since she does not see everyone as a fully reliable and independent
information source. She admits that her interlocutors are less than fully reliable
and sometimes provide biased or inaccurate information. Hence, she would not
adopt her interlocutors’ credences without doubt but would calibrate them. If ev-
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ery member of an epistemic network adopts this strategy, the probability for them
to misjudge the number of independent information sources would be reduced. As
a consequence, the probability for this epistemic network to evolve into an epis-
temic bubble could also be reduced.
One may challenge this approach by pointing out that those who adopt this
strategy may still misjudge the number of information sources. That is, it is still
possible for there to be several individuals in the same epistemic network who
collect information from the same source. In such a case, the problem that the
individuals mistakenly amplify the importance of some pieces of information may
arise. Indeed, it is possible for there to be multiple individuals collecting informa-
tion from the same source. However, since what we consider are not the credences
of these individuals but the calibrated credences of them, it is not the case that all
of them are treated as fully reliable individuals collecting information from mu-
tually independent sources. We may illustrate this with a toy example. Consider
a group of five individuals 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷 and 𝐸 where 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝐶 have the same cre-
dence 𝑥 over a proposition 𝑃 since they collect information from the same source.
On the other hand, 𝐷 collects information from another source and has the cre-
dence 𝑦 over 𝑃 . Let their credence functions respectively be 𝑐𝐴(·), 𝑐𝐵(·), 𝑐𝐶(·), 𝑐𝐷(·)
and 𝑐𝐸(·), we may derive that
𝑐𝐴(𝑃 ) = 𝑐𝐵(𝑃 ) = 𝑐𝐶(𝑃 ) = 𝑥, 𝑐𝐷(𝑃 ) = 𝑦.




Such a result is far from ideal. 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝐶 collect information from the same source
and form the same credence in 𝑃 . Their credence 𝑥 should be counted only once.
When all the members conciliate by adopting the average as their new credence,
the credence 𝑥 is assigned with an incorrect weight and thus mistakenly amplified.
This, as we have seen, is a typical case where conciliation leads to an epistemic
bubble.
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What would happen if they calibrate each other’s credence? We may consider
this from the fifth individual 𝐸’s perspective. Suppose that 𝐸 comes in and cal-
ibrates the others’ credences according to the record of the disagreements that




(3𝑥 −∆𝐸𝐴 −∆𝐸𝐵 −∆𝐸𝐶 + 𝑦 −∆𝐸𝐷).
𝐸 forms her credence in 𝑃 with several factors, including the others’ credences in
𝑃 , her own credence in 𝑃 and the average difference between her credences and
the others’ credences over other propositions. Since such an outcome involves
several factors which need to be derived from 𝐸’s perspective, it is unlikely for the
other members of this network to have the same credence as 𝐸 does.45 Consider
𝐷’s credence. Suppose that 𝐸’s credence over 𝑃 is 𝑧. If 𝐷 adopts the strategy I
proposed, her credence would be
1
4
(3𝑥 −∆𝐷𝐴 −∆𝐷𝐵 −∆𝐷𝐶 + 𝑧 −∆𝐷𝐸).
Since there are many factors involved, the probability for 𝐷 and 𝐸 to have the same
credence is low. For this reason, it is quite unlikely for the members in the group to
reach a consensus. If all of them, instead of making a simple conciliation, choose to
calibrate the others’ credences, all their credences would more or less be different.
A direct consequence is that the members would not be overly confident in their
credences. Recall that when every member in a network has the same credence
over a proposition, it is likely for them to very confident in holding their credence.
In such a group, it is quite natural for one to think that one’s credence is the correct
one. After all, everyone else shares exactly the same credence. Such a case would
easily collapse into an epistemic bubble, as the members are overly confident in
45Here what I meant by 𝐸’s perspective is the difference between 𝐸’s credence and the others’
credences in the past, namely ∆𝐸𝐴, ∆𝐸𝐵, ∆𝐸𝐶 and ∆𝐸𝐷 . It is possible that the sum of these values
happen to coincide with the average difference between another individual and the other members.
Hence, it is possible that another member calibrates the others’ credences and get the same outcome
as 𝐸. However, the probability for such cases is low as too many factors are involved.
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their credences. If, on the contrary, every member’s credences always differ from
others’ credences to some extent, members in the group would be more cautious
and less confident in holding their credences. They do find the others having simi-
lar credences over some propositions, but their credences always deviate to at least
a small extent. Thus, the reason for one to hold fast one’s credence is much weaker.
The probability of forming an epistemic bubble, therefore, would be lower.46
4.11 Conclusion
Epistemologists in the past have aimed to find an ultimate solution to disagree-
ment which deals with all kinds of cases in a impeccable way. This project looks
impractical. No matter whether one conciliates, it is always possible for one to end
up with the incorrect credence. That is, there does not seem to exist a single solu-
tion which completely gets us rid of the probability of having a wrong credence. A
possible and more practical goal is to develop a diachronic strategy which leads to
the least problematic result in the long run. In other words, for the study of dis-
agreement to be genuinely fruitful, what we should do is not to aim for an one-shot
solution, but a solution which gradually leads us to an ideal outcome.
Apart from getting us out of the dilemma of Independence, the strategy I pro-
pose here has an additional advantage. It provides a better response to cases of
idealised disagreement. Traditionally, one’s reliability is taken as a static notion
determined by factors that are independent from the disagreement, such as the
training one has received. On the contrary, my strategy does not need these ex-
ternal factors. One’s reliability can be determined solely with the track record of
previous disagreements between the interlocutors. Hence, this strategy provides a
better response to idealised cases of peer disagreement where all the disagreeing
peers are equal regarding the external factors. For the same reason, the strategy
46A standing worry is that one may not be systematically biased. That is, we are in no position to
claim that when an individual 𝐴 is biased regarding a proposition 𝑝1, she is also biased regarding
another proposition 𝑝2. A possible solution is to claim that all these propositions involved are in
the same category and hence similar in their content. As a result, it is reasonable for us to assume
that one is systematically biased.
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also tells us how, in the absence of additional information, we should calibrate a
person’s reliability.
Since this strategy gets people out of the dilemma between an epistemic bubble
and an echo chamber, it should be adopted as a general strategy for one to update
her credence upon knowing the credences of others. The next step for us to take,
therefore, is to explore the features of this strategy and examine it by simulat-
ing the practical results it brings. Moreover, we can review previous discussions
concerning peer disagreement in light of this new strategy. By doing so, a huge




A pluralistic View of Formal Methods
In this last chapter, I critically review the projects introduced in this thesis and
draw a conclusion concerning the use of formal tools in philosophical research.
The three projects share a common theme: philosophers should consider a suf-
ficiently wide range of formal tools when facing philosophical problems. What is
shown, substantially, is that philosophers sometimes make hasty generalisations
when deriving normative claims with a formal approach. Recall that there are
two primary uses of formal philosophy. On the one hand, we take formal appara-
tuses as handy tools for describing a philosophical position. With the help of for-
mal apparatuses, philosophers can deal with problems under a more fine-grained
framework and obtain results that are more accurate. On the other hand, when we
model a philosophical position with a formal theory, the constraints of the formal
theory can be taken as norms governing the philosophical position modelled. By
applying formal tools, philosophers can derive normative results concerning the
philosophical position modelled. However, there exists an asymmetry between the
two uses of formal apparatuses. When a philosopher aims to formally describe a
philosophical position, she only needs to find a single theory which correctly cap-
tures the features of the position. On the contrary, when a philosopher intends to
derive a normative claim about a position, she should consider a variety of formal
theories which can model the position in question.
All three chapters serve as examples showing the point I intend to make. In
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the second chapter, we see that Koscholke and Schippers implicitly argue against
the idea of measuring coherence in terms of relevance. They claim that there is no
relevance-sensitive measure of coherence which does not suffer from the problem
of common cause. Hence, all these measures fail to correctly capture the notion of
coherence.
The problem of their reasoning lies in the assumption that they have examined
all the relevance-sensitive measure of coherence. With the modified version of
these measures, I have shown that the conclusion to be drawn is not that coher-
ence should not be measured by relevance, but that an important factor, namely
the number of confirmation relations, should be considered when we measure the
coherence of a set. Thus, what Koscholke and Schippers argue for is the normative
claim that the notion of relevance should not be taken to measure the coherence of
a set, but what I show, in opposition to their claim, is that the notion of coherence
can be measured in terms of relevance if we adopt a different averaging function.
We may therefore see a case in which philosophers fail to consider alternative av-
eraging functions and end up with a fallacious normative result.
The third chapter, similarly, shows that a normative conclusion needs to be
supported by a complete exploration of different formal tools. In the debate over
whether to conciliate in a disagreement, some philosophers mistakenly take lin-
ear averaging as the only method for us to conciliate. In other words, they equate
conciliating to conciliating with linear averaging. Based on this incorrect assump-
tion, they conclude that conciliating leads to some significant formal deficiencies.
What I point out is that there are at least three averaging functions which peo-
ple can adopt to conciliate. Hence, one should not take linear averaging as the
only method for conciliating but should consider every possibility. If we adopt
the nonlinear averaging functions to make conciliation, we can avoid some of the
problems philosophers pointed out.
The fourth chapter illustrates a different point that if one attempts to use a for-
mal theory descriptively and models a philosophical notion, one need not consider
all the possibilities. In the project, I introduced a dilemma concerning the Princi-
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ple of Independence. The key to avoiding the problem, I argue, is to formulate the
notion of reliability in a new way and, based on this new formulation of reliability,
develop a new strategy for updating our estimate of our interlocutor’s reliability.
By doing so, one can avoid the potential pitfalls.
Although the two uses are intertwined and sometimes hard to clearly sepa-
rate, we may still draw a conclusion from the case studies provided in this thesis:
philosophers should embrace a pluralistic view of formal methods and explore, to
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